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1. General Introduction
One of the central questions defining the field of Economics is how scarce goods
should be allocated among a pool of economic agents. Since at least the seminal
work of Akerlof (1970), asymmetric information became a focus of study as a
major source of inefficiencies in many markets. This dissertation consists of three
self-contained papers on this topic: Two mechanism design papers aiming at the
strategyproof elicitation of private information, and one dynamic pricing paper
where sellers can screen private information with continuous price paths. The
chapters are linked through the presence of capacity constraints as a common
theme.
Chapter 2 is joint work with Felix Jarman. We derive mechanisms that maximize
a budget-constrained procurer’s payoff under ex-post constraints. Chapter 3, also
joint with Felix Jarman, is a note that formulates a revelation principle in terms
of payoff for deterministic mechanisms under ex-post constraints. In Chapter 4, I
investigate the interaction between forward-looking buyers and multiple sellers in
a continuous-time revenue management setting.
I Chapter 2 and 3
Public procurement affects a substantial share of world trade flows, amounting
to 10 - 25 % of GDP. According to the European Commission,1 16 % of the EU
GDP stems from public procurement. As a consequence, even small increases in
efficiency amount to billions of dollars saved. Many procurement commissions are
endowed with a fixed budget, and they are allowed to finance as many projects as
the budget allows. In such settings, problems often arise as the allocated funding
may be insufficient and hence bidders default. Either the provider goes bankrupt
1Source: http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/accessing-markets/public-procurement/
1
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which means the project is not provided and the money is lost, or he requests
additional funding. The second and the third chapter address mechanism design
under such ex-post constraints.
For example, a development fund with a fixed budget wants to install wells for
heterogeneous developing communities. The fund knows how much it values water
supply for those communities, but does not know the wells’ building costs. The
communities cannot pay for the well themselves. Hence, costs have to be covered
by a compensation payment out of the procurer’s budget. We ask the question,
how should the budget be allocated, and which projects should be implemented?
Crucially, how can this be done when the budget and the participation constraint
hold ex-post. That is, for every possible state of the world, the sum of transfers
does not exceed the budget and costs are always fully compensated. We find that
the optimal allocation can be implemented with a descending-clock auction with
deferred-acceptance rule.
Without informational asymmetries, this problem is the classical knapsack prob-
lem: The procurer can carry up to B kg/lbs in a knapsack, and faces a set of
items, each characterized by a value and a weight. He wants to maximize the
aggregate value packed without exceeding the weight limit. We add asymmetric
information to this setting: We want the items to tell us their weight, and use
transfers to provide incentives. The combinatorial problems arising due to the
ex-post budget constraint make Vickrey-Clarke-Groves outcomes almost impossi-
ble to compute. Because we impose individual rationality, incentive compatibility
and the budget constraint ex-post, we cannot solve the problem using standard
pointwise optimization techniques. In settings as described above, insights from
mechanism design under ex-ante or interim constraints are not directly applicable.
Instead, we derive a set of properties that every optimal mechanism must have.
First, we show that strategyproofness (ex-post incentive compatibility) implies
that the optimal mechanism is a cutoff mechanism: Every project obtains an indi-
vidual cutoff cost level determined by others’ cost reports, and gets implemented
if and only if the own cost is below the cutoff. Second, we show that the optimal
allocation rule has substitutes. That is, if a project gets implemented, it also
gets implemented when, all else equal, another project’s cost increases. Third,
the optimal allocation rule has non-bossy winners. That is, an individual provider
who is implemented cannot affect the allocation without losing his own allocation
status. These three properties imply that the optimal mechanism belongs to a
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special class of deferred-acceptance auctions, recently introduced by Milgrom and
Segal (2014).
They show that any DA auction has a corresponding implementation with a
descending-clock auction with a deferred-acceptance rule: Each agent faces a clock
with a continuously decreasing price, and indicates whether he is willing to pro-
vide the project for the price currently shown on his clock. The optimal allocation
takes a simple form in the symmetric case, when all projects have the same value
and costs are drawn from the same distribution: All projects get the same transfer
and the most expensive projects are rejected iteratively until the budget suffices.
A single price clock can implement this allocation by having projects drop at their
reservation prices out over time. However, when projects are asymmetric, every
project is assigned an individual clock. Clocks not only descend asynchronously,
sometimes individual clocks have to stop. This is due to a quantity-quality trade-
off: The procurer not only prefers high-value projects over low-value projects, but
also prefers more over fewer projects. If the procurer did always implement the
best projects, the properties of the allocation rule enforce that the number of
conducted projects is reduced.
In Chapter 3, we address that the classical revelation principle does not hold
when attention is restricted to deterministic mechanisms. However, we show that
deterministic direct truthful mechanisms are optimal when constraints have to
hold ex-post.
II Chapter 4
The final chapter deals with revenue management. Revenue management is the
technical term for dynamic pricing under capacity constraints with heterogeneous
consumers and a deadline before which the good has to be sold. It is practiced
in multimillion dollar businesses such as airlines, hotels, cruise ships, rental cars,
seasonal clothing, sporting events and many more. The lead example for this
literature is the sale of airline tickets: There is a fixed number of seats on a
plane and having a ticket loses its value after departure. Almost all such papers
consider a monopolistic seller, although the markets of application are almost
never monopolistic. I address this gap in the literature by considering oligopolistic
competition on the seller side.
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I find that for all model parameters for which a monopolist would want to sell all
his goods with probability one, the same price path, the same allocation, the same
consumer surplus and the same industry profit is obtained under monopoly and
under oligopoly. The intuition is that, because the good is scarce, a seller does
not want to undercut every price, because he can just let his competitors sell out
and thereby become a monopolist. Because forward-looking buyers arbitrage away
any differences between current and future prices, prices are a martingale. Hence,
in equilibrium a seller is at each time indifferent between selling the current and
selling the next item, exactly as a monopolist.
In contrast to static models, I can elaborate on differences between sellers with and
without the ability to commit to future prices. While a seller with commitment
power might be able to commit to withhold some capacity of the good profitably,
this may not be the case when she lacks the commitment power. In equilibrium,
sellers replicate sequential Dutch auctions by continuously decreasing the price. As
a purely technical contribution, I generalize the continuous-time inertia approach
by Bergin and MacLeod (1993) to stochastic games with private information.
2. Ex-post Optimal Knapsack
Procurement
with Felix Jarman
I Introduction
We study the problem of a procurer who can spend a fixed budget on any of n avail-
able projects which differ in the value the designer derives from them. Projects
(agents) have private information about their costs and want to get funding beyond
the necessary minimum. The designer’s goal is to select an affordable set of max-
imal aggregate quality. In other words, she faces a mechanism design variant of
the knapsack problem with strategic behavior due to informational asymmetries.1
Essentially, we approach this problem as an “up to possibly n-units” procurement
problem with n agents with single-unit supply where demand quantity is deter-
mined after observing projects’ reports under a budget constraint. The budget
constraint, the individual rationality constraints, and the incentive compatibility
constraints are imposed ex-post, i.e., for any cost realization, implemented projects
are always at least fully compensated, the sum of transfers must not exceed the
budget, and truth-telling must be a (weakly) dominant strategy. We find that the
optimal mechanism can be implemented with a descending-clock auction with a
deferred acceptance rule. Because of a tradeoff between quantity and quality, an
optimal price clock may have to stop for a period of time leading to instances in
which an inferior project is implemented instead of a superior one.
This framework matches a large range of allocation problems, in which a designer
needs to allocate a divisible but fixed capacity among agents. Allocation problems,
1The knapsack problem is a classical combinatorial problem, dating as far back as 1897. A
set of items is assigned values and weights. The knapsack should be filled with the maximal
value, but can carry only up to a given weight. For an overview of the literature on knapsack
problems, see Kellerer, Pferschy, and Pisinger (2004).
5
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in which a financial budget constraint represents the fixed capacity, include the
procurement of bus lines, bridges, and streets, or the allocation of subsidies or
research money. Alternatively, the capacity constraint can represent the payload
limit on a freighter or on a space shuttle,2 or a limited amount of time to be
devoted to several tasks. Out of many suitable applications, we employ as our
leading example a development fund that desires to distribute money to nonprofit
projects with nonmonetary benefits.
Our paper not only helps to understand a class of economically relevant problems,
the framework also presents a novel methodological challenge. The ex-post nature
of both the participation and the budget constraint precludes the use of standard
pointwise optimization techniques a` la Myerson (1981). Nonetheless, rewriting the
problem involves expressing expected transfers in terms of the allocation function
as an auxiliary step. As the designer maximizes expected payoff including residual
money, we can employ the procurement analogue of Myerson’s notion of “virtual
values”. However, our results qualitatively translate to a setting in which the
designer does not value residual money.
By focusing on strategyproof deterministic mechanisms, we can reduce the prob-
lem to finding a set of optimal cutoff functions zi that, for each project i, map the
cost vector of other projects c−i into a cutoff cost level. Project i is conducted
if and only if i’s cost report falls weakly below cutoff zi(c−i) and the correspond-
ing compensation payment for that case equals the cutoff zi(c−i). In optimum,
these cutoff functions implement an allocation rule that exhibits certain properties.
First, the optimal allocation rule has substitutes: Given a project is implemented
for some cost vector, it is also implemented when, all else being equal, the cost
of a rival project is increased. Second, the optimal allocation rule has non-bossy
winners: A single project that is implemented cannot affect the allocation without
changing its own allocation status. Third, the optimal allocation rule excludes all
projects with negative “virtual surplus” from the allocation.
By virtue of these properties, any optimal mechanism has an equivalent deferred
acceptance (DA) auction representation as described in Milgrom and Segal (2014).
A DA auction is an iterative algorithm that computes the allocation and transfers
of an auction mechanism and possesses attractive features with respect to bidders’
2Clearly, the capacity of a space shuttle is limited. The problem of optimally allocating
the capacity and incentivizing projects to reduce payload is economically relevant, see Ledyard,
Porter, and Wessen (2000).
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incentives that go beyond dominant-strategy implementability. First, in any DA
auction, revealing the type truthfully is an “obviously dominant strategy” as de-
fined by Li (2015).3 Second, any DA auction is weakly group-strategyproof. In
other words, it is impossible for a coalition of projects to coordinate their bidding
strategies such that it strictly increases the utility of all projects in the coalition.
Third, the dominant strategy equilibrium outcome of any DA auction is the only
outcome that survives iterated deletion of dominated strategies in the correspond-
ing full information game with the same allocation rule but where players pay
their own bid. Therefore predicting the dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome
in a DA auction can be considered robust.
Milgrom and Segal (2014) argue that these properties make DA auctions suit-
able for many challenging environments such as radio spectrum reallocations.
Most importantly, they show that every DA auction can be represented by a
descending-clock auction. Among several potential applications, they also con-
sider our budget-constrained procurement setup (Example 5: “Adaptive Scoring
for a Budget Constraint”). However, they do not show optimality of the DA auc-
tion. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to do so in a nontrivial setting.
Therefore we can strengthen the argument in favor of DA auctions. The tech-
niques established in our paper may be helpful to prove optimality of DA auctions
in the other settings mentioned in their paper.
Reducing the set of candidates for optimality to a special kind of DA auction
implies that any optimal allocation can be implemented with an appropriately
designed descending-clock auction: Any project faces a clock with a continuously
decreasing price on it, and indicates whether it is willing to conduct its project at
this price. In this auction it is a weakly dominant strategy for any project to exit
the auction once the clock price hits the project’s cost level. At first, we focus on
the case in which all projects are ex-ante symmetric: They have the same value
and costs are drawn from the same distribution. Here, we show that it is optimal
to rank projects according to their cost and “greenlight” the cheapest ones. In
optimum, price clocks run down synchronously and hence projects exit in order of
their costs until the budget suffices to pay the current clock price to all remaining
active projects.
3There does not exist any deviation such that, in any information set in which a deviat-
ing action is played, the best-case deviation payoff (against even the most favorable profile of
strategies of the other players that is consistent with this information set) is strictly larger than
the worst-case payoff from truthful bidding (achieved against the least favorable such strategy
profile).
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Next, we examine the case of ex-ante asymmetric projects, i.e., costs are drawn
from different distributions and/or project values differ. Here, we restrict atten-
tion to the two-project case because it conveys the main insights while retaining
tractability. In applications, the designer may prefer some projects over others and
might have different information over cost distributions. In standard procurement
settings, the quantity of units to be procured is not endogenously determined
as in our model, but it is exogenously fixed to be some quantity k. It is well
known that in k-unit procurement auctions the k projects with the greatest non-
negative virtual surpluses are implemented, e.g., Luton and McAfee (1986). In
the asymmetric case, the ranking implied by costs and the ranking implied by
virtual surpluses do not necessarily coincide. Broadly speaking, the designer dis-
criminates against stochastically stronger projects, and favors projects with higher
values. The asymmetry requires that each project faces an individual clock and
prices decrease asynchronously. In optimum when quantities are exogenous, the
clocks’ speed is adjusted such that the virtual surplus of marginal projects is kept
equal at all times, see Caillaud and Robert (2005, Proposition 1).
Interestingly, the optimal allocation of this environment does not simply translate
into the asymmetric case of our environment. In contrast, projects are not always
greenlighted in order of their virtual surpluses. Therefore we cannot adopt the
approach of Caillaud and Robert (2005). Instead, the descending-clock imple-
mentation of the optimal allocation includes individual clocks stopping at certain
times. Here, the quantity-quality tradeoff kicks in: We show that the optimal allo-
cation generically features instances in which out of two rival projects the project
with lower virtual surplus is chosen. The reasoning behind this result is that the
number of procured units is endogenous. In the asymmetric case, always green-
lighting in order of virtual surplus reduces the expected number of greenlighted
projects compared to the optimal mechanism. Strategyproofness creates a trade-
off between quantity and quality of the procured projects. This discrimination of
the stronger project is employed on top of the discrimination due to stochastic
domination through the virtual costs.
Clock auctions are generally easy to understand and hard to manipulate. Fur-
thermore, they are less information hungry than, for example, sealed bid auctions.
In descending-clock auctions, the designer only learns the private information of
those projects that are not greenlighted. In fact, Milgrom and Segal (2014) show
that clock auctions are the only strategyproof mechanisms that preserve winners’
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unconditional privacy: Winners only need to reveal the minimum of their private
information that is necessary to prove that they should be winning. These features
of clock auctions make them attractive for applications in which there is limited
trust between the involved parties. In practice, clock auctions are commonly used
to sell fish in Japan and they are often found in the public sector, e.g., when the
US Department of the Treasury sells warrant positions.
To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the only one that considers purely
ex-post constrained optimal procurement design. Such a restrictive setting can
be seen as a “worst-case scenario” for the designer, suiting many economic ap-
plications. In our leading example of the development fund, an ex-post budget
constraint appears natural as budgets are usually fixed. The nonprofit nature of
the projects might prohibit acquiring additional money on the financial market.
Information rents are necessary, because a project might want to spend money on
extra equipment that is convenient for the project’s staff but has no value for the
designer. In practice, such incentive problems are often resolved using dominant-
strategy implementable mechanisms. In strategyproof mechanisms, agents have
no incentive to invest in espionage activities or to hire consultants to avoid mis-
specification of beliefs. Mainly, dominant strategies are desirable as they are easy
to explain and not prone to manipulation. For similar reasons, we restrict at-
tention to deterministic mechanisms. Deterministic mechanisms obviate the need
for a credible randomization device and are therefore more easily applicable in
practice. Finally, ex-post participation constraints are necessary because projects
simply cannot be conducted with insufficient funds, and the designer wants to
avoid costly renegotiations when the projects default.
I.i Literature
Even though the knapsack problem has a wide range of economic applications,
there are relatively few publications in economics on this issue. Most prominently,
Maskin (2002), in his Nancy L. Schwartz memorial lecture, addressed the related
problem of the UK government that put aside a fixed fund to encourage firms to
reduce their pollution. The government faces n firms that have private marginal
cost of abatement θi and can commit to reduce xi units of pollution. To reduce pol-
lution as much as possible, the government pays expected compensation transfers
ti to the firms, who report costs and proposed abatement to maximize ti−θixi. For
some distributions, Maskin (2002) proposes a mechanism that satisfies an ex-post
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participation constraint, an ex-post incentive compatibility constraint, and the
condition that the budget is not exceeded in expectation. In response to Maskin
(2002), Chung and Ely (2002b) look at a more general class of mechanism design
problems with budget constraints and translate them into a setting a` la Baron
and Myerson (1982). Their approach nests Maskin (2002) and also Ensthaler and
Giebe (2014a) as special cases. However, Ensthaler and Giebe (2014a) more ex-
plicitly derive a constructive solution. In contrast to us, they all consider a soft
budget constraint that only requires the sum of expected transfers to be less than
the budget. By incorporating the budget constraint into a Lagrangian function
and ignoring the monotonicity (incentive) constraint, they find a mechanism that,
under the standard regularity condition, indeed is incentive compatible.
In addition, Ensthaler and Giebe (2014a) use AGV-budget-balancing (such as
Bo¨rgers and Norman, 2009) to obtain a mechanism which is ex-post budget-
feasible. However, transformation into a mechanism with an ex-post balanced
budget in such a way comes at the cost of sacrificing ex-post individual rational-
ity. Many applications do not allow this constraint to be weakened. For instance,
subsidy applicants usually cannot be forced to conduct their proposal when re-
ceiving only a small or possibly no subsidy. Alternatively, limited liability justifies
insisting on ex-post individual rationality. Because we want both constraints to
hold ex-post, we cannot build on their techniques and, thus, we approach the
problem by characterizing the optimal allocation rule.
To the best of our knowledge, no paper exists that jointly considers optimal mech-
anism design under ex-post budget balance and ex-post individual rationality in
a procurement setting. Ensthaler and Giebe (2014b) propose a belief-free clock
mechanism that coincides with our optimal mechanism in the symmetric case for
many parameterizations4 but differs in the asymmetric case by holding the cost-
benefit-ratio equal among projects. By simulating different settings, they conclude
that this mechanism outperforms a mechanism used in practice. In contrast to
their setting, the mechanism designer in our model values residual money. In Sec-
tion V, we discuss the meaning of residual money and find that our main results
qualitatively carry to the case where residual money is neglected.
4For all parameter constellations such that virtual surplus is always nonnegative.
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Because of the appeal of dominant-strategy incentive-compatible (DIC) mech-
anisms compared to Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC) mechanisms, many re-
searchers have produced valuable BIC-DIC equivalence results. These results char-
acterize environments in which restricting attention to the more robust incentive
criterion comes without loss. Our setup is not contained in these environments.
For any BIC mechanism, Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) show that one can
construct a DIC mechanism implementing the same ex-post allocation rule, when-
ever this allocation rule is monotone in each coordinate. However, the ex-post
transfers of the constructed DIC mechanism are not guaranteed to satisfy ex-post
budget balance. More recently, Gershkov, Goeree, Kushnir, Moldovanu, and Shi
(2013) employ a definition of equivalence in terms of interim expected utilities
introduced by Manelli and Vincent (2010). For any BIC mechanism, including
the optimal one, they construct a DIC mechanism that yields the same interim
expected utilities. Here, the ex-post allocation as well as the ex-post transfers
might differ between the two. Therefore a DIC mechanism equivalent to a feasible
BIC mechanism might violate the ex-post constraints in our setting.
Our budget-constrained procurement setup with ex-post constraints has received
much attention in the computer science literature. Instead of specifying the opti-
mal mechanism, the authors in this literature typically aim to construct allocation
algorithms that give good approximation guarantees. In other words, they try
to maximize the minimal payoff an algorithm can guarantee compared to the full
information knapsack payoff. Apart from the seminal paper by Singer (2010), the
works of Dobzinski, Papadimitriou, and Singer (2011) and Chen, Gravin, and Lu
(2011) are notable examples of this approach. Anari, Goel, and Nikzad (2014)
present a stochastic algorithm and show that it gives the best possible approxima-
tion guarantee in the many projects limit in which any individual project’s costs
are small compared to the budget. While the above papers examine the belief-free
case, Bei, Chen, Gravin, and Lu (2012) propose an algorithm for setups in which
the designer knows how the private information is distributed.
Other auction theoretic papers featuring “knapsack auctions” deal with a slightly
different problem compared to us. Aggarwal and Hartline (2006) consider a set-
ting in which each agent is characterized by his object of commonly known size
and a privately known valuation for having his object placed in the auctioneer’s
knapsack with commonly known capacity. They are looking for the truthful auc-
tion that best approximates the optimal full-information monotone pricing rule
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which maximizes the auctioneer’s profit. Mu’Alem and Nisan (2008) cover the
case of an auctioneer maximizing social welfare instead. Du¨tting, Gkatzelis, and
Roughgarden (2014) study the performance of DA auctions for knapsack auctions,
i.e., they show DA auctions fail to achieve a constant factor approximation of
the optimal social welfare in knapsack auctions Dizdar, Gershkov, and Moldovanu
(2011) investigate a similar knapsack problem of a profit maximizing auctioneer
in a dynamic setting: Agents sequentially arrive over time and are either included
in the knapsack immediately or lost forever. Thereby they avoid combinatorial
issues, which gives rise to a threshold property of the optimal mechanism. In such
knapsack auctions, the mechanism designer maximizes the sum of transfers, and
the value only enters the individual projects’ payoff while the capacity constraint is
imposed on the weight assigned to agents. In our framework, the value is collected
by the auctioneer and the capacity constraint is imposed on the sum of transfers.
Because of the latter, knapsack auctions and our knapsack procurement auctions
are not dual problems
There seems to be no reasonable analogy for our setting to another setting in
which the mechanism designer is a similarly constrained seller and the agents are
buyers. The literature on group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms, initiated
by Moulin (1999), considers the dual of a “surplus-sharing” problem. The crucial
difference between this problem and our “budget-sharing” problem is that the
agents themselves produce the output to be distributed, while in our case the
budget to be distributed is fixed and unrelated to the surplus created by the
agents, which is collected by the mechanism designer. Budget-constrained buyers
in auctions have been discussed in the literature, e.g., by Che and Gale (1998) or
Pai and Vohra (2014). However, these authors study budget-constrained agents
whereas in our setting the designer is budget-constrained.
In the following section, we introduce the model. In Section III, we rewrite the
problem as a problem of finding the optimal cutoff functions and derive a set of
properties that any optimal mechanism must have. Sections III.i and III.ii cover
symmetric and asymmetric environments, respectively. We discuss extensions and
possible modifications to the model in Section V. Finally, we conclude in Section
VI.
Ex-post Optimal Knapsack Procurement. 13
II Model
We consider a set of n projects I = {1, . . . , n} and one mechanism designer. Each
project can be conducted exactly once. The designer gains utility vi if and only
if project i ∈ I is conducted. We consider projects to be utility maximizing
agents. If project i is executed, it incurs cost ci ∈ Ci := [ci, ci], where in the
following we restrict c = 0.5 Let C := ×i∈ICi and C−i := ×j∈I\{i}Cj. Let the
realization of a cost vector be denoted by c ∈ C. The costs are the projects’ private
information and are independently drawn from a distribution Fi. We assume Fi
to be continuously differentiable with a strictly positive density fi on the support.
The value of the project vi and the distribution Fi are common knowledge.
To compensate project i for its cost, the designer pays transfer ti. A direct mech-
anism is characterized by 〈qi, ti〉. It is a mapping from the vector of cost reports
c ∈ C into provision decisions and transfers. We denote the allocation function by
γ : C → P(I), and it maps a cost vector into the set of “greenlighted” projects,
an element of the power set of I. Correspondingly, we call I \ γ(c) the set of
“redlighted” projects.
We restrict attention to deterministic mechanisms. This restriction implies that
once all cost reports are collected, we know with certainty which project is selected
by the mechanism. In other words, the decision of implementation qi is binary,
qi(c) = I(i ∈ γ(c)),
where I denotes an indicator function that is one if the corresponding condition is
true and zero otherwise. We employ a revelation-principle argument and without
loss of generality only consider direct mechanisms.6
5The impact of this assumption it discussed in Appendix VI.D.
6In general, the revelation principle does not hold when restricting attention to deterministic
mechanisms: Deterministic direct mechanisms are unable to replicate mixed strategy equilib-
ria in deterministic indirect mechanisms, as noted by, e.g., Strausz (2003). However, in our
setting we do not lose generality. A mixed strategy equilibrium consists of a distribution over
pure strategy profiles. Because the mechanism is implementable in dominant strategies any of
these pure strategy profiles also constitutes a pure strategy equilibrium, in particular the pure
strategy equilibrium associated with the designer’s most preferred outcome. Similarly, because
the mechanism is ex-post constrained, this outcome is feasible. Therefore, while there are al-
locations that (in the class of deterministic mechanisms) can only be implemented by indirect
mechanisms, the designer’s most preferred feasible allocation can truthfully be implemented in
a direct mechanism.
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Project i’s utility ui is given by its transfer minus the cost it bears,
ui(c) = ti(c)− qi(c)ci.
The designer derives value vi from each greenlighted project i while having to
pay the sum of transfers. Therefore she wants to maximize the aggregate value
of greenlighted projects net of transfers paid. Her (ex-post) utility function uD
implies that, in our setting, the designer values residual money,
uD(c) =
∑
i
(
qi(c)vi − ti(c)
)
. (2.1)
We impose an ex-post participation constraint. That is, if i is greenlighted the
transfer must be at least as high as the cost,
ti(ci, c−i)− qi(ci, c−i)ci ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ I, (ci, c−i) ∈ C. (PC)
In addition, the designer has a budget constraint which is “hard” in the sense that
she cannot spend more than her budget B for any realization of the cost vector.
That is, the designer can never exceed her budget,
∑
i
ti(c) ≤ B ∀c ∈ C. (BC)
Finally, incentive compatibility has to hold ex-post. Alternatively, we can say
that the mechanism has to be implementable in (weakly) dominant strategies7 or
that the mechanism must be strategyproof. Therefore for every realization of the
cost vector, project i’s truthful report must yield at least as much utility as any
possible deviation,
ti(ci, c−i)− qi(ci, c−i)ci ≥ ti(c˜i, c−i)− qi(c˜i, c−i)ci
∀i ∈ I, c−i ∈ C−i and ci, c˜i ∈ Ci. (IC)
7In our private value environment, these two concepts are equivalent in a direct revelation
mechanism. In general, however, ex-post incentive compatibility is essentially a generalization
of dominant-strategy implementability to interdependent value environments. See Chung and
Ely (2002a).
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III Analysis
We search for the direct mechanism that maximizes the expected utility of the
designer and refer to this mechanism as the optimal mechanism. One may think
that a natural approach to this problem would be to express the ex-post transfer
ti(ci, c−i) as a function of the ex-post allocation decision qi(ci, c−i), taking c−i as
given, and applying the envelope theorem. In that case, it would be possible to
restrict attention to the allocation in order to solve for the optimal mechanism.
However, this approach does not reduce the complexity of the problem. The reason
is that the ex-post transfers and allocation for one cost vector restrict transfers and
allocation for other cost vectors through the budget constraint in a manner much
more involved than standard monotonicity. In particular, the budget constraint
with the ex-post transfer expressed as a function of the ex-post allocation may be
ill-behaved. Therefore we cannot straightforwardly arrive at sufficient conditions
using convex optimization.8
Instead, we derive a set of properties that every mechanism must inherit to be
optimal. In general, we establish these properties by showing that the expected
payoff yielded by any feasible mechanism not having one of the properties can
be increased by adopting the properties. For some of the following lemmata, we
provide the proof for the two-project case in the main text and provide the proof of
the general case in the appendix. Our first step is to show that strategyproofness
implies that the optimal mechanism has to be a cutoff mechanism.
Lemma 2.1. The optimal mechanism can be represented by cutoff functions zi :
C−i → Ci, such that project i is greenlighted whenever it reports a cost weakly less
than its cutoff,
qi(ci, c−i) = I(ci ≤ zi(c−i)).
The transfer to project i equals its cutoff whenever it is greenlighted and zero
otherwise,
ti(ci, c−i) = qi(ci, c−i)zi(c−i).
Proof. For any two cost reports ci, c
′
i ∈ Ci of project i and for some c−i ∈ C−i,
(IC) implies that if the allocation of i is the same, qi(ci, c−i) = qi(c′i, c−i), also the
transfer has to be the same, ti(ci, c−i) = ti(c′i, c−i). Otherwise, project i could, as
one of the cost types, deviate to the report yielding the higher transfer.
8Requiring either the budget or the participation constraint to hold only in expectation would
enable us to use the techniques employed by Ensthaler and Giebe (2014a).
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Conditional on i’s allocation and given any cost reports c−i, the transfer is fixed
and does not vary with i’s cost report. Hence, given c−i, there can only be two
different transfers ti for project i, one for each allocation status, t
qi=1
i (c−i) and
tqi=0i (c−i).
Define zi(c−i) := t
qi=1
i (c−i)− tqi=0i (c−i). Then, (IC) implies
qi(ci, c−i) =
1 if ci ≤ zi(c−i)0 if ci > zi(c−i) .
Suppose to the contrary that for some realization ĉi < zi(c−i) and some other
c˜i < zi(c−i), qi(ĉi, c−i) = 0 and qi(c˜i, c−i) = 1. Then, type ĉi can profitably
deviate to reporting c˜i to ensure the green light which yields a utility increase of
zi(c−i)− ĉi. An analogous argument applies for ĉi > zi(c−i) > 0.9
The last step is to show that tqi=0i (c−i) = 0. This result follows from the mechanism
being optimal, i.e., maximizing expected utility of the designer.
As a direct consequence of dominant-strategy implementability, Lemma 2.1 shows
that allocation and transfers are characterized by cutoffs. Project i is greenlighted
whenever it reports a cost that lies weakly below the cutoff. Crucially, these cutoffs
are functions of the other cost reports c−i. However, the optimal cutoffs remain
to be determined. The maximization problem of the designer is given by
max{zi}i∈I Ec [
∑
i qi(c)vi − ti(c)]
s.t. (BC),
qi(c) = I(ci ≤ zi(c−i)) ∀c ∈ C,
ti(c) = I(ci ≤ zi(c−i))zi(c−i) ∀c ∈ C.
(2.2)
9When ci = zi(c−i), (IC) permits both qi(ci, c−i) = 0 and qi(ci, c−i) = 1. By convention,
we assume qi(ci, c−i) = 1 in this case. However, writing a mechanism this way precludes the
specification of tie-breakers, which might be necessary to conserve budget balance. For example,
in a two-project example we would write down the mechanism “greenlight the cheaper project”
as z1(c2) = c2 and z2(c1) = c1. If c1 = c2 a tie-breaker is needed to select a project. As this
is a zero-probability event, the choice of the tie-breaker does not impact the designer’s payoff.
Similarly, as projects are indifferent, their ex-post utility is unaffected. Therefore we refrain
from specifying a tie-breaker and proceed with our analysis as if both projects are greenlighted
in these cases.
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Here, qi and ti are determined by the cutoff function zi. Incentive compatibility
and participation constraints, thus, hold by construction.
The next step towards solving this problem involves applying standard methods
introduced by Myerson (1981). Let the conditional expected probability of being
greenlighted and the conditional expected transfer be
Qi(ci) = Ec[qi(ci, c−i)|ci]
and Ti(ci) = Ec[ti(ci, c−i)|ci].
The interim incentive compatibility required by Myerson (1981) is weaker than
our condition (IC). Consequently, the expected transfer is determined by the al-
location, Ti(ci) = Qi(ci)ci +
∫ ci
ci
Qi(x)dx. The usual monotonicity condition is
trivially fulfilled as we are dealing with cutoff mechanisms. This reformulation
in turn allows us to rewrite the objective function as a function of the alloca-
tion. Substituting into problem (2.2) and integrating by parts yields the following
maximization problem,
max{zi}i∈I Ec
[∑
i I(ci ≤ zi(c−i))
(
vi − ci − Fi(ci)fi(ci)
)]
s.t.∑
i∈I
I(ci ≤ zi(c−i))zi(c−i) ≤ B ∀c ∈ C.
(2.3)
We call ϕi(ci) := ci+
Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
the virtual cost of project i and ψi(ci) := vi−ϕi(ci) the
virtual surplus. Here, ϕ and ψ are the procurement analogues to standard auction
terminology. We can directly see from problem (2.3) that the optimal mechanism
maximizes the expected sum of greenlighted virtual surpluses.
Note that constrained optimization by Lagrangian is not straightforward here be-
cause of the nondifferentiability of the indicator function. Instead, in the following
we derive useful properties of the optimal cutoffs that can be exploited to charac-
terize the optimal mechanism. A cutoff mechanism is by construction monotonic
in the following sense:
Definition 2.2. An allocation rule γ is monotonic in costs if i ∈ γ(ci, c−i) and
c′i < ci imply i ∈ γ(c′i, c−i) for all c−i ∈ C−i.
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In words, if a project gets greenlighted for some cost vector, it also gets green-
lighted when, all else equal, its cost is lower. To proceed, we restrict the class of
distributions from which costs can be drawn.
Assumption 1 (Log-concavity). For all i, the cumulative distribution function Fi
is log-concave.
This assumption is standard in information economics. It is equivalent to the
reverse hazard rate function f/F being a weakly decreasing function or the ratio
F/f being weakly increasing. Hence, the standard regularity condition is implied:
ϕi is strictly increasing and ψi is strictly decreasing. A decreasing reverse hazard
rate is the procurement analogue to the assumption of increasing hazard rate
functions in seller auction settings.
Regularity ensures that a lower cost ci translates to a higher virtual surplus ψi(ci).
Hence, we can define the following cutoff cost type
z∗∗i :=
ψ
−1
i (0) if ψ
−1
i (0) ∈ Ci
ci otherwise
, (2.4)
where regularity implies the invertibility of ψi and thus allows for the above def-
inition of z∗∗i . In the symmetric case, z
∗∗
i = z
∗∗ for all i ∈ I. Let ζ∗∗ be the
n-dimensional vector with z∗∗i as i-th element for all i ∈ I.
Definition 2.3. An allocation rule γ is ζ∗∗-exclusive if, for all i ∈ I, ci > z∗∗i
implies that i 6∈ γ(ci, c−i) for all c−i ∈ C−i.
A cutoff mechanism is ζ∗∗-exclusive if and only if zi(c−i) ≤ z∗∗i for all c−i ∈ C−i
and for all i ∈ I. If the budget sufficed, a designer would want to greenlight all
projects with nonnegative virtual surplus. Crucially, the arguments leading to this
statement also imply that it is never optimal to greenlight a project with negative
virtual surplus.
Lemma 2.4. The optimal mechanism is ζ∗∗-exclusive. In the trivial case,
∑
z∗∗i ≤
B, the optimal cutoffs are independent of the cost reports,
zi(c−i) = z∗∗i ∀c−i ∈ C−i and ∀i ∈ I.
The proof of this lemma is standard and hence omitted. It immediately follows
from the rewritten objective function (2.3): Greenlighting a project with negative
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virtual surplus decreases the designer’s payoff and uses part of the budget. Guar-
anteeing the green light for high-cost types comes at the cost of having to pay
higher information rents to all cost types. For the same reason, also a budget-
unconstrained designer would implement a ζ∗∗-exclusive mechanism, even when
the surplus vi − ci is positive for all projects. Next, we show that an optimal
mechanism possesses the following property:
Definition 2.5. An allocation rule γ has substitutes if i ∈ γ(c) and c′j > cj for
some j 6= i implies i ∈ γ(c′j, c−j).
That is, if a project gets greenlighted for some cost vector c, it is also greenlighted
when, all else equal, another project’s cost is increased. This property relates to
the cross-monotonicity defined in the cost sharing problem of Moulin and Shenker
(2001): an agent’s cost share cannot increase when the allocation set expands.
Having in mind a setting with an exogenously determined amount of projects to
be procured and without a budget constraint, this property is clearly optimal,
because if i is among the projects with the highest virtual surpluses for some cost
vector, it is also among them when the cost of some other project j is increased,
i.e., when j’s virtual surplus is decreased. However, with the budget constraint,
this property does not hold in a full-information setting.10 A cutoff mechanism
has substitutes if all functions zi are weakly increasing in each argument.
Lemma 2.6. The optimal mechanism has substitutes,
zi(c˜j, c−i−j) ≥ zi(ĉj, c−i−j) for almost every c˜j > ĉj and c−i−j ∈ C−i−j. (2.5)
Proof. (with n = 2, see appendix for the general proof)
For a graphical representation of the proof, consult Figure 2.1. We show that for
any feasible cutoff mechanism that does not have substitutes, there exists a feasible
alternative mechanism with substitutes that outperforms the initial candidate in
terms of the designer’s payoff. In fact, the alternative mechanism outperforms the
initial candidate state-by-state and not only in expected terms.
As a first step, we can, without loss of generality, restrict the range of any optimal
function zi: By ζ
∗∗-exclusivity, any optimal functional value zi(c−i) cannot exceed
10For example, there are two projects, v1 > v2. Under full information, both projects get
implemented for a cost vector (c1, c2) = (B − z, z). Then, increasing c1 would kick project 2
out of the allocation. In contrast, in our asymmetric-information setting where c2 pins down a
cutoff z1(c2) for project 1, project 1 instead loses the green light status, when its cost increases
while c2 remains constant.
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z∗∗i .
Next, fix an arbitrary feasible pair of cutoff functions {z1, z2} as a candidate for
optimality. Contrary to (2.5), suppose that z2 is decreasing on a set with positive
Lebesgue-measure. Then, there exist sets C˜1 and Ĉ1 with positive Lebesgue-
measure, such that
z2(ĉ1) > z2(c˜1) for all ĉ1 ∈ Ĉ1, c˜1 ∈ C˜1,
and ĉ1 < c˜1 for all elements of the corresponding sets.
Figure 2.1: The alternative cutoff mechanism {z1, z′2} outperforms the initial
candidate {z1, z2} for all cost vectors in the light gray area and otherwise yields
the same allocation.
c1 c1 c1
c2
c2,
z2(c1)
z2
ĉ1
Ĉ1 C˜1
c˜2
z′2z2(ĉ1)
c˜1 c2 c2 c2
c1
c1,
z1(c2)
z1(c˜2)
Case 1
Case 2
c˜2
z1 = z
′
1
Now, consider an alternative cutoff mechanism {z1, z′2} that leaves cutoff function
z1 unchanged, but modifies the cutoff function of project 2 in the following way
z′2(c1) =
z2(ĉ1) if c1 ∈ C˜1z2(c1) otherwise ,
with an arbitrary ĉ1 ∈ Ĉ1. In words, the alternative flattens z2 over region C˜1 and
otherwise leaves the initial mechanism as it is. This alternative cutoff function is
depicted in Figure 2.1 as the thick flat line.
The alternative mechanism implements the same allocation, except in the gray
area depicted in Figure 2.1 where it additionally greenlights project 2. Because
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z2(ĉ1) ≤ z∗∗2 by ζ∗∗-exclusivity, the alternative mechanism clearly yields a higher
payoff.
It remains to be shown that the alternative mechanism is not only more profitable
but also feasible. First of all, the initial mechanism is, by assumption, budget-
feasible everywhere. In particular, it is feasible at any point (ĉ1, c˜2) with ĉ2 ≤ z2(ĉ1)
and ĉ1 ∈ Ĉ1. Formally, for any such points, the budget constraint holds,
q1(ĉ1, c˜2)z1(c˜2) + q2(ĉ1, c˜2)z2(ĉ1) ≤ B. (*)
To any point (ĉ1, c˜2), there is a range of corresponding points (c˜1, c˜2) with c˜1 ∈ C˜1.
We now check feasibility for any such point (c˜1, c˜2). Referring to Figure 2.1, we
are addressing all points that live in the rectangle below the thick flat line of z′2.
Under the alternative mechanism, for all c˜1 ∈ C˜1, q′2(c˜1, c˜2) = q2(ĉ1, c˜2) = 1.
Regarding ĉ1, there can be two cases:
Case 1: If ĉ1 ≤ z1(ĉ2), then q1(ĉ1, c˜2) = 1, i.e., both projects are implemented and
have to be compensated. The alternative is feasible in any point (c˜1, c˜2) as
q′1(c˜1, c˜2)z
′
1(c˜2) + q
′
2(c˜1, c˜2)z
′
2(c˜1) = q
′
1(c˜1, c˜2)z1(c˜2) + z2(ĉ1)
≤ z1(c˜2) + z2(ĉ1) ≤ B,
where the final inequality follows from (*).
Case 2: If ĉ1 > z1(ĉ2), then q1(ĉ1, c˜2) = 0, i.e., only project 2 is financed. The
alternative is feasible in any point (c˜1, c˜2) as
q′1(c˜1, c˜2)z
′
1(c˜2) + q
′
2(c˜1, c˜2)z
′
2(c˜1) = 0 + z
′
2(c˜1)
≤ z2(ĉ1) ≤ B,
where the first equality follows from c˜1 ≥ ĉ1 > z1(c˜2) and the final inequality again
follows from (*).
Since, for any feasible cutoff mechanism with a cutoff function that is somewhere
decreasing, we can find an alternative more profitable cutoff mechanism with cutoff
functions that are weakly increasing, the optimal mechanism’s allocation rule must
have substitutes.
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Lemma 2.6 establishes that optimal cutoff functions are weakly increasing in each
of their arguments. The intuition is straightforward. The cost realizations of all
projects are independent. Therefore project i’s cost report only influences the
allocation of project j 6= i via the budget constraint. Project i’s cost report only
influences the budget through exceeding or lying below the cutoff. If project i
exceeds its cutoff, this frees budget to be distributed among the other projects.
Consequently, their cutoffs should remain constant or increase. While the intuition
is the same for both n = 2 and n > 2, the proof is more involved in the general
case. The reason is that the cost report of the project with the decreasing cutoff
does not simultaneously pin down all other cutoffs and the remaining budget - as
it does when n = 2. We cannot trivially extend the proof above, if some cutoff of
a third project z3 increases in c1 while z2 decreases. The intuition of the general
proof is that a decreasing cutoff cannot be optimal, because it essentially implies
exchanging project 2 for project 1 while the virtual surplus of project 2 decreases
relative to the virtual surplus of project 1.
We continue by establishing the next property of the optimal mechanism:
Definition 2.7. An allocation rule γ has non-bossy winners if for any i ∈ I,
c ∈ C, and c′i ∈ Ci, i ∈ γ(c′i, c−i) ∩ γ(c) implies γ(c′i, c−i) = γ(c).
In words, a non-bossy winner cannot affect the allocation without changing its own
green-light status. In restricted environments, it can be shown that the optimal
allocation rule is non-bossy: γ(c′i, c−i)∩ {i} = γ(c)∩ {i} implies γ(c′i, c−i) = γ(c).
However, we only need the winners to be non-bossy and examples of environments
with bossy losers in the optimal mechanism can be constructed, see Appendix
VI.D.
Given some cost vector, let G represent the set of greenlighted projects and R
represent the set of redlighted projects. In the following lemma, we show that
given that only the projects in some set G are greenlighted and given the re-
maining projects’ costs cR, for all g ∈ G all functions zg intersect at some point
(aG1 (cR), a
G
2 (cR), ...). This point only depends on cost reports cR of redlighted
projects. Intuitively, optimal cutoffs cannot depend on greenlighted projects’ cost,
because for these projects the cutoff coincides with the transfer. For the two-
project case, Figure 2.2 illustrates that (BC) must bind when both projects are
greenlighted. However, then project 1 influencing project 2’s cutoff would change
the remaining budget which is equal to project 1’s transfer, given that (BC) binds.
This contradicts the notion of a cutoff mechanism.
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Lemma 2.8. For any cost vectors (cG, cR) ∈ C and (c′G, cR) ∈ C such that
G = γ(cG, cR) = γ(c
′
G, cR) and R = I \ γ(cG, cR), the optimal cutoff function zg
for all g ∈ G is (almost everywhere) independent of the costs of all greenlighted
projects cG. That is,
zg(cG−g, cR) = zg(c′G−g, cR),
for all cG−g and c′G−g such that G is the set of greenlighted agents.
Proof. (with n = 2, see appendix for the general proof and consult Figure 2.2 for
intuition)
By Lemma 2.1, the optimal mechanism has to be a cutoff mechanism. What
remains to be shown is that the cutoff functions {zi}i∈I only depend on cR. When
γ(c) is a singleton, i.e., when only one project is greenlighted, the statement follows
from the nature of a cutoff function. Hence, we need to show that the cutoffs
must be constants whenever γ(c) = {1, 2}. Therefore suppose that γ(c) = {1, 2}
is induced with positive probability.
Figure 2.2: In Lemma 2.8, we show that in the nontrivial two-project case
whenever G = {1, 2} both projects get constant transfers summing up to the
budget. For instance, the candidate mechanism (with substitutes) depicted
above is outperformed by an alternative mechanism indicated by the arrows.
B c1
B
c2
G =
{1, 2}
a2
a1
Take any feasible candidate mechanism with any increasing cutoff functions zi and
define
a1 = max{c1|∃c2 : c2 ≤ z2(c1), c1 ≤ z1(c2)}
a2 = max{c2|∃c1 : c1 ≤ z1(c2), c2 ≤ z2(c1)}, (2.6)
i.e., ai is the highest cost of project i such that both projects are implemented.
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Whenever greenlighting both projects, the sets over which we have defined a1 and
a2 must be non-empty. The maximum exists by left-continuity of any optimal
function zi.
11 Hence by definition of a1, there exists c˜2 such that a1 = z1(c˜2).
Similarly, there exists c˜1 such that a2 = z2(c˜1).
By definition, (c˜1, c˜2) ≤ (a1, a2) and at cost realization (c˜1, c˜2) both projects are
implemented. The budget feasibility of the candidate mechanism implies a1 +a2 ≤
B.
Now we show that, in optimum, z1(c
′
2) = a1, for all c
′
2 ≤ a2, and z2(c′1) = a2, for
all c′1 ≤ a1. Suppose not. Suppose (without loss of generality) there is some set
Ξ ⊂ [0, a2] with positive Lebesgue-measure such that z1(c′2) < a1 for all c′2 ∈ Ξ.
Denote zΞ1 := maxc2∈Ξ z1(c2). Since a1 + a2 ≤ B, changing the mechanism to
z1(c
′
2) = a1, ∀c′2 ≤ a2 does not violate the budget constraint and increases the
payoff by
∆ > Pr(c2 ∈ Ξ)
∫ a1
zΞ1
ψ1(c)dF (c) > 0.
In fact, this alternative mechanism outperforms the initial candidate state-by-state
and not only in expectation.
The following corollary is an immediate consequence of Lemma 2.8 combined with
monotonicity and bidder substitutability. It establishes that any optimal mecha-
nism satisfies non-bossiness of greenlighted projects.
Corollary 2.9. For any optimal mechanism with G = γ(cG, cR) for some (cG, cR) ∈
C, also γ(c′G, cR) = G for any cost vector (c′G, cR) ∈ C with c′g ≤ cg for all g ∈ G.
Hence, for all i ∈ I, for all c−i ∈ C−i, and for all ĉi, c˜i ∈ Ci with ĉi < c˜i, in any
optimal mechanism,
ĉi < c˜i ≤ zi(c−i) implies γ(ĉi, c−i) = γ(c˜i, c−i).
Taking stock, among all mechanisms satisfying (PC), (BC) and (IC), any mecha-
nism that maximizes the designer’s expected payoff (2.1) belongs to a certain class
11We can replace any function zi with a left-continuous function that is identical up to a set
of points with Lebesgue-measure zero. Hence, if there exists an optimal function zi that is not
left-continuous, then there also exists a left-continuous version of the same function that yields
the same payoff and hence is also optimal.
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of mechanisms: We have shown that the optimal mechanism is characterized by a
set of cutoff functions {zi}i∈I and the corresponding allocation rule is
Property 1 monotonic in costs,
Property 2 ζ∗∗-exclusive,
Property 3 has substitutes, and
Property 4 has non-bossy winners.
Being able to restrict attention to mechanisms with these properties is highly
useful, as these mechanisms are a much more tangible class than the substantially
larger set of all permissible cutoff mechanisms. In addition, all mechanisms with
these properties can be implemented with a DA auction as proposed by Milgrom
and Segal (2014). To this end, we first restate their definition adapted to our
setting.
Definition 2.10 (DA auction). A deferred acceptance (DA) auction is an iterative
algorithm defined by a collection of scoring functions
sAi : Ci × CI\A → R+
that are weakly increasing in ci for all i ∈ A and for all A ⊂ I. Let At ⊂ I denote
the set of active bidders in iteration t and initially A1 = I. The algorithm stops
in some period T when all active projects have a score of zero, sATi = 0 for all
i ∈ AT . Then the set of greenlighted project is AT . Otherwise, at each iteration
t, the project with the highest score is removed. The payment pti of project i at
iteration t is either given by the highest possible cost that i could have had without
being removed from the set of active bidders or by the last iteration’s payment,
depending on which payment is smaller,
pti(c) =
sup{c′i : s
At
i (c
′
i, cI\At) < s
At
j (cj, cI\At)} for j ∈ At \ At+1,
min{sup{c′i : sAti (c′i, cI\At) ≤ 0}, pt−1i } if t = T.
The algorithm is initialized with p0i = min{ci, z∗∗i , B}.12
The main appeal of DA auctions lies in their incentive guarantees. They are
not only strategyproof, they are obviously strategyproof, as defined by Li (2015).
12Compared to Milgrom and Segal (2014), we slightly tweak the updating function of payments
without changing the deferred acceptance nature of the algorithm and any of its properties.
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Moreover, DA auctions are weakly group-strategyproof. That is, no coalition of
projects can manipulate their reports such that it strictly increases the utility
of all projects in the coalition: At least one member of the coalition receives a
weakly worse payoff whenever other coalition members benefit. Because collusion
in auctions is generally illegal, compensating the worse off coalition member is
not contractible. In addition, the dominant-strategy equilibrium outcome in a
DA auction can be interpreted as robust in the following sense: Consider the
full-information game in which all cost reports are observed, projects can report
any cost, the allocation is determined according to the DA auction’s allocation
rule, but projects receive their own report as payments. The dominant-strategy
equilibrium outcome of the DA auction is the only outcome that survives iterated
deletion of dominated strategies in this game.
Proposition 2.11. Any optimal mechanism has a DA auction representation and
can be implemented with a descending-clock auction.
The proof of Proposition 2.11 is relegated to a separate section in the appendix.
Milgrom and Segal (2014) show that with a finite type space, any mechanism
satisfying monotonicity, bidder substitutability, and non-bossiness of winners can
be implemented by a myopic clock auction.
III.i The symmetric case
In this section, we focus on symmetric projects, i.e., environments with vi = v
and Fi = F for every project i ∈ I. An implication of this assumption is that
the order of costs coincides with the order of virtual surpluses and that z∗∗i = z
∗∗
for all i ∈ I. We show how to utilize the established results to characterize the
optimal allocation and also how to implement it. As in previous proofs, the proof of
Proposition 2.12 considers the two-project case while the general proof is relegated
to the appendix. In the two-project case, the designer’s optimization problem can
be reduced to optimally solving for a single constant. Nevertheless, we discuss
possible alternatives to the optimal mechanism in greater detail to foreshadow the
complications which arise in asymmetric environments.
Proposition 2.12. Arrange the projects in ascending order of their reported costs,
c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cn ≤ cn+1 := c, and define zk := min
{
B
k
, z∗∗, ck+1
}
. In the
symmetric case, the cutoff mechanism with zi(c−i) = zk
∗
is the optimal mechanism.
The optimal number of accepted projects k∗ is given by k∗ := max{k|ck ≤ zk}.
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Proof. (with n = 2, see appendix for the general proof)
In Proposition 2.11, we have shown that the optimal mechanism must be a special
kind of DA auction. We call the mechanism in the proposition the proposed
mechanism and, as a candidate for optimality, consider {z1, z2}, some different
cutoff mechanism with the properties we derived. Suppose {z1, z2} greenlights both
projects with nonzero probability and that it differs from the proposed mechanism
in a way such that a1 = z > B/2 and a2 = B − z < B/2 with ai defined as in
(2.6). For graphic intuition of the deviation consult Figure 2.3.
By Lemma 2.4, any optimal mechanism must never greenlight a project with
negative virtual surplus. This property is depicted as the kink at (z∗∗, z∗∗).
In the area northwest of the dashed budget line, c1 + c2 > B, the designer can,
by (BC) and (PC), only execute one of the two projects. It can be directly seen
from objective function (2.3) that the designer prefers the project with the higher
virtual surplus, i.e., the one with lower cost. It does not, however, follow directly
that zi(cj) = cj whenever B−ci < cj < z∗∗. It could be optimal for the designer to
forgo executing the lower-cost project for some cost vectors (shaded triangle and
crossed square in Figure 2.3) in order to execute both projects in an additional
area (horizontally lined, Figure 2.3). In such a case, the designer is forced by
incentive compatibility to execute the higher-cost project (for cost vectors in the
shaded triangle or the square that is both horizontally and vertically lined).
Figure 2.3: A candidate mechanism compared to the proposed mechanism.
c1 B c1
c2 = c
B
c2
B
2
B − z
zB
2
z∗∗
z2(c1)
z2(c1) candidate
z1(c2)
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By Lemma 2.8, both cutoffs must be constant whenever both projects are executed.
In optimum in that case, there can be no slack in the budget constraint and zi is
flat in that region. Otherwise increasing one of the cutoffs until the budget binds
is both feasible and profitable.
Formally, candidate mechanism {z1, z2} is given by
z2(c1) =

z∗∗ if c1 ≥ z∗∗
c1 if z < c1 < z
∗∗
B − z if c1 < z
and z1(c2) =

z∗∗ if c2 ≥ z∗∗
c2 if B − z < c2 < z∗∗
z if c2 < B − z
. (2.7)
For ease of exposition, let A = B
2
. Let ∆ be the increase in the designer’s expected
payoff from implementing the proposed mechanism instead of candidate {z1, z2}.
∆ = F (z)
∫ A
B−z
ψ(x2)dF (x2) (vertical)
− F (A)
∫ z
A
ψ(x1)dF (x1) (horizontal)
+
∫ z
A
∫ c
A
ψ(x2)dF (x2)− (F (c)− F (A))ψ(x1)dF (x1) (shaded)
where the patterns represent the area in Figure 2.3 where the allocation changes.
Everywhere else the allocation and payoff remain the same.
To rewrite ∆, define ξ(x) = F (x)(v − x) with ξ′(x) = ψ(x)f(x):
∆ = F (z)(ξ(A)− ξ(B − z))− F (A)(ξ(z)− ξ(A))
+ F (A)(ξ(z)− ξ(A)) +
∫ z
A
ξ(x1)− ξ(A)− F (x1)ψj(x1)dF (x1)
= F (z)(ξ(A)− ξ(B − z))− F (A)(ξ(z)− ξ(A))
+ F (A)(ξ(z)− ξ(A))− ξ(A)(F (z)− F (A)) +
∫ z
A
F 2(x1)dx1
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because (ψ(c)F (c) − F (c)(v − c))f(c) = F 2(c) and then since ∫ z
A
F (x1)
2dx1 >
F (A)2
∫ z
A
1dx1,
∆ > F (z)(ξ(A)− ξ(B − z))− ξ(A)(F (z)− F (A)) + F (A)2(z − A)
= F (A)2(v − A+ z − A)− F (z)F (B − z)(v −B + z)
= (v −B + z)(F (A)2 − F (z)F (B − z))
> 0 ⇔ F (A)2 > F (z)F (B − z).
This statement is true under Assumption 1, log-concavity. Maximizing F (z)F (B−
z) with respect to z, the first order condition is given by
F (z)
f(z)
=
F (B − z)
f(B − z) (2.8)
which is only true at z = B/2 since F/f is an increasing function. For the same
reason, the left-hand side is greater (less) than the right-hand side for z > B/2(<
B/2) making z = B/2 the maximum.
We have assumed that in the optimal mechanism both projects get greenlighted for
some cost vectors. It remains to show that the optimal mechanism beats the best
mechanism in which at most one project gets greenlighted. The best mechanism
that selects at most one project always greenlights the project with higher virtual
surplus. Clearly, the proposed mechanism outperforms this mechanism as it also
always greenlights the project with higher virtual surplus, and it, additionally,
sometimes greenlights a second project with positive virtual surplus.
To sum up, in the symmetric case, the optimal allocation rule takes a simple
form: The cheapest projects are greenlighted and the mechanism greenlights as
many projects as the budget allows, while each procured project receives the same
compensation. Any project that is redlighted prefers this allocation status over
having to conduct the project with the associated compensation.
There are two rationales for greenlighted projects to get the same transfer. First,
as shown in the proof of Proposition 2.12, this cutoff rule maximizes the probability
of getting as many projects as possible. Dominant-strategy incentive compatibility
prevents the budget from being shifted away from projects with low cost reports to
projects with high costs. Therefore offering equal cutoffs is the best the designer
can do. Second, as seen in (2.3), the rewritten maximization problem of the
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designer, the expected utility of the designer is given by the sum of virtual surpluses
of greenlighted projects. Therefore she wants to greenlight those projects with
the highest virtual surpluses. That goal is consistent with offering equal cutoffs
to greenlighted projects and excluding those with higher cost. In the optimal
allocation, greenlighted projects have higher virtual surplus than those which are
not greenlighted. The compatibility of the two goals - get as many projects as
possible and get those with the highest virtual surpluses - is a special feature of
the symmetric case. It generically fails in the asymmetric case, as we demonstrate
in the next section.
Figure 2.4: An example of optimal allocations for the symmetric case with
n = 2.
c1 B c1
c2 = c
B
c2
both
1
2
(a) Budget-constrained, full infor-
mation.
c1 B c1
c2
B
c2
both
1
2z2(c1)
z1(c2)
none
z∗∗
z∗∗
(b) Budget-constrained, private
information.
Figure 2.4 illustrates the optimal budget-constrained allocations in an example
with two projects. Panel 2.4b shows the fully-constrained optimal allocation jux-
taposed with the relaxed optimal allocation when (IC) is neglected, shown in
Panel 2.4a. First, note that in this example v ≥ c and c < B. Therefore a
fully-unconstrained designer with full information would always greenlight both
projects, and a budget-constrained designer with full information would always
greenlight at least one project. However, since z∗∗ < c, there exist realizations
of c (the upper-right corner of Panel 2.4b) such that no project gets greenlighted
in the (IC)-constrained optimal allocation, even though doing so would be prof-
itable from an ex-post perspective. The negative virtual surpluses of the projects
in these cases indicates that the cost of allocating to such a project - incentive
compatibility requires higher transfers for other cost types - outweighs the benefit
from an ex-ante perspective. The second major difference between the relaxed
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optimal allocation and the optimal allocation can be seen for those realizations of
costs such that allocating to both projects would be feasible only in the relaxed
problem. This difference is a result of the designer’s inability to shift budget from
low-cost to relatively higher-cost projects with a strategyproof mechanism.
Corollary 2.13. In the symmetric case, the optimal direct mechanism can be
implemented by a descending-clock auction. The clock price, denoted by τ , starts
at z∗∗ and descends continuously and synchronously down to B
n
. Projects can drop
out at any price but cannot re-enter. The auction stops once the clock price can
be paid out to all projects remaining in the auction.
In any iteration, a scoring function of the corresponding DA auction is
sAti (ci, At) = max
{
ci − B|At| , 0
}
.
We consider the descending-clock auction of Corollary 2.13 to be a natural indirect
mechanism that implements the outcome of the optimal allocation. Project i’s
equilibrium strategy, which implements this outcome, has it staying active as long
as the price is weakly larger than its private cost, τ ≥ ci. It is easily verifiable
that this is a weakly dominant strategy for project i.
III.ii The asymmetric case
In this section, we demonstrate why the logic of the optimal mechanism in the
symmetric case does not carry over to the asymmetric case. To preserve tractabil-
ity, we restrict the analysis to the two-project case which conveys the intuition
behind the forces at work in the general case. However, we allow for general val-
ues v1 and v2 as well as differing cost distributions F1 and F2. We consider the
non-trivial case, z∗∗1 + z
∗∗
2 > B
Since we did not impose symmetry to prove Proposition 2.11, we can without loss
of generality restrict attention to mechanisms inheriting the optimal properties
to find an optimal mechanism for the asymmetric case as well. The rewritten
maximization problem of the designer (2.3) for the asymmetric two-project case
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is given by
maxz1(c2),z2(c1) E
[
I(c1 ≤ z1(c2))
(
v1 − c1 − F1(c1)f1(c1)
)
+I(c2 ≤ z2(c1))
(
v2 − c2 − F2(c2)f2(c2)
) ]
s.t.
I(c1 ≤ z1(c2))z1(c2) + I(c2 ≤ z2(c1))z2(c1) ≤ B ∀(c1, c2) ∈ C.
(2.9)
By Lemma 2.8, the cutoffs must be constants whenever both projects are green-
lighted. Since we consider the non-trivial case, these constants must sum up to
the budget. Otherwise, increasing one of the cutoffs until the budget binds is
both feasible and profitable. Let project 1’s cutoff for this case be z1(c2) = z and
project 2’s cutoff be z2(c1) = B − z. By virtue of the optimal properties, the de-
signer must greenlight a project once its cost is below the constant cutoff zi(c−i).
If both projects report greater costs, the designer is free to choose one of them. A
glance at the objective function (2.9) reveals that in such a case it is desirable to
greenlight the project with greater positive virtual surplus, if feasible. This result
allows us to rewrite the objective function (2.9) as a function of z,
max
z
pi(z) =
∫ z
0
ψ1(c1)dF1(c1) +
∫ B−z
0
ψ2(c2)dF2(c2) (2.10)
+
∫ c2
max{ψ−12 (ψ1(z)),B−z}
∫ min{ψ−11 (ψ2(c2)),z∗∗1 ,B}
z
ψ1(x)dF1(x)dF2(c2)
+
∫ c1
max{ψ−11 (ψ2(B−z)),z}
∫ min{ψ−12 (ψ1(c1)),z∗∗2 ,B}
B−z
ψ2(x)dF2(x)dF1(c1).
In the symmetric case, the ranking of virtual surpluses coincides with the reversed
order of costs. Hence, the optimal DA auction in the symmetric case rejects in each
round the least attractive project in terms of virtual surplus. A natural extension
of this mechanism to the asymmetric case would involve adjusting the cutoffs so
that they equalize virtual surplus. This modification ensures that again in each
round the least attractive project in terms of virtual surplus is rejected. We call
this the candidate allocation.
The condition for optimality of the candidate allocation is stated in (2.11). To
implement the candidate allocation, the constant cutoffs at which both projects
are greenlighted must be a pair (a1, a2) = (z, B− z) such that ψ1(z) = ψ2(B− z).
Then, however, optimality is only obtained if F2(B−z)
f2(B−z) =
F1(z)
f1(z)
. The intuition behind
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this statement is straightforward. Selecting z in order to satisfy ψ1(z) = ψ2(B−z)
allows the designer to always program the price clocks such that they greenlight
the project with the higher virtual surplus, whenever it is not feasible to greenlight
both projects. However, if F2(B−z)
f2(B−z) 6=
F1(z)
f1(z)
the cutoffs z and B−z do not maximize
the probability to greenlight both projects. Consequently, the designer can adjust
the cutoffs {z,B − z} to trade off a higher probability of implementing the most
favorable allocation (γ(c1, c2) = {1, 2}) against a positive probability of having to
implement the less preferred of two possible singleton allocations (γ(c) = j, when
project j has lower virtual surplus).
Therefore the two aspects of the designer’s payoff maximization - getting projects
with high virtual surplus and getting as many projects as possible - are only
aligned if condition (2.11) is met. In the symmetric case, the condition holds by
construction. However, in an asymmetric environment it is generically violated.
Proposition 2.14. In the nontrivial asymmetric two-project case, i.e., n = 2
and z∗∗1 + z
∗∗
2 > B, in which values or cost distributions differ across projects, it
is generically not optimal to always greenlight the project with the higher virtual
surplus. That is, under the optimal allocation rule γ, there may exist cost vectors
(ci, cj, c−i−j) ∈ C such that
i 6∈ γ(ci, cj, c−i−j), and j ∈ γ(ci, cj, c−i−j)
although
ψi(ci) > ψj(cj).
Proof. To obtain the derivative of pi(z) given in (2.10) with respect to z we can use
the rules for differentiation under the integral sign.13 Given the max operators,
the derivative takes a different form depending on whether ψ1(z) ≷ ψ2(B − z).
However, as pi is continuously differentiable, it suffices to look at one of the two
forms,
∂pi
∂z
∣∣∣∣
z:ψ1(z)≥ψ2(B−z)
=
∫ ψ−11 (ψ2(B−z))
z
ψ1(x)dF1(x)f2(B − z)+
+ ψ1(z)f1(z)F2(B − z)
− ψ2(B − z)f2(B − z)F1(ψ−11 (ψ2(B − z))).
13Define g(z, c2) :=
∫min{ψ−11 (ψ2(c2)),z∗∗1 ,B}
z
ψ1(x)dF1(x)f2(c2) and then use
d
dz
(∫ b(z)
a(z)
g(z, c2)dc2
)
= g(z, b(z))b′(z)− g(z, a(z))a′(z) + ∫ b(z)
a(z)
gz(z, c2)dc2.
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Now, consider z corresponding to the candidate allocation with ψ1(z) = ψ2(B−z),
which yields
∂pi
∂z
= 0⇔ F2(B − z)
f2(B − z) =
F1(z)
f1(z)
, (2.11)
a nongeneric case. Consequently, it is generically not optimal to always allocate
to the project with the higher virtual surplus.
Proposition 2.14 is driven by a tradeoff between quantity and quality: Even though
the designer always prefers the project with the higher virtual surplus, if she
greenlights a single project she sometimes greenlights the project with lower virtual
surplus out of two rival projects, as quantity is endogenous here. The simplest
way to lay out the intuition behind Proposition 2.14 is by an example.
Example 2.1. There are two projects, (n = 2) with v1 = 5, v2 = 4.5 and c1 and
c2 are uniformly distributed on support [0, 1]. The budget is given by B = 1. The
optimal cutoff functions are given by:
z1(c2) =

0.53 if c2 ≤ 0.47
c2 + 0.25 if 0.47 < c2 ≤ 0.75
1 if c2 > 0.75
z2(c1) =
0.47 if c1 ≤ 0.72c1 − 0.25 if c1 > 0.72.
Possible scoring functions for a corresponding DA auction are given by:
s
{1,2}
1 (c1) =

c1 + 0.47 if 0.53 < c1 < 0.72
2c1 − 0.25 if c1 ≥ 0.72
0 otherwise
s
{1,2}
2 (c2) =
2c2 + 0.25 if c2 > 0.470 otherwise
s
{1}
1 (c1) = 0
s
{2}
2 (c2) = 0.
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The corresponding optimal allocation is:
(q1, q2) =

(1, 1) if 0 ≤ c1 ≤ 0.53 and 0 ≤ c2 ≤ 0.47
(1, 0) if 0 ≤ c1 ≤ 0.72 and c2 > 0.47
(1, 0) if c1 > 0.72 and ψ1 ≥ ψ2
(0, 1) if 0.53 < c1 ≤ 0.72 and c2 ≤ 0.47
(0, 1) if c1 > 0.72 and ψ1 < ψ2.
The corresponding transfers are:
t1(c1, c2) =

0.53 if c2 ≤ 0.47 and c1 ≤ 0.53
c2 + 0.25 if 0.47 < c2 ≤ 0.75 and c1 ≤ c2 + 0.25
1 if c2 > 0.75
0 otherwise
t2(c1, c2) =

0.47 if c1 ≤ 0.72 and c2 ≤ 0.47
c1 − 0.25 if c1 > 0.72 and c2 < c1 − 0.25
0 otherwise.
Consider Example 2.1. The candidate allocation demands cutoffs such that z˜1(c2) =
0.625 and z˜2(c1) = 0.375 for allocating to both projects. At these cutoffs, the prob-
ability of greenlighting both projects is 0.625 · 0.375 ≈ 0.234. This allocation is
depicted in Panel 2.5a. In contrast, the maximal feasible probability to greenlight
both projects is at equal cutoffs, ẑ1(c2) = ẑ2(c1) = 0.5. The corresponding area is
the dotted square in the lower-left corner of Panel 2.5b. However, at these cutoffs
it is not incentive compatible to guarantee the green light for the project with
higher virtual surplus in every case. More specifically, it is not incentive compat-
ible to allocate along the dotted14 diagonal line, if at least one project exceeds
ẑi(c−i). Hence, strategyproofness introduces a tradeoff between maximizing the
probability of greenlighting both projects and allocating to the preferred one if only
one project is feasible. Consequently, the optimal cutoffs (z∗1 , z
∗
2) for greenlighting
14Not to be confused with the dashed diagonal representing the budget constraint.
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both projects do not lie at (0.625, 0.375) but rather at (0.53, 0.47). Importantly,
this optimal discrimination of the stronger project is pursued independently of the
discrimination due to the stochastic dominance reflected in the virtual costs.
Given the optimal allocation in Example 2.1, there are some realizations of the cost
vector for which the designer greenlights the project with lower virtual surplus.
These realizations are represented by the shaded area in Panel 2.6a. Here, (IC),
(PC), and the choice of (z1(c2), z2(c1)) force the designer to greenlight project 2,
even though project 1 has the higher virtual surplus.
The cost vectors for which the designer implements both projects are repre-
sented by the rectangular area in the lower-left corner of Panel 2.6a. Any point
(z1(c2), z2(c1)) on the dashed line representing the budget constraint satisfies z1(c2)+
z2(c1) = B. Moving this corner point southwest along the dashed budget line has
two effects: shrinking the shaded area and shrinking the area of the rectangle,
which in this example represents the probability that both projects are conducted.
While it is desirable to shrink the shaded area, in which the designer must allocate
to project 2 despite its lower virtual surplus, shrinking the size of the rectangle
lowers the probability of allocating to both projects. Given that we have an in-
terior solution in this example, at (z1(c2), z2(c1)) these two effects balance each
other out.
Figure 2.5: Candidate and optimal allocation for Example 2.1.
B, c1 c1
B, c2
c2
both
1
2
z˜1(c2)
z˜2(c1)
(a) Candidate allocation.
B, c1 c1
B, c2
c2
both
1
2
z2(c1)
z1(c2)
(b) Optimal allocation.
Graphically, the fact that there is no slack in the budget constraint whenever both
projects are greenlighted implies that the area representing points at which both
projects are executed touches the dashed line at least once, as can be seen, for
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example, in Panel 2.6b. In fact, it can touch the (BC)-constraint exactly once, as it
is not possible to greenlight both projects when c1 > z1(c2) or c2 > z2(c1) without
violating (BC) sometimes. This result means that the area where both projects
are greenlighted is the rectangle with corners (0, 0) and (z1(c2), z2(c1)). Then,
if c1 < z1(c2) but c2 > z2(c1), the nature of cutoffs prevents the designer from
greenlighting project 2. Therefore project 1 must be greenlighted, as represented
by the lightly shaded area in Panel 2.6b. A similar argument applies to the darkly
shaded area. Thus, looking at Panel 2.6b, the choice of (z1(c2), z2(c1)) determines
the allocation for all cost realizations except those in the upper-right corner. Here,
the designer is free to choose the allocation, as long as the line delineating whether
project 1 or 2 gets greenlighted is (weakly) increasing or vertical. Not surprisingly,
it is optimal to greenlight the project with the higher virtual surplus.
Figure 2.6: Greenlighting the project with lower virtual surplus and (IC)-
constraints on the allocation (Example 2.1).
B, c1 c1
B, c2
c2
1
2
z2(c1)
z1(c2)
both
(a) Greenlighting the project with
lower virtual surplus.
B, c1 c1
B, c2
c2
both
z2(c1)
z1(c2)
2 by (IC)
1 by (IC)
free to
choose (IC)
allocation
(b) (IC)-constraints on the alloca-
tion.
By Proposition 2.11, the optimal allocation can be implemented with a descending-
clock auction. In the following, we show how to accommodate the tradeoff between
quantity and quality in a modified clock auction.
Corollary 2.15. In an optimal implementation with descending price clocks, the
clocks not only run at individual speeds, occasionally some clocks also have to halt.
A crucial difference to the symmetric case is that each project must have an individ-
ual price clock, because heterogeneous virtual surplus functions require individual
speeds. Interestingly, an implication of the quantity-quality tradeoff is that some-
times one clock has to halt. For Example 2.1, the clock prices, denoted by τi, are
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depicted in Figure 2.7 as a function of time. The entire (maximal) duration of the
auction can be divided into three segments. The auction starts with both clocks
at z∗∗1 = z
∗∗
2 = c. First, τ2 decreases while τ1 is held constant, which happens
until both clock prices lead to the same virtual surplus, i.e., ψ2(τ2) = ψ1(c2). Sec-
ond, both τ1 and τ2 decrease simultaneously, but asynchronously keeping virtual
surplus equal, ψ1(τ1) = ψ2(τ2), until τ2 = z2(c1). Third, only τ1 decreases until
τ1 = z1(c2). If at this point both projects still remain in the auction, the auction
stops and both are greenlighted. Otherwise, the inferior project 2 is greenlighted.
Figure 2.7: Optimal descending-clock auction in Example 2.1.
time
prices
τ1, τ2
c
τ2
τ1
z1(c2)
z2(c1)
ψ−12 (ψ1(c))
end
The cost vectors for which the designer greenlights project 2 despite its lower
virtual surplus, represented by the shaded area in Panel 2.6a, are also represented
graphically in Figure 2.7: If the auction ends in the third time segment (shaded
area of Figure 2.7) before both projects can be greenlighted, project 1 must have
exited because τ1 dropped below c1. Project 2 is greenlighted and receives transfer
z2(c1) even though project 1 has the higher virtual surplus. Therefore if cost
vectors in the shaded area of Panel 2.6a realize, the optimal descending-clock
auction ends in the third time segment.
We should emphasize again a novel feature of this descending-clock auction. The
clocks of both projects are paused asynchronously over some time of the auction.
One project’s clock runs down while the other project’s clock stops. Since we have
examined a very simple example, each project’s clock is paused only once. In a
more general setting, the projects’ clocks may pause and resume several times.
Given the complexity of our problem, we do not find a simple and general (n >
2) full characterization of the optimal mechanism in the asymmetric case. In
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our examples with two projects, the problem boils down to finding one point,
(z1(c2), z2(c1)), with respect to one crucial tradeoff. Naturally, the number of
relevant tradeoffs increases with the number of projects. Therefore unfortunately,
optimization with a larger set of projects quickly loses tractability.
IV Discussion
With our model as a starting point, there are several interesting modifications. In
this section, we address the most natural alternative models or extensions.
vi as private information, potentially correlated with ci - The designer can
neglect asking for vi directly since no meaningful non-babbling equilibria in the
vi-dimension exist. If the conditional density of vi|ci has full support, project i
cannot credibly announce being a “high” type, say vi. If we slightly change the
regularity assumption such that E[vi|ci]−ci− F (ci)f(ci must be strictly increasing, our
results generalize by exchanging the previously commonly known vi with E[vi|ci].
This regularity condition mildly restricts the degree of positive correlation.
Interdependent types - We can interpret the symmetric case as a setting in
which identical projects are provided at individual costs. Hence, one may wonder
about a setting in which projects only draw an imperfect signal about the cost,
which finally depends on other projects’ signals as well. In a clock auction in such
an environment, active projects update their belief about the cost whenever a
project drops out. Moreover, the designer learns this information as well. There-
fore the design of the optimal mechanism crucially depends on the information
structure. This analysis is left for a follow-up paper.
IV.i Residual money
Whether it is reasonable to assume that the designer values residual money de-
pends on the setting. In Ensthaler and Giebe (2014a), money does not enter the
objective function, only the constraints. To clarify the relation to their paper, we
introduce a linear weighting λ ∈ [0, 1] of residual money, and provide comparative
statics on parameter λ. The objective function can be rewritten as in (2.3),
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max{zi}i∈I Ec
[∑
i I(ci ≤ zi(c−i))
(
vi − λ
(
ci +
Fi(ci)
fi(ci)
))]
s.t.∑
i∈I
I(ci ≤ zi(c−i))zi(c−i) ≤ B ∀c ∈ C.
This objective function highlights one difference to the original setting. Instead of
ζ∗∗-exclusive the optimal mechanism is ζ∗∗λ -exclusive: Define ψi,λ(c) = vi − λ(c +
Fi(c)
fi(c)
) as the λ-adjusted virtual surplus and define the vector ζ∗∗λ with i-the element
z∗∗i,λ = min{ci, ψ−1i,λ (0)}.
It can be shown that the other properties that are sufficient to allow a DA-auction
implementation continue to hold. In fact, the optimal allocation in the symmetric
case remains unchanged if ζ∗∗λ = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) for all λ ∈ [0, 1], i.e., when the
original optimal mechanism did not exclude any cost types. For any combination
of cost supports and values, there exists a sufficiently small λ′ > 0 such that
the designer’s ranking over projects is lexicographic. In other words, λ′ must
be sufficiently small such that no λ′-weighted difference in cost can offset any
difference in values.
Figure 2.8: Decreasing λ augments the quantity-quality tradeoff: The gray
areas, where the project with lower λ-adjusted virtual surplus is implemented,
increases.
B, c1 c1
B, c2
c2
λ = 1
λ = 0.5
λ = 0
In the asymmetric case, however, the quantity-quality tradeoff is affected as well.
To illustrate how the optimal allocation varies when λ is perturbed, we consider
the example again, see Figure 2.8. A lower λ means that the designer prefers the
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high-value project 1 for higher cost reports relative to the low-value project 2 for
a given cost report. This difference is illustrated by a right-shift in the diagonal
that represents the loci such that both projects have equal (λ-adjusted) virtual
surplus.
Reducing the weight of residual money increases the measure of cost reports for
which the optimal mechanism implements project 2 despite project 1 having the
larger λ-adjusted virtual surplus. Thus changing λ directly affects the quantity-
quality tradeoff. As illustrated in Figure 2.8, reducing λ means that in the optimal
mechanism the cutoffs at which both projects are greenlighted moves southeast,
thus reducing the probability to greenlight both projects. The reason is that for
lower λ a higher weight is placed on the high-value project 1.
V Conclusion
Despite their importance, knapsack problems with private information have been
somewhat overlooked by the economics literature. We examine a setting in which
a budget-constrained procurer faces privately-informed sellers under ex-post con-
straints. Amongst many possible economic problems, this setting particularly ap-
plies to development funds, which are typically endowed with a fixed budget and
want to finance both many projects and projects of high quality. Such problems
often entail relationships in which sellers can renege on the terms of the agree-
ment ex-post. To avoid nondelivery, shelving the project or costly renegotiation,
it is appropriate to impose ex-post constraints on the agents’ participation. For
such settings, we have shown that a subset of DA auctions constitutes the class of
optimal deterministic strategyproof mechanisms.
An optimal mechanism is described by a set of cutoff functions: All projects that
report costs below their cutoff are greenlighted and receive a transfer equal to
the cutoff. These cutoff functions are weakly increasing in other projects’ costs,
which means that the optimal allocation rule has substitutes: Given a project
is implemented for some cost vector, it is also implemented when, all else being
equal, the cost of a rival project is increased. Moreover, we show that the optimal
allocation rule has non-bossy winners: A project that is implemented cannot affect
the allocation without changing its own allocation status. In particular, if two
different realizations of the cost vector lead to the same allocation, then the cutoffs
of conducted projects only vary in the costs of projects not conducted. Finally,
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the optimal allocation rule excludes all projects with negative “virtual surplus”
from the allocation.
These properties allow for a characterization as a deferred acceptance (DA) auc-
tion, introduced by Milgrom and Segal (2014). The DA auction representation
provides a simple implementation via descending-clock auctions, which are easy
to understand and usable in practice. In addition, DA auctions have attractive
properties regarding incentive compatibility which make the prediction of equilib-
rium play more robust.
We fully describe the optimal allocation and the corresponding descending-clock
auction in an environment in which projects are ex-ante symmetric. The optimal
mechanism is monotone in the sense that the cheapest projects are greenlighted
and all projects conducted receive the same transfer. This transfer either corre-
sponds to the lowest cost among redlighted projects or the budget is distributed
equally. The equivalent clock auction features a single price clock that continu-
ously descends until all active projects can be financed.
For asymmetric environments, in which values and/or cost distributions differ,
we demonstrate a novel tradeoff between quantity and quality of the greenlighted
projects. The designer values both quantity and quality of the projects: She
prefers projects with high virtual surplus over projects with low virtual surplus
and she prefers more projects over fewer projects. In models in which the designer
wants to procure a fixed number of projects, she would always choose the projects
with the highest virtual surpluses. If quantity is endogenously determined by the
mechanism, as in our setup, it is ex-ante not always desirable to conduct the best
projects. When the best projects are always conducted, incentive compatibility
would force the designer to reduce the expected number of greenlighted projects.
This insight entails a consequence for the corresponding descending-clock auction.
Clocks not only run asynchronously, but also periodically have to stop for certain
projects.
Other interesting extensions are left for future research, for example, multiple
projects per agent or projects that are complements instead of perfect substitutes.
For practitioners, a simple approximately optimal mechanism may be of great
value. The characterization of the optimal mechanism as a DA auction sheds
light on how to construct such an approximately optimal mechanism. Halting
clocks should be a key feature for the corresponding clock auction in asymmetric
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environments. However, we showed that the optimal strategyproof mechanism is
not detail-free.
In conclusion, our methodological approach contributes to a better understanding
of a class of relevant problems and opens the door for future research in this
area. Furthermore, we provide an elegant indirect mechanism that can be easily
implemented in practice.
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VI Appendix
VI.A Properties of optimal mechanisms: General proofs
Lemma 2.6. The optimal mechanism has substitutes,
zi(c˜j, c−i−j) ≥ zi(ĉj, c−i−j) for almost every c˜j > ĉj and c−i−j ∈ C−i−j. (2.5)
Figure 2.9: Continuous decrease / increase.
cM c1
z2
z3
c1
ĉ3
ĉ2
(a) Intuition for the hat devi-
ation.
cM c1
z2
z3
c1
c˜3
c˜2
(b) Intuition for the tilde devi-
ation.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that somewhere z2 is decreasing in c1. Then there
exist some c1
M and η > 0 such that z2(c1, c−1−2) > z2(c1, c−1−2) for all c1 ∈
(c1
M − η, c1M), for all c1 ∈ (c1M , c1M + η), and for all c−1−2 ∈ χ−1−2 ⊂ C−1−2, and
χ−1−2 has positive Lebesgue-measure.
With more than two projects, the simple deviation of the two-project case - flat-
tening the decreasing cutoff - is not necessarily feasible. It may be the case that
other projects’ cutoff functions are strictly increasing in c1 over the same region
and that for some cost vectors these cutoffs have to be paid along z2. Then simply
flattening z2 could violate the budget constraint.
Suppose no other cutoff function is increasing while z2 is decreasing. Then the
decrease of z2 cannot be optimal and flattening z2 increases the designer’s payoff
much in the same way as in the two-project-case. Otherwise, pick a subset of
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Figure 2.10: Jump decrease / increase.
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(b) Intuition for the tilde devi-
ation.
χ̂1 ⊂ (c1M , c1M + η) (with pos. Lebesgue-measure) such that w.l.o.g. project 3’s
cutoff increases in c1 in the analogous sense to the decrease of z2 defined above -
for cost vectors where both project 2 and project 3 are eventually greenlighted,
i.e., z2 and z3 both need to be paid.
The set
Ξ̂23(c1, c−1−2−3, δ) = {(c2, c3)|c2 ∈ (z2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3), z2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3) + δ];
c3 ∈ (z3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3)− δ, z3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3)]}
must have positive measure on R2 for all c1 ∈ χ̂1 and for any c−1−2−3 ∈ χ−1−2−3,
where χ−1−2−3 is a set with positive Lebesgue measure where the cutoff of project
2 is decreasing while the cutoff of project 3 is increasing. It is the set of (c2, c3)
tuples, where c2 just exceeds z2 by no more than δ, while c3 lies just below z3 by
no more than δ - given c−1−2−3 and c1. By Ξ̂223(c1, c−1−2−3, δ) we denote the set
of project 2 components of tuples in the set Ξ̂23(c1, c−1−2−3, δ), and similarly for
project 3.
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Now deviate from the candidate mechanism in setting
ẑ2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3) := z2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3) + δ
ẑ3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3) := z3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3)− δ
for all
c1 ∈ (ĉ1, ĉ1 + ε)
c2 ∈ Ξ̂223(c1, c−1−2−3)
c3 ∈ Ξ̂323(c1, c−1−2−3)
c−1−2−3 ∈ χ̂−1−2−3 ⊂ χ−1−2−3.
We call this deviation the hat deviation. The intuition for this deviation is the
following. For an ε-environment of c1 to the right of c
M
1 (i.e., ĉ1 > c
M
1 ), in-
crease the decreasing cutoff z2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3) by δ for all c3 that drop out of
the allocation if z3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3) (at c2) is decreased by δ. Likewise only in-
crease z3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3) by δ for those c2 that are additionally greenlighted if
z2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3) is increased by δ. Therefore if the deviation changes the alloca-
tion, project 2 is now greenlighted whereas project 3 is not.
This deviation is feasible. Remember that there must be enough budget to pay
both z2 and z3 - otherwise flattening z2 would have been possible. But then there
is enough budget for z2 + δ and z3 − δ.
Now define
ĉ2 := sup
c1,c−1−2−3
Ξ̂223(c1, c−1−2−3)
ĉ3 := inf
c1,c−1−2−3
Ξ̂323(c1, c−1−2−3)
s.t.
c1 ∈ (ĉ1, ĉ1 + ε)
c−1−2−3 ∈ χ̂−1−2−3.
In words, to bound the change in payoff we let ĉ2 be the highest cost type gained
by the deviation and we let ĉ3 be the lowest cost type lost by the deviation. Then
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the change in payoff for the hat deviation is bounded in the following way:
∆̂ > (ψ2(ĉ2)− ψ3(ĉ3))∗∫
χ̂−1−2−3
∫ ĉ1+ε
ĉ1
∫
Ξ̂223(c1,c−1−2−3)
∫
Ξ̂323(c1,c−1−2−3)
1dF3(·)dF2(·)dF1(·)dF−1−2−3(·).
If ∆̂ > 0, we have found a profitable deviation. If not, then consider the following
tilde deviation.
Analogously to Ξ̂23 we define the set
Ξ˜23(c1, c−1−2−3, δ) = {(c2, c3)|c2 ∈ (z2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3)− δ, z2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3)];
c3 ∈ (z3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3), z3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3) + δ]}
which again must have positive measure.
Now, we deviate for an ε-environment to the left of cM1 (i.e., c˜1 < c
M
1 ). But instead
of increasing z2 and decreasing z3, we increase z3 and decrease z2:
z˜2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3) := z2(c1, c3, c−1−2−3)− δ
ẑ3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3) := z3(c1, c2, c−1−2−3) + δ
for all
c1 ∈ (c˜1 − ε, c˜1)
c2 ∈ Ξ˜223(c1, c−1−2−3)
c3 ∈ Ξ˜323(c1, c−1−2−3)
c−1−2−3 ∈ χ˜−1−2−3 ⊂ χ−1−2−3.
The relevant bounds to bound the payoff are then given by
c˜2 := inf
c1,c−1−2−3
Ξ˜223(c1, c−1−2−3)
c˜3 := sup
c1,c−1−2−3
Ξ˜323(c1, c−1−2−3)
s.t.
c1 ∈ (c˜1 − ε, c˜1)
c−1−2−3 ∈ χ˜−1−2−3.
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And this gives the following bound for the payoff
∆˜ > (ψ2(c˜3)− ψ3(c˜2))∗∫
χ−1−2−3
∫ c˜1
c˜1−ε
∫
Ξ˜223(c1,c−1−2−3)
∫
Ξ˜323(c1,c−1−2−3)
1dF3(·)dF2(·)dF1(·)dF−1−2−3(·).
By appropriately choosing δ, Ξ̂−1−2−3, and Ξ˜−1−2−3, we can ensure that ĉ3 > c˜3 and
ĉ2 < c˜2. This follows simply from the notion of increasing/decreasing cutoffs and is
illustrated in Figures 2.9 and 2.10. Therefore ∆̂ ≤ 0 implies ∆˜ > 0. Consequently,
there is always a profitable deviation and our candidate mechanism could not have
been optimal.
Lemma 2.8. For any cost vectors (cG, cR) ∈ C and (c′G, cR) ∈ C such that
G = γ(cG, cR) = γ(c
′
G, cR) and R = I \ γ(cG, cR), the optimal cutoff function zg
for all g ∈ G is (almost everywhere) independent of the costs of all greenlighted
projects cG. That is,
zg(cG−g, cR) = zg(c′G−g, cR),
for all cG−g and c′G−g such that G is the set of greenlighted agents.
Proof. Take any feasible candidate mechanism with any set of increasing cutoff
functions {zi}i∈I for any individual project. Assume that for some cost vectors
with positive Lebesgue-measure, only all projects in set G ⊆ I are executed while
all projects of set R are not conducted. Therefore there exists a set, CGR , with
positive Lebesgue-measure containing the part of the cost vector for the projects
in setR such that the partition {G,R} is induced given some c where the redlighted
projects have costs cR ∈ CGR . Then aGi (cR) according to the following definition
aGi (cR) = max{ci|∃cG−i : ci ≤ zi(cG−i, cR),
and cg ≤ zg(cG−j, c−G)∀g ∈ G,
and cr > zr(cG, c−G−r)∀r ∈ R} (2.12)
exists for all i ∈ G given cR ∈ CGR . In words, aGi (cR) is the highest cost of project i
such that, given some cost vector cR of projects that are not executed, there exists
some vector cG−i of costs of competing projects that induces a cutoff zi(cG−i, c−G)
above said cost while each element cg of the vector cG−i is lower than the cutoff
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induced by aGi (cR) and the elements of the cost vectors cR and cG−i−g,
∀g ∈ G \ {i}, cg ≤ zg(cR, cG−i−g, aGi (cR)).
Simultaneously, it must hold that these costs induce a cutoff such that no project
r ∈ R is conducted
∀r ∈ R, cr > zr(cR−r, cG−i, aGi (cR)).
Moreover, we can replace any function zi with a left-continuous function that is
identical up to a set of points with Lebesgue-measure zero. Hence, the limit is
reached from below and there exists at least one cost vector (ĉ−i, aGi (cR)) where
G is the set of executed projects and aGi (ĉR) = zi(ĉ−i) holds. Now, notice that
ĉg ≤ aGg (ĉR) ∀g ∈ G \ {i},
because, given ĉR, there cannot exist a cost vector where only all projects in G are
executed and the cost of project g exceeds aGg (ĉR) by its construction. Moreover,
we have established that every cutoff function zi is weakly increasing in each
argument. Thus,
aGi (ĉR) = zi(ĉ−i) ≤ zi(aGG−i(ĉR), ĉR), (2.13)
where aGG−i is the vector of all a
G
g defined according to (2.12) except a
G
i . This in-
equality tells us that, whenever some vector (cR, cG−i) ≥ (ĉR, aGG−i(ĉR))15 realizes,
a sufficient condition for project i ∈ G to be executed is ci ≤ aGi (ĉR).
The same logic also applies to all projects in G other than i. Therefore at least
all projects g ∈ G are conducted whenever a cost vector realizes such that cg =
aGg (cR).
16 Consequently, the budget constraint requires that
∑
g∈G
zg(a
G
−g(cR), cR) ≤ B. (2.14)
Furthermore, given cR, for all projects g ∈ G, zg(c−G, cR) = aGg (cR) if cG−g ≤
aGG−g(c−G). That is, the cutoffs are constant given the cost vector of redlighted
projects.
15When x and y are vectors, x ≥ y means that every element xi of x weakly exceeds the
corresponding element yi of y.
16aGi (cR) is only defined if C
G 6= ∅ and cR ∈ CGR , but this does not hinder the proof.
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Suppose to the contrary that zi(c−i) < ai(cR) for some i ∈ G and for all c−i ∈
Ξ ⊂ CG−i with Ξ having positive Lebesgue measure.
Define Ξ(cG−i−j, cR) ⊂ [0, cj] where zi(cG−i−j, cj, cR) < aGi (cR) for all cj ∈ Ξ(cG−i−j, cR).
For any cG−i−j ≤ aG−i−j(cR), let
zΞi (cG−i−j, cR) := max
cj∈Ξ(cG−i−j ,cR)
zi(cG−i−j, cj, cR)
By (2.14), changing the mechanism to
zi(cG−i,−j, cj, cR) = aGi (cR), ∀cj ≤ aGj (cR)
does not violate the budget constraint. This deviation increases the payoff condi-
tional on cR by
∆ >
∫
Ξ−j
Pr(cj ∈ Ξ(cG−i−j, cR))
∫ aGi (cR)
zΞi (cG−i−j ,cR)
ψi(c)dFi(c)dF−i−j(c−i−j) > 0.
Given that Ξ has positive Lebesgue-measure, this deviation also strictly increases
the unconditional payoff.
VI.B Constructing a scoring function: Proof of Proposition 2.11
To prove Proposition 2.11, it is helpful to consider the following lemmata. While
Lemma 2.8 (non-bossy winners) is a statement that conditions on a fixed alloca-
tion, it also has implications on the cutoffs resulting from different cost vectors
that induce different allocations.
Lemma 2.16. Take any mechanism and any two cost vectors c 6= ĉ that induce
partitions {G,R} and {Ĝ, R̂}, respectively. Then
cR∪R̂ = ĉR∪R̂
cG∩Ĝ 6= ĉG∩Ĝ
implies
G = Ĝ
R = R̂,
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that is, c and ĉ induce the same allocation.
Proof. Given cost vector c, define a new cost vector c′, where c′i = min{ci, ĉi} for
all i ∈ G ∩ Ĝ and c′R∪R̂ = cR∪R̂. By Lemma 2.8, c′ induces allocation {G,R}.
Similarly, a perturbation of cost vector ĉ in the same way with ĉ′i = min{ci, ĉi}
for all j ∈ G∩ Ĝ and ĉ′
R∪R̂ = ĉR∪R̂ must induce allocation {Ĝ, R̂}. But c′ = ĉ′ by
construction. Hence, G = Ĝ and R = R̂.
Lemma 2.17. Take any mechanism and any two cost vectors c 6= c˜ that induce
partitions {G,R} and {G˜, R˜}, respectively. Then
zi(cG∩G˜, cR∪R˜) = zi(c˜G∩G˜, cR∪R˜)
zj(c˜G∩G˜, c˜R∪R˜) = zj(cG∩G˜, c˜R∪R˜)
for all i ∈ G and for all j ∈ G˜, respectively.
Proof. By Lemma 2.16, the vector (c˜G∩G˜, cR∪R˜) leads to allocation {G,R} and
the vector (cG∩G˜, c˜R∪R˜) leads to allocation {G˜, R˜}. The rest follows directly from
Lemma 2.8 (non-bossy winners).
Having established these properties we can prove Proposition 2.11 by induction.
We construct a DA scoring function for each iteration. Conditional on all previous
iterations having been constructed correctly, we can demonstrate how to construct
an appropriate scoring function for any iteration.
Proposition 2.11. Any optimal mechanism has a DA auction representation and
can be implemented with a descending-clock auction.
Proof. This proof is structured as follows. First, we construct scoring functions
for each iteration of the DA auction. Then we explain how the zeros of the scoring
functions are derived. Finally we show by induction that the constructed DA
auction implements the same allocation as the underlying z-mechanism.
Scoring functions
First, we introduce some notation. Let At be the set of active projects in iteration
t and let Ot := I \ At be the set of inactive projects (O as in “out”). Let Otj :=
Ot ∪ {j} be the union of dropped out projects and some individual project j.
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Fix an optimal z-mechanism and consider the corresponding DA auction with
scoring functions {sAi }A⊂I,i∈A
sAi (ci, cO) =

0 if ci ≤ aAi (cO),
ci +
j∈A∑
i 6=j
bjOi(ci, cO) otherwise,
(2.15)
where aAi (cO) is defined as in (2.12) and b
j
Oi(ci, cO) is defined as
bjOi(ci, cO) := max
{
cj : ∃c˜−Oi−j : R = Oi|ci, cO
}
:= max
{
cj : ∃c˜−Oi−j : ci > zi(cj, c˜−Oi−j, cO),
and co > zo(ci, cj, c˜−Oi−j, cO−i)∀o ∈ O,
and cg ≤ zg(ci, cj, c˜−Oi−j, cO)∀g ∈ A \ i
}
.
In words, bjOi(ci, cO) is the highest cost of project j such that given the vector cOi
the corresponding z-mechanism implements the allocation partition R = Oi and
G = A \ i for some realization of the cost vector c˜−Oi−j.
Zeros of the scoring functions
Suppose the DA auction ends in the t-th iteration. Then all projects i ∈ At
have score sAti = 0 and the cost vector must induce G = At in the underlying
z-mechanism. By non-bossiness of winners, cutoffs of projects in G are constant
in the part of the cost vector cAt for all cost vectors inducing the same allocation.
Therefore we can characterize the zeros of the scoring function by a threshold and
sAti = 0 whenever project i’s cost is below this threshold. The threshold is given
by aAti (cO) as defined in (2.12). Notice that ci ≤ aAti (cO) implies that project i is
not eliminated in the t-th iteration, even if other projects exceed their threshold.
This implication does not rule out permissible z-mechanisms. Conditional on cOt ,
some projects exceeding their threshold can at most lead to a higher cutoff for
project i due to monotonicity.
Further notice that if ci > a
At
i (cO), there always exist cost vectors with cOt for
previously eliminated projects that induce G = At \ {i}. For example, all cost
vectors with cj ≤ aAtj (cOt) for all j ∈ At \ {i} induce that allocation. However,
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this condition is sufficient for G = At \ {i} but not necessary. There can be other
cost vectors inducing the same allocation.
Iteration 1
If multiple projects have a positive score, it also holds that
If ĉ induces R̂ = {i} then sIi (ci) > sIj (cj) for all j 6= i (2.16)
The meaning of R̂ = {i} is that ĉi > zi(ĉ−i) and ĉj ≤ zj(ĉ−j). Hence, by construc-
tion
ĉj ≤ zj(ĉ−j) ≤ bji (ĉi) (2.17)
as bji (ĉi) is the highest cutoff zj that allows allocation R̂ = {i} given ĉi.
Next, we show
ĉi > b
i
j(ĉj). (2.18)
Suppose that the contrary holds, then there exists a vector c˜−i−j such that
ĉi ≤ zi(ĉj, c˜−i−j)
and allocation R˜ = {j} is implemented. By Lemma 2.17 we know that the cutoffs
z are constant in costs of projects Ĝ ∩ G˜ = I \ {i, j}. Consequently, we arrive at
ĉi ≤ zi(ĉj, c˜−i−j) = zi(ĉj, ĉ−i−j)
which means that i is greenlighted for vector ĉ, a contradiction to our initial
assumption that ĉ implements R̂ = {i}.
Next, we show
bki (ĉi) ≥ bkj (ĉj) for all j 6= i and k 6= i, j. (2.19)
By definition
bki (ĉi) = zk(ĉi, c˜−i−k) for some c˜−i−k,
bkj (ĉj) = zk(ĉj, c˙−j−k) for some c˙−j−k.
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Because projects −i−j−k are greenlighted for both cost realizations (ĉk, ĉi, c˜−i−k)
and (ĉk, ĉi, c˙−i−k), it follows by Lemma 2.17 that
bki (ĉi) = zk(ĉi, c˜−i−k) = zk(ĉi, ĉ−i−k),
bkj (ĉj) = zk(ĉj, c˙−j−k) = zk(c˙i, ĉ−i−k).
Furthermore, it must hold that ĉi > c˙i, otherwise vector ĉ would not optimally
redlight project i while vector (ĉ−i, c˙i) optimally greenlights project i. Then by
bidder substitutability,
bki (ĉi) = zk(ĉ−k) ≥ zk(c˙i, ĉ−i−k) = bkj (ĉj).
Combining (2.17), (2.18) and (2.19) leads to (2.16). We have shown that the
scoring function eliminates the correct project when |R| = 1, i.e., the redlighted
project.
Finally, we need to show that if |R| > 1, the project removed in the first iteration
is redlighted in the allocation implemented by the underlying z-mechanism, i.e.,
A1 \ A2 = {k} ⇒ k ∈ R.
Now take cost vector c˜ with allocation {G˜, R˜} and let i ∈ G˜ be some greenlighted
project and and let j ∈ R˜ be some redlighted project, respectively. Since project j
is redlighted, it must have cost c˜j > a
I
j . Hence there exists some cost vector ĉ with
ĉj = c˜j such that R̂ = {j}. By Lemma 2.17, we can assume ĉi = c˜i since i ∈ G˜∩Ĝ.
As our scoring function correctly matches all cases in which |R| = 1, it must be
that sj(c˜j) > si(c˜i). Given that we have chosen i and j arbitrarily, we have shown
that any project removed in the first iteration must be in the redlighted set, which
was to show.
Iteration 2
We can show with the same arguments as above, that the previously stated scoring
function is correct for t = 2 as well. To this end, we inductively rely on the fact
that the project k removed in the first iteration is indeed redlighted by the z-
mechanism - as we have shown above.
Iteration t ≥ 3
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With the appropriate scoring functions used in all previous iterations, we can
then show that the t-th iteration removes the correct project for all cost vectors
inducing |R| = t given a z-mechanism and otherwise removes some project i ∈ At,
where i ∈ R, for all cost vectors inducing |R| > t.
VI.C The symmetric case
Proposition 2.12. Arrange the projects in ascending order of their reported costs,
c1 ≤ c2 ≤ · · · ≤ cn ≤ cn+1 := c, and define zk := min
{
B
k
, z∗∗, ck+1
}
. In the
symmetric case, the cutoff mechanism with zi(c−i) = zk
∗
is the optimal mechanism.
The optimal number of accepted projects k∗ is given by k∗ := max{k|ck ≤ zk}.
Proof. The case n = 2 has been proven in Section III.i.
Now, consider n = 3. Fix any c3 and any mechanism as candidate for optimality.
Either c3 > z3(c1, c2) or c3 ≤ z3(c1, c2). In the first case, project 3 is not executed
and the budget remaining for the other two is still B. In the second case, project
3 is executed and the budget remaining for the other two becomes B − z3(c1, c2).
Now, consider deviating to the proposed mechanism only for project 1 and 2. The
change in profit looks like a probability weighted sum of terms similar to the two-
project case, only that the distributions F are conditional on c1 and c2 being in
some interval (that induces z3 > or < c3) and the budget must be adjusted.
Because log-concavity of F implies log-concavity of F (c)−F (a)
F (b)−F (a) this deviation is al-
ways positive like in the case n = 2. The same logic can be applied to any
n, changing any mechanism by selecting two projects and then adjusting their
cutoffs in the following way: The budget is shared equally if both projects are
executed; if only one project is executed, it has to be the one with higher virtual
surplus; never execute projects with negative virtual surplus. Iterating over these
steps ultimately arrives at the proposed mechanism which has to be optimal.
VI.D Bidder Substitutability and Complementarity
In the main text, we made the crucial assumption that c = 0. As a consequence,
complementaries as in the following example are excluded. The example shows
that an optimal mechanism may not have substitutes. When the lower bound of
all projects’ costs is zero, it is always possible to improve a mechanism that does
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not have substitutes. The idea of the proof of optimality of bidder substitutability
in Appendix A is that it cannot be optimal to decrease i’s cutoff to the benefit of
increasing j’s cutoff when some third project’s cost increases from ck to c
′
k > ck,
because then it would either be better to raise project zj(·, ck) at the cost of
lowering zi(·, ck) as well or it would be better to raise zi(·, c′k) at the cost of lowering
zj(·, c′k).
In the following example, this approach is not feasible. Through the lower cost
bounds and the values, projects 1 and 2 inherit endogenous complementarities.
The designer prefers implementing 1 and 2 together over implementing 3 alone,
but once either 1 or 2 becomes too expensive the other project is dropped as well
in favor of implementing only project 3.
Example 2.2. Suppose I = {1, 2, 3} and B = 300. Let the costs be arbitrarily
distributed on the following supports:
c1 ∼ [200, 400], c2 ∼ [20, 200], c3 ∼ [290, 300],
and let the values be
v1 = 700, v2 = 500, v3 = 1000.
Let the corresponding optimal mechanism be given by
z1(c2, c3) =
250 if c2 ≤ 500 otherwise , z2(c1, c3) =
50 if c1 ≤ 2500 otherwise ,
z3(c1, c2) =
300 if c2 > 50 or c1 > 2500 otherwise .
Bidder substitutability fails because, e.g., as c1 increases from 249 to 251, project 2
with, say, cost 40 gets dropped from the allocation set. The designer cannot, as in
the main text with c = 0, lower z3(40, 249) as it is already zero or profitably raise
z2(251, ·) at the cost of project 3 as the lower cost bounds prohibit that projects
2 and 3 are ever conducted together and implementing G = {3} is preferred to
G′ = {2}.
However, it is still possible to construct an implementation with price clocks: All
clocks start at the upper bounds. Then (at arbitrary speed) the prices of 1 and
2 decrease to (250, 50). If both projects are still active, the price for project 3
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decreases to zero while clocks 1 and 2 halt: 1 and 2 are implemented. If any
project i ∈ {1, 2} drops out earlier, then the price for j 6= i, j ∈ {1, 2} drops to
zero, while price 3 remains at 300. 3 is implemented.
The next example features another kind of complementatity. In this example
project 3 can be a bossy loser. Again, there exists a DA-auction implementation.
The lower cost bounds of the (stochastically) identical projects 1 and 2 are too
high for both projects to ever be conducted together. The cheaper of the two is
greenlighted. Project 3 is then only implemented if enough money remains.
Example 2.3. Suppose I = {1, 2, 3} and B = 300. Let the costs be arbitrarily
distributed on the following supports:
c1, c2 ∼ [151, 200], c3 ∼ [50, 300],
and let the values be
v1 = v2 = 1000, v3 = 500.
Let the corresponding optimal mechanism be given by
z1(c2, c3) = c2, z2(c1, c3) = c1, z3(c1, c2) = B −max{c1, c2}.
Suppose c2 > c1, then project 2 can be a bossy loser: It can increase its cost report
without changing its status to the green light and thereby kick project 3 out of
the allocation.
While substitutes and non-bossiness are sufficient for an implementation with a
DA auction, they are clearly not necessary. From the matching literature, it is
apparent that some kind of substitutes condition is needed and non-bossy winners
seem to be important for DA implementations. We have constructed a scoring
function that implements the exemplary allocations above. However, in the proof
of non-bossiness of winners, we need the strong substitutes condition for inequality
(2.13).
A weaker substitutes condition, such as our groupwise substitutes, does not suffice
for the optimality of non-bossy winners. This condition is satisfied by the examples
above and is helpful for the construction of a scoring function.
Definition 2.18. An allocation rule γ has groupwise substitutes, if
∑
g∈G zg(c−g)
is increasing in any cost report cr with r 6∈ G for all allocation sets G that are
admitted by γ.
3. Deterministic mechanisms, the
revelation principle, and ex-post
constraints
with Felix Jarman
I Introduction
In the analysis of mechanism design problems, economists often restrict atten-
tion to deterministic mechanisms. In applications, stochastic mechanisms are
often deemed unfair as they require that the mechanism designer has access to
a credible randomization device which can be implausible in some environments
or, alternatively, may be prone to manipulation. However, restricting attention to
deterministic mechanisms is not innocuous.
As shown by Strausz (2003), the classical revelation principle (e.g., Myerson, 1979)
does not hold if the environment contains more than one agent. More precisely,
there are social choice functions that can be implemented by deterministic indirect
mechanisms but that cannot be implemented by a deterministic direct mechanism
in which agents truthfully reveal their type. We generalize his formulation of the
revelation principle in terms of payoff from the one-agent case to the multiple-
agents case under ex-post constraints: Any optimal deterministic mechanism cor-
responds to a payoff-equivalent feasible truthful direct deterministic mechanism.
Hence, when constraints have to hold regardless of the strategy of other players
(including “nature”), there is no loss of generality when restricting attention to
direct truthful mechanisms in optimal mechanism design.
The failure of the revelation principle is due to the possibility that agents play a
mixed-strategy equilibrium in a discrete indirect mechanism. In this equilibrium,
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a stochastic social choice function can be implemented, even though the out-
come function of an indirect mechanism is restricted to be deterministic. While a
stochastic deterministic direct mechanism can replicate mixing using a randomiza-
tion device, a deterministic direct mechanism cannot. In this note, we show that
despite the failure of the revelation principle, it is still without loss of generality to
neglect indirect mechanisms if the objective is to identify a social choice function
that
(a) maximizes the expectation of some objective function over outcomes,
(b) is implementable in dominant strategies, and
(c) satisfies additional constraints (if there are any) ex-post.
We use this result in Jarman and Meisner (2015).
II Model
A mechanism designer faces is a set of agents I = {1, 2, ..., N}. Each agent i ∈ I
is privately informed about type θi, drawn from type space Θi. The type profile
θ = (θ1, . . . , θN) is drawn from Θ = Θ1× · · ·×ΘN according to some distribution.
The mechanism designer’s problem is to select an outcome x ∈ X to maximize her
expected payoff w(θ, x), while constraints imposed ex-post have to be satisfied.
A deterministic social choice function fd is a mapping from the set of type profiles
into the set of outcomes X,
fd : Θ→ X,
while a stochastic social choice function fs maps type profiles into distributions
over outcomes,
fs : Θ→ ∆X.
We call the set of deterministic social choice functions Fd and the set of stochastic
social choice functions Fs, where Fd ⊂ Fs.
A deterministic mechanism M = (S, g) consists of a collection of strategy spaces
S = S1 × . . . SN and an outcome function g that maps the strategy profile
s = (s1, . . . , sN) ∈ S into outcomes, g : S → X. We say that the mechanism
M implements a potentially stochastic social choice function f if f(θ) is an equi-
librium outcome of the game induced by M and θ. Similarly, M implements
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f in dominant strategies if the equilibrium strategies that lead to f are weakly
dominant. Let agent i’s payoff from playing strategy si against strategies s−i in
mechanism M be denoted by uMi (si, s−i). Strategy si is a dominant strategy if
uMi (si, s−i) ≥ uMi (s′i, s−i) ∀s′i, s−i. (3.1)
The designer generally cannot implement any social choice function but might face
some feasibility constraints. We say that the designer faces ex-post constraints if
these constraints must be satisfied at the ex-post stage, i.e., regardless of which
strategy other players (including nature) play. The resulting set of implementable
social choice functions is given by F ⊂ Fs.
The mechanism designer searches for an implementable social choice function that
maximizes her objective function. The value of the objective function is w(θ, x)
for type profile θ if outcome x is realized. For a stochastic social choice function
fs several outcomes can potentially realize for type profile θ. The expected value
of the designer’s objective conditional on θ is given by
ω(θ, fs) := E[w(θ, x)|θ] =
∫
x∈X
w(θ, x)fs(θ, x)dx.
Consequently, the designer’s optimization problem is:
max
fs∈F
E[ω(θ, fs)].
III A revelation principle in terms of payoff
The following proposition gives the main result of this note.
Proposition 3.1. For any stochastic social choice function f that is implemented
with an indirect deterministic mechanism in dominant strategies and under ex-post
constraints (or no constraints) there exists a deterministic social choice function
f̂ that
1. is implementable under the same set of ex-post constraints in a deterministic
direct revelation mechanism,
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2. weakly dominates f in the sense of a general objective function w(θ, x):
w(θ, f̂(θ)) ≥ ω(θ, f).
Proof. Suppose f ∈ Fs and f /∈ Fd. The deterministic indirect mechanism M =
(S, g) implements f in dominant strategies and for some type profiles some players
mix. Let σ(θ) = (σ1(θ1), . . . , σN(θN)) be the corresponding mixed strategy profile
for type profile θ, mixing over pure strategy profiles ŝ ∈ Ŝ ⊂ S with density γ.
Because σi(θi) is a dominant strategy for agent i, every pure strategy ŝi ∈ ŝ ∈ Ŝ
over which σi randomizes must be a pure strategy, too, and u
M
i (σi(θi), s−i) =
uMi (ŝi, s−i) for all ŝi ∈ ŝ ∈ Ŝ. Otherwise (3.1) would be violated for σi(θi), as it
must be a best-response for agent i regardless of the other agents’ strategies.
The designer’s payoff is given by
ω(θ, f) =
∫
ŝ∈Ŝ
w(θ, g(ŝ))γ(ŝ)dŝ.
Define strategy profile s(θ) = (s1(θ), ..., sn(θ)) such that
s(θ) ∈ arg max
ŝ∈Ŝ
w(θ, g(ŝ)).
By the argument above, s(θ) is a pure strategy equilibrium profile for type profile
θ in mechanism M . Similarly, any outcome that can result from f(θ) for type
profile θ must be ex-post feasible. Therefore g(s(θ)) is feasible as well.
Set f̂(θ) = g(s(θ)) for any type profile θ for which agents mix according to f . By
construction, f̂ generates a weakly higher payoff for any type profile,
ω(θ, f̂) = w(θ, g(s(θ))) ≥ ω(θ, f),
and consequently f̂ also yields a weakly larger payoff in expectation,
E[ω(θ, f̂)] ≥ E[ω(θ, f)].
Because f̂ is feasible, f̂ ∈ F , and deterministic, f̂ ∈ Fd, f̂ can be implemented in
a direct revelation mechanism.
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Proposition 3.1 states that for any stochastic social choice function that is imple-
mentable by a deterministic indirect mechanisms there exists a deterministic social
choice function that is also implementable and weakly dominates the stochastic
social choice function in terms of the designer’s payoff. This result holds under
some conditions on the initial social choice function. It must be implementable
in dominant strategies and, if there are any additional feasibility constraints, it
must satisfy them ex-post. Such a deterministic social choice function can also be
implemented by a deterministic direct revelation mechanism. Therefore the result
can be interpreted as a variation of the revelation principle, formulated in terms
of payoff. While not any social choice function that can be implemented by an
indirect deterministic mechanism can also be implemented by a direct determinis-
tic mechanism, the optimal social choice function can be implemented by a direct
mechanism under the above conditions.
This result is an extension of an argument made by Strausz (2003) who obtains
a similar result for mechanisms with one agent. In such mechanisms, the agent’s
best response is necessary a dominant strategy. Similarly, with only one agent in
a deterministic mechanism a participation constraint that holds interim also holds
ex-post.
Strausz (2003) provides an example with more than one agent such that his rev-
elation principle in terms of payoff fails. In his example, he imposes an interim
participation constraint (individual rationality), and mixing in the indirect mech-
anism guarantees the agents their reservation utility. In contrast, in our setting
the participation constraint would have to hold ex-post, i.e., agents must obtain at
least their reservation utility regardless of the other agents’ strategies. Therefore
agents cannot play a mixed strategy that attaches positive weight to a pure strat-
egy that could, against any possible strategies of the other agents, yield a payoff
less than the reservation utility.
IV Conclusion
It is known that the classical revelation principle fails when attention is restricted
to deterministic mechanisms. In this note, we establish that deterministic di-
rect truthful mechanisms are optimal when dominant-strategy implementability is
considered and all constraints are imposed ex-post.
4. Competeing for Strategic
Buyers
I Introduction
In this paper, I investigate the interaction between forward-looking buyers and
multiple sellers in a continuous-time revenue management setting. Perhaps sur-
prisingly, allocations, prices, joint industry profits and buyer payoffs are equivalent
under monopoly and oligopoly if a monopolist prefers to sell efficiently all her goods
with probability one. For example, for uniformly distributed valuations, such a
pricing strategy is optimal when sellers are unable to commit to future prices and
goods are sufficiently scarce. In contrast, if a monopolist can commit on future
prices, she only wants to sell her full capacity if she values the good sufficiently less
than the lowest buyer type. The irrelevance of the distribution of goods over sellers
is driven by the insight that a seller can let her competitors sell their entire stock,
and then gain a monopoly continuation payoff. Hence, she is not willing to un-
dercut every positive price. The results follow because intertemporal arbitrage of
the forward-looking buyers entails martingale equilibrium prices. In equilibrium,
a seller is, at each point in time, indifferent between selling at the current price
and letting a competitor sell at that price and instead having the next trade at the
same price in expectation. In contrast, if a monopolist in expectation profits from
withholding some capacity with positive probability, the profit of a monopolist is
higher than the industry profit of oligopolists. For example, this condition holds
when sellers can commit to future prices in “no-gap cases”.
Since the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, revenue management (RM) has been
a standard business practice to price airline tickets and subsequently became a
tool to price goods in a wide range of industries with similar characteristics, for
example, cruise ships, hotels, rental cars, seasonal clothing, freight, electricity or
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sporting and entertainment events. Key business conditions conducive to RM
are that (i) customers have heterogeneous valuations, (ii) (short-term) capacity is
fixed and (iii) the goods lose their value after a deadline. Although none of the
industries mentioned above is monopolistic, the literature on RM in oligopolistic
settings is scant. In this paper, I ask how the interaction between forward-looking
buyers and competing sellers shapes market outcomes.
I consider a RM environment in which M ≥ 2 price-posting sellers desire to sell in
total K homogeneous goods, which are exogenously distributed among the sellers.
Sellers can post prices at any point in a time continuum before the deadline. All
n buyers enter the market at the same time, privately draw a persistent valuation
for the good, and strategically time their purchase decision. Importantly, the good
is scarce, n > K. Sellers exit the market once they are stocked out and buyers
exit the market once their single-unit demand is satisfied.
I find that for all model parameters such that a monopolist would optimally sell
her goods with certainty, it is irrelevant for consumer rents and industry profits
how the K units of the good are distributed among sellers. Hence, a thorough
understanding of the monopoly benchmark is essential for the analysis of the
oligopoly setting. The monopoly benchmark for the case without price commit-
ment is provided by Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2011). Their most important result
for my setting is that a monopolist with K goods replicates an efficient Dutch
auction when facing n > K + 5 buyers with uniformly distributed value. Un-
fortunately, the analysis is quite involved, making it hard to expand this result
qualitatively to other distributions.
To grasp the intuition behind the oligopoly prices, suppose that two sellers, each of-
fering one good, jointly replicate sequential Dutch auctions without reserve prices:
At first, they simultaneously post the choke price and then synchronously and
continuously decrease the price until a sale occurs and the corresponding seller
exits the market. Immediately after the sale, the remaining seller discontinu-
ously raises the price to a choke level and continuously decreases it until the next
sale occurs. The price must jump to avoid frenzies as in Bulow and Klemperer
(1994), because supply decreased relative to demand. Because in sequential auc-
tions forward-looking buyers arbitrage away any differences between current and
expected future prices, both sellers are at each point in time indifferent between
selling at the current price and letting the competitor sell and then replicating a
Dutch auction in the monopoly continuation game. Consequently, the same price
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path arises, leading to the same allocation and the same expected payoffs per trade
for all players as in a setting in which a monopolist sells two goods in an auction
without reserve price.
However, a monopolist may profit from setting an exclusive reserve price implying
that she may not sell her entire capacity. In my setting, only a monopolist with the
ability to commit to future prices can replicate an exclusive optimal mechanism:
Prices decrease continuously, jump to a choke price immediately after each sale
and finally remain at an optimal reserve price. However, in the presence of a
competitor, a single seller has an incentive to decrease the price further than the
optimal reserve price of a monopolist. In equilibrium under oligopoly, sellers sell
out over time and the terminal price is determined by the last active seller once all
competitors are stocked out. Although equilibrium prices decrease continuously as
well, any buyer type who would get a good under both market conditions pays a
lower price. Moreover, the price decreases below the level optimal under monopoly
such that possibly more goods are sold in comparison. At the time a seller becomes
a monopolist, she commits to (replicating) a Dutch auction that is optimal with
respect to her updated prior about the remaining buyers’ valuations. The payoffs of
players are bounded from above by the monopoly payoffs (the mechanism design
optimal profit) and bounded from below by the payoffs from sequential Dutch
auctions without reserve price. Consequently, prices under oligopoly are lower
and buyers are better off, while competing sellers are worse off compared to a
situation in which they share a jointly maximized profit.
In traditional RM models, a monopolist faces sequentially arriving and perfectly
impatient buyers, but there is survey evidence1 that buyers strategically time
their purchase decision. For a review of dynamic pricing with forward-looking
consumers, consult Go¨nsch, Klein, Neugebauer, and Steinhardt (2013) who report
losses between 7% and 50% in the surveyed articles when sellers treat forward-
looking consumers as myopic. In my model, the buyers’ strategic purchase timing
drives an important ingredient for the equivalence result, the martingale property
of prices: In equilibrium, the expected sale price of the next unit of the good is
at each time equal to the current price. As a consequence, it is important for
antitrust authorities to know whether buyers are forward-looking or myopic.
1According to the consumer report “America’s Bargain-Hunting Habits”, Apr. 30th 2014,
around 60% of consumers “wait for a sale to buy what they want.” See also the survey of
American Research Group, Inc on “2014 Christmas Gift Spending Plans Stall”, Nov. 21st 2014.
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In terms of policy advice, my findings have to be interpreted with caution as they
suggest that, under conditions, an industry with RM characteristics and forward-
looking buyers does not require any merger control. There is no need to protect
forward-looking-consumers from a monopolistic price discrimination by breaking
the monopoly into several smaller firms. This benchmark result, however, raises
the question of what kind of additional features have to be included into the model
to yield the more intuitive result that seller competition increases buyers’ rents.
The insight that the irrelevance result does not hold when sellers prefer to commit
to excluding low buyer types sheds light on the role of commitment in RM markets
which is valuable for evaluating antitrust issues. Because the martingale property
of prices is key for the results, I discuss extensions for which it is known that prices
do not follow a martingale process.
My oligopoly setting emphasizes results from the sequential auctions literature
from a novel angle, and thereby links two seemingly unconnected insights: First,
a price posting monopolist without price commitment replicates Dutch auctions
by posting continuous price paths in equilibrium and, second, prices in sequential
auctions are a martingale. The martingale property of prices in sequential auc-
tions was derived by Milgrom and Weber (2000) and sparked the academic debate
around the “declining price anomaly” discussed in Section V. Settings with in-
terdependent valuations, unknown size of inventory or background risk would be
interesting to study as such models feature upward or downward trends in prices.
In light of major applications such as airline tickets or hotel rooms, the role of
sequentially arriving buyers is of great interest as well.
This RM model of multiple sellers facing buyers with private information fills an
important gap in the literature. One reason why current research is paradoxically
silent on competing sellers in a private value environment might be that it is
not clear how the buyers’ selection strategies might look like if sellers do not
post identical prices. One may think about correlated equilibria or alternatively
introduce a coordination device or a search game. The approach taken here is
to allow at most one good to be traded at each instant and this single good is
traded at the lowest current price. Either all buyers reject the posted prices or a
single buyer trades and the remaining buyers face new prices in the future. This
procedure has convenient implications: First, sellers’ profits feature a discontinuity
reminiscent of Bertrand (1883). Second, the buyers’ optimal dynamic strategy is
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easy to characterize. Third, matching frictions such as those described in Burdett,
Shi, and Wright (2001) are circumvented in a game-theoretically consistent way.
Only allowing a single transaction at each trading instant sounds more restrictive
than it actually is. Primarily, it is a succinct way to capture the idea that, following
a sale, sellers can adapt prices faster than buyers can react. Alternatively, I could
put all buyers into a queue in random order. Neither sellers nor buyers have any
knowledge about the positions in the queue except that they are drawn uniformly
at random before each purchase decision. Then, at each time buyers are released
sequentially from the queue and observe the prices and how many items were sold.
Because buyers are released one-by-one and have single-unit demand, a buyer’s
optimal strategy is to randomize among the cheapest sellers if he wants to buy.
Sellers set a menu of prices contingent on how many sales have already occurred
at that time. Consequently, with each price, sellers only compete for the first
purchasing buyer in the queue and then the queue is redrawn. In equilibrium, each
trade occurs between a randomly chosen interested buyer (the first accepting buyer
in the random queue) and a randomly chosen cheapest seller (the one randomly
selected by that buyer). This approach is similar to the model by Deneckere and
Peck (2012) in which, however, the queue is not reformed in each period.
Another reason why the RM literature with competing seller is relatively sparse
might be that it appears to be complicated to keep track of intertemporal arbitrage
conditions of buyers and sellers simultaneously. In my setting, tractability can
be sustained when prices are well-behaved. Importantly, prices are driven by
continuation payoffs which makes the game easy to solve when the continuation
payoffs are easy to solve for. In particular, I can incorporate the tractable solution
to the problem of Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2011) as the payoff of a monopoly
continuation game of my richer oligopoly setting. To construct a well-defined
game in continuous time, I have to consider a restricted “inertia” strategy space
that permits the use of discrete-time game theory, and then I complete the strategy
space with respect to an appropriately defined metric.
The following subsection relates my paper to the existing literature. Section II
presents the model. After I introduce the full-commitment monopoly optimum,
I analyze of the model without price commitment in Section III. In Section IV,
I solve the model with full price commitment under oligopoly. The discussion in
Section V serves the purpose to identify which assumptions are important for the
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main result, Proposition 4.15, and touches on a few interesting modifications of
the model. Finally, I conclude in Section VI.
Literature
Initiating the literature on RM, Gallego and Van Ryzin (1994) consider a single
seller facing demand by short-lived buyers, whose arrival is modeled as a Poisson
process with intensity λ(p). The take-away result of such models is that average
prices fall over time as the approaching deadline diminishes the option value of
selling. The main focus of this literature has been to improve the modeling of buyer
behavior (such as strategic buyers) or making the monopolist’s problem more
complex by introducing additional resources to manage (network RM). Talluri
and Van Ryzin (2005) provide an excellent overview of RM in their book that
became the main reference of the field. There have been only few studies on RM
with oligopoly. One reason might be that capacity constraints are a definitive
characteristic of RM models, and equilibriua in a simple static benchmark model
such as Bertrand-Edgeworth competition (Edgeworth (1897)) is widely unexplored
beyond special cases.2 In such models, it is known that assumptions about how
buyers are rationed are not innocuous. In my model, efficient rationing arises
endogenously. Moreover, a static model obviously cannot quantify the value of
commitment to future prices like my model is able to do.
Mart´ınez-de Albe´niz and Talluri (2011) generalize the model of Dudey (1992), who
shows that a dynamic version of Bertrand-Edgeworth duopoly competition has a
unique subgame-perfect equilibrium. They model sequentially and randomly ar-
riving short-lived buyers with commonly known valuations. In contrast, the buyers
in my setting are long-lived and forward-looking, and have private information.
Similar to my results, Mart´ınez-de Albe´niz and Talluri (2011) find that continua-
tion payoffs determine prices. Contrary to my results, the seller with the fewest
goods sells her entire stock first, always priced at the reservation value of the
next smallest seller, and the largest seller sells her goods at last and at a con-
stant monopoly price. Gallego and Hu (2014) consider a similar framework with
differentiated products.
2See Levitan and Shubik (1972), Kreps and Scheinkman (1983), Osborne and Pitchik (1986)
for a full characterization for the duopoly case, Hirata (2009) and De Francesco and Salvadori
(2009) for the triopoly case and Vives (1986) for the case of equal capacities among all sellers.
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Deneckere and Peck (2012) model a perfectly competitive dynamic market with
a continuum of sellers, who have to produce output in advance, and a continuum
of buyers who can costly delay their purchase. Moreover, demand uncertainty is
innovatively modeled through a demand state. The unobserved demand state then
determines the value distribution of a new batch of buyers that joins the remaining
active buyers of the previous period. Sellers price under partial knowledge of the
demand state: Prices within a period rise as sellers become more optimistic about
the demand realization and then prices have to be corrected when demand dries up.
Prices are dispersed as some sellers only want to sell when demand is sufficiently
strong. However, as a consequence of intertemporal arbitrage conditions, lowest
prices available are a martingale. My model differs in multiple respects: I model
oligopolistic competition for (exogenously) scarce goods, there is no buyer entry
and the possibility of being rationed is the only cost from delaying purchase.
The literature on the Coase conjecture (1972) was the first to investigate the role of
a seller’s (lack of) commitment power. Surprisingly, Gul (1987) and Ausubel and
Deneckere (1987) show that the competitive allocation result of durable-goods
monopoly (e.g. Stokey (1981), Bulow (1982), Gul, Sonnenschein, and Wilson
(1986), Ausubel and Deneckere (1989)) is reversed when additional sellers populate
the model: While the monopolist prices at marginal cost, oligopolists can attain
(total industry) profits arbitrarily close to the static monopoly profit. The reason
why monopoly is more competitive than oligopoly is that a competitor can help
to sustain higher prices through credible punishments, which is not possible when
a monopolist only competes with the future self. In comparison, my equivalence
result does not stem from punishment strategies. In fact, strategies only depend
on a market state. The equilibrium in this paper rather reflects that the market
cannot become more competitive when the good is scarce and buyers are forward-
looking, because there is no incentive to exert competitive pressure. Therefore,
despite the similarities, the durable-goods monopolist, who can offer as many
goods as buyers are present, is not the relevant monopoly benchmark of my RM
setting. In contrast, my buyers want to buy early to avoid being rationed and the
good is paid and consumed at a fixed date in the undiscounted future. Hence, the
monopoly benchmark in a setting with price commitment is given by an optimal
Dutch auction that screens types perfectly and can maintain an exclusive reserve
price and the benchmark in a setting without price commitment is explored by
Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2011),
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II The Model
Players: I consider a dynamic game with M sellers (she) and n buyers (he) over
the normalized time interval T := [0, 1]. Each seller m ∈ M := {m1, ...,mM}
is endowed with Km ∈ N homogeneous goods, respectively. All buyers simulta-
neously enter the market at time 0. Each buyer i ∈ I := {i1, ..., in} demands
a single good and exits the market after purchasing. Similarly, a seller exits the
market after selling all her goods. All players who have not exited the market
are called active. The good is scarce, n > K :=
∑
Km, and the endowment of
all sellers is common knowledge. In addition, the game has three nature players:
Nature 1 (N1), a “trade selector”, Nature 2 (N2), a “trade processor”, and Nature
3 (N3) who draws private types. Nature 1 determines who trades at time t ∈ T ,
while Nature 2 determines if a trade can occur. A generic player is denoted by
ι ∈ I := I ∪M∪ {N1, N2, N3}.
Actions: Each player ι has a corresponding action space Aι from which an action
is selected at any time t ∈ T . Let A := ×ι∈IAι. Each seller m posts a price
pmt ∈ Am := R+ at each time t. Each buyer i either decides to buy at a current price
or to delay purchase to the next purchasing opportunity, dit ∈ Ai := {0, 1}. At each
time t, N1 randomly draws a buyer and a seller, (it,mt) ∈ AN1 := I∪{0}×M∪{0}.
At each time t, at most one good is traded, and this trade is selected by N1: The
seller is randomly selected among the sellers posting the lowest price at the time,
some m ∈ {m : pmt ≤ pm′t ∀m′ ∈M}, and the buyer is randomly selected among
the accepting buyers, some i ∈ {i : dit = 1}.3 That is, a necessary condition for
buyer i and seller m to trade at time t is that they are selected. If no buyer wants
to purchase, (it,mt) = (0, 0). For each time t, N2 sets a time τt ∈ AN2 := T .
A necessary condition for a trade to occur at time t is that τt = t. In other
words, by setting some τt 6= t, N2 can prohibit all trade activity at time t. N3
draws for each buyer i a persistent valuation (or type) vi. Each vi is an iid draw
from commonly known continuous distribution F with support [v, v] and positive
density f , AN3 := [v, v]
n.
Outcomes: An outcome for player ι is a function oι : T → Aι and Oι is the set of
outcomes for player ι. Let o = (oι)ι∈I denote an outcome vector, while O = ×ι∈IOι
is the set of possible outcomes of the game.
3This assumption is merely for simplicity of notation. Alternatively, I could let the buyers
decide which seller to select. Since only one trade can occur at each time, in equilibrium, a buyer
would randomize over the cheapest sellers.
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Timing and Information: The goods are traded within the normalized time
interval T = [0, 1]. At t = 0, N3 draws the types, and each vi = oN3(t)i is
privately observed by the corresponding buyer i. The type is constant over time.
At t = 0, N2 publicly sets trading times τt ≥ t for all t ∈ T contingent on the
game’s history. I am interested in the game where τt = t for all t ∈ T except
those times at which inertia (see below) prohibits this action of N2. I set up a
continuous-time game in which actions are taken sequentially at each time t ∈ T
in the following order:
1. Sellers and buyers update their belief about the buyers’ valuation corre-
sponding to the history. Go to step 2.
2. All active sellers publicly post individual prices. Go to step 3.
3. All active buyers privately and simultaneously decide whether they want to
purchase. Go to step 4a or 4b.
4a. If τt = t, N1 selects the trade oN1(t) = (i
t,mt). Trade (it,mt) occurs and
the corresponding seller is publicly observed. End of time t.
4b. If τt 6= t, N1 sets oN1(t) = (it′ ,mt′) with t′ = max{t̂ : τt̂ = t̂, t̂ < t} and no
trade occurs. End of time t.
Importantly, after a sale, sellers do not observe which or how many other buyers
tried to purchase. Let some history be denoted by h and let a posterior following
history h be denoted by Fh. More specific, let a seller history be denoted by
hm ∈ Hm and a buyer history be denoted by hi ∈ Hi, where Hι is the set of all
possible histories of player ι. A seller history at time t given by
hmt :=
(
(oι(t
′))ι∈M∪{N1}
)
t′<t:τt′=t′
, (4.1)
that is a seller remembers all past prices and all past trades for all times at which
a trade could have occurred, i.e., times t′ at which N2 τt′ = t′. A buyer history at
time t given by
hit := (oN3(t)i,
(
(oι(t
′))ι∈M∪{N1}∪{i}
)
t′<t:τt′=t′
). (4.2)
Thus, compared to a seller, a buyer additionally recalls all of his own actions and
knows his own valuation, vi = oN3(t)i, the i-th element of constant vector oN3(t).
Competeing for Strategic Buyers. 72
Let a market state for player ι following history h be denoted by
ωι(h) := (Fh, (km(h))m∈M), (4.3)
where km(h) is the number of goods seller m is offering following history h. From
this information, the number of active sellers, Mh =
∑
m Ikm(h)>0, as well as the
number of active buyers, nh = n−
∑
m(Km − km(h)), can be inferred.
Payoffs: Obtaining a good is only valued at a time t ∈ T , after time 1 the good
loses its value. From outcome o, buyer i of type vi = oN3(t)i gains payoff
Ui(o) =
vi − pt if for some t ∈ T : oi(t) = 1; oN1(t) = (i, ·); oN2(t) = t0 otherwise , (4.4)
that is, a buyer only gains a positive payoff if he, at some point in time, accepted
a price pt = minm∈M{om(t)}, he was selected for this trade by N1 and the trade
was possible according to N2.
It is commonly known that sellers do not value the good and v ≥ 0. A seller m
has a time-t payoff from outcome o given by
Um(o) =
∑
t∈Tm
pmt , (4.5)
where Tm = {t′ : oN1(t′) = (·,m); oN2(t′) = t} is the set of all times when seller m
traded and pmt = om(t) is the corresponding sale price. Nature players don’t have
a payoff function. As seen from Uι, there is no discounting.
Inertia: When setting up a continuous-time model, unavoidable pathologies arise.
Namely, well-defined strategies may be consistent with multiple outcomes.4 Here,
I circumvent these issues by generalizing the approach that Bergin and MacLeod
(1993) introduced for full-information repeated games to asymmetric-information
stochastic games. I look at the restricted space of inertia strategies S and take
the completion S∗ of the strategy space with respect to an appropriately defined
metric. Thereby I include strategy profiles ζ∗ ∈ S∗ that arise as limits of iner-
tia strategies ζ ∈ S. A more detailed description and the preliminary analysis
that guarantees that such limits and its outcomes are well-defined is executed in
Appendix VII.A.
4“Next” instants are not well-defined, see Simon and Stinchcombe (1989) and Bergin and
MacLeod (1993) for a detailed discussion.
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Roughly speaking, I require that each player’s action (including the nature players)
at any time t is held constant during some time interval [t, t+ ). That is, players
can only adjust their action after some time lag  has passed, implying that players
can adjust actions only a countably number of times. The limits  → 0 capture
the idea that players can react “instantaneously”. Importantly, this  may depend
on the time t and all outcomes up to that time. Note that no player receives
any payoff or any valuable new information during the inertia lags: N2’s action
is held constant as well, prohibiting all trading activity, and the prices and the
corresponding trade outcome set by N1 was already observed at time t. The inertia
formulation of the game allows me to employ discrete-time game theory and then
translate the analysis to continuous time.
Equilibrium: I restrict attention to a tractable class of equilibria: In an ε-
Strongly Symmetric Markov Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (SSMPBE),
1. sellers post identical prices given the market state,
2. buyers of the same type take the same purchase decision given the market
state,
3. all actions are sequentially rational, given the history of previous play and
anticipations of optimal continuation play,
4. beliefs are ε-consistent (Definition 4.1) with beliefs derived according to
Bayes’ rule.
I call this equilibrium strongly symmetric, because sellers set the same price even
if they do not have the same stock of goods km(h).
I analyze the model under different assumptions regarding sellers’ ability to commit
to future prices. In Section IV, I analyze the model with full price commitment,
i.e., I look for semi-perfect equilibria. They are defined as above, but bullet point
3 is replaced with
3a. buyers’ purchase decisions are sequentially rational, given the history of pre-
vious play and anticipations of optimal continuation play,
3b. each seller m commits to a price plan contingent on each possible market
state in the beginning of the game.
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It remains to be shown that any sequence of ε-SSMPBE strategy profiles with
ε→ 0 converges to a 0-SSMPBE strategy profile, the equilibrium I am eventually
interested in.
Definition 4.1. A distribution G is ε-consistent with a true Bayes’ update F , if
and only if
1 ≥ F (v)
G(v)
≥ 1− ε ∀v > v and F (v) > F (v′)⇒ G(v) > G(v′). (4.6)
III Analysis
The full-commitment monopoly benchmark
This subsection serves the purpose to provide an upper bound of industry profits
that turns out to be helpful over the course of the analysis. The reader familiar
with basic auction design with single-unit demand following Myerson (1981), Riley
and Samuelson (1981) and Maskin and Riley (1989) may want to skip to the
definition of Condition 4.4 immediately.
Let the i-th highest order statistic of n draws from distribution F be denoted by
Y
(n)
i such that Y
(n)
1 ≥ ... ≥ Y (n)i ≥ ... ≥ Y (n)n is a rearrangement of V1, . . . , Vn.
Moreover, let the virtual valuation be denoted by
ψ(v) = v − 1− F (v)
f(v)
. (4.7)
The literature on auctions speaks of a regular environment when ψ is a strictly
increasing function of the valuation.
Lemma 4.2 establishes the first important benchmark: If sellers with the ability
to commit to future prices collude and jointly maximize profits, each seller m can
get her fraction Km/K of the (mechanism design) optimal industry profit.
Lemma 4.2 (Monopoly, full commitment). A monopolist with the ability to com-
mit to future prices can replicate sequential Dutch auctions with any reserve price.
In regular environments, this mechanism is optimal when the reserve price r∗ is
such that ψ(r∗) = max{0, ψ(v)}. With K goods, this price path yields a profit of
E
[
K∑
l=1
max{ψ(Y (n)l ), 0}
]
. (4.8)
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I omit a formal proof and give the intuition. Since there is no competition and the
price path is not restricted to be sequentially rational, a monopolist can imple-
ment the optimal allocation (Maskin and Riley (1989)) by replicating an optimal
Dutch auction: In continuous time, a seller has an infinite amount of pricing pos-
sibilities and, thus, she can optimally screen and exclude buyer types by setting a
continuously decreasing price path that becomes flat at an optimal reserve price
r∗ defined by ψ(r∗) = max{0, ψ(v)}. It is irrelevant for the monopolist’s payoff
whether the price decreases rapidly or slowly because there is no discounting. By
the revenue equivalence theorem the implemented allocation yields the optimal
profit. Under the condition below, the optimal auction is efficient as it allocates
the goods to the K highest types, and the seller never keeps a good.
Corollary 4.3 (Monopoly, no exclusion). In regular environments, the optimal
allocation is efficient if and only if
ψ(v) ≥ 0 ⇐⇒ vf(v) ≥ 1. (4.9)
Replicating a sequential Dutch auctions without or with non-exclusive reserve price
r ≤ v is optimal for the seller.
Condition 4.4 (No exclusion). A monopolist wants to sell all of her goods effi-
ciently with probability one.
The buyers’ cutoff valuation x
For every potential sale, every active buyer faces a stopping problem, i.e., he
chooses a point along a path of minimum prices (pt)t∈T at which he wants to
apply for a good, taking as given the stopping strategy of other buyers. If another
buyer got to buy the good at some price, a similar stopping problem arises for the
next sale and so on. In the following, consider an arbitrary buyer i and take as
given an inertia strategy profile of all other players, ζ−i ∈ S−i.
Let h be a history with no sale so far, so that all players are in the same market
state ω = ωm(h
m) = ωi(h
i) = (Fh, (Km)m∈M) for all i ∈ I and m ∈M, all players
have the same beliefs. Consider a type-v buyer i with corresponding buyer history
hi. Let W (v, hi) be buyer i’s continuation payoff at buyer history hi,
W (v, hi) := max
ζi∈Si
Eo [Ui(o)| ζ−i, hi, v
]
,
Competeing for Strategic Buyers. 76
i.e., his expected payoff from optimal continuation play under uncertainty of the
true outcome conditional on being type v and having observed buyer history hi so
far when playing against inertia strategy profile ζ−i ∈ S−i. A buyer knows that
once he sets his purchase decision at time t, all players are inertial for some known
time  and the next trade can occur at time t + , while all outcomes in (t, t + )
are meaningless.
If buyer i decides to buy at time t, then either he gets the good and exits the
market or another buyer got the good. Similar, if i decides to delay, then either
someone obtained a good or all buyers declined, and he faces a new price with an
updated belief about the other buyers. Define
W+(v, h
i, pt, dt) := Ehit+
[
W (v, hit+)
∣∣ dt, pt, oN1(t) 6= (0, 0)]
as the expected continuation payoff of a type-v buyer observing a sale at t, after
setting action dt at time t when pt was the minimum price. The expectation is
taken with respect to history hit+ as it is uncertain which seller is selected and,
thus, how the market state evolves. Let h˜it+ be the continuation of history h
i
t such
that, at t, sellers posted a price consistent with ζ and all buyers rejected prices,
and players were inertial during (t, t+ ). Let
W−(v, hi, pt) := W (v, h˜it+)
be the continuation payoff of a type-v buyer when no sale occurred at price pt
with history hi. I can dispense with the expectation with respect to history h˜it+,
as necessarily all buyers must have delayed purchase.
Buyer i’s payoff when deciding to purchase, dit = 1, at price pt following buyer
history hi is
φω(vi − pt) + (1− φω)W+(v, hi, pt, 1) (4.10)
where φω denotes the probability that any given accepting buyer is selected for
purchase at time t when accepting the minimum price in market state ω = ωi(h
i).
Obviously, this probability depends on how many other buyers accept the price
which in turn depends on the given strategy profile ζ−i. With probability (1−φω)
another buyer gets the good and buyer i obtains the expected continuation payoff
of the corresponding history.
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The expected payoff from delaying is given by
σωW−(vi, hi, pt, 0) + (1− σω)W+(vi, hi, pt, 0),
where σω is the probability that no sale occurred during time [t, t + ). I can
specify the probabilities φ and σ after the statement of Lemma 4.5. To find a
critical type, who is indifferent between taking the current and the next price, the
following expected payoff is crucial: From delaying purchase and accepting the
minimum price at the next opportunity, time t+ , buyer i garners
σω
[
φω˜(vi − pt+) + (1− φω˜)W+(vi, h˜it+), pt+, 1)
]
+(1− σω)W+(vi, hi, pt, 0), (4.11)
where ω˜ is a market state following from ω after no sale occurred during time
[t, t+ ).
Since the good is scarce and each sale reduces the supply further (and finally the
good may be sold out), a form of discounting arises endogenously through the
probability that the good becomes more expensive or sells out. Consequently,
higher types are more eager to buy. Remember that up to this point my analysis
solely covers the case of histories without a sale, but I will extend it to the case of
histories with nice price paths after the statement of the following lemma and its
implications.
Lemma 4.5. Consider some time t ∈ T with a market state ω without a sale so
far. In equilibrium, there exists an ω-dependent cutoff type xt ∈ [v, v] such that all
types v ≥ xt decide to accept price pt and all types v < xt delay purchase.
Proof. Fix some equilibrium and consider a market state ω with corresponding
history ht. Suppose that some buyer i with valuation vi prefers to buy at price p
over delaying purchase to the next opportunity at price p′. Then it must be that
(4.10) is larger than (4.11). It remains to be shown that all types v > vi decide to
buy as well. I do this by showing that the derivative of (4.10) with respect to v is
larger than the derivative of (4.11), i.e.,
φω + (1− φω)W ′+(vi, ht, p, 1) ≥ (4.12)
σω
[
φω˜ + (1− φω˜)W ′+(vi, h˜it+, p′, 1)
]
+ (1− σω)W ′+(vi, ht, p, 0),
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where W ′ denotes the derivative of W with respect to the first argument, the
valuation v.
By the envelope theorem, any derivativeW ′(vi, ht, p, d) is a type-independent prob-
ability (the probability that buyer i gets selected for purchase before the good is
sold out). Hence, W ′+(vi, ht, p, d) is bounded from above by one and it follows that[
φt′ + (1− φt′)W ′+(vi, 0h0t (p), p′, 1)
] ≤ 1. Therefore a sufficient condition for the
inequality above is
φω(1−W ′+(vi, ht, p, 1)) ≥ σω(1−W ′+(vi, ht, p, 0)). (4.13)
If
W ′+(vi, h, p, 0) ≥ W ′+(vi, h, p, 1) for a.e. vi ∈ [v, v] (4.14)
holds, (4.13) is clearly true, because the probability that no other buyer at all
accepts the price cannot be larger than the probability that no other buyer is
selected for purchase by definition, φω ≥ σω: If no other buyer i′ 6= i accepts the
price, buyer i is selected with certainty, and even when other buyers i′ 6= i want
to purchase as well, buyer i is still selected with positive probability.
The sufficient condition (4.14) follows as a corollary from Lemma 4.8 which holds
for arbitrary symmetric strategy profiles. The reason is that a declining buyer
attaches a higher probability to obtaining a good than an accepting buyer. Hence,
any symmetric equilibrium strategy for the first purchase is necessarily a cutoff
strategy.
Define
xt := min{vi : (4.10) ≥ (4.11)}. (4.15)
This cutoff varies with previous and future prices. Moreover, the cutoff is not
necessarily unique as the φω and σω depend on the corresponding cutoff type x as
well.
Having established this lemma, I can express the probabilities φω and σω as func-
tions of cutoff valuations xt. The event that no sale occurred reveals that every
buyer rejected the current prices and, hence, there is no asymmetric information
about the buyer decisions in the market. As a consequence, a common prior is
maintained: All buyers and sellers learn that all buyer types are below the cutoff
level. Straightforwardly, σω then is the probability that all (n − 1) other buyers’
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types are below the cutoff. Similarly for the first sale, φω also is a simple function
of the cutoff valuation. Given that j other buyer types are above the cutoff, the
probability that a buyer who is willing to purchase at price pt gets to buy is given
by 1/(j + 1).5
Corollary 4.6. Suppose market state ω with prior Fh does not feature a sale so
far. The probabilities φω (probability of getting the good when accepting price pt)
and σω (probability that no buyer accepted price pt) can be expressed as
φω =
n−1∑
j=0
(
n− 1
j
)
1
j + 1
Fh(xt)
n−1−j(1− Fh(xt))j = 1− Fh(xt)
n
n (1− Fh(xt)) (4.16)
and
σω = Fh(xt)
n−1. (4.17)
It remains to be formalized how Fh is formed for general histories. Lemma 4.5
establishes that given that no sale occurred following history h, all players know,
that no active buyer’s type is greater than cutoff xt, and update the prior appro-
priately. However, if a sale occurred at t, it is possible that types greater than
cutoff xt remain in the market because they were not (randomly) selected for pur-
chase. Then the analysis is complicated by the fact that different players can have
different beliefs on how likely it is that such types remained in the market.
Remark 4.7. After a sale occurred, buyers and sellers update their prior differently.
Moreover, accepting buyers update their prior in a different way from declining
buyers. The reason is that the individual histories differ.
For some seller history h, let Fs,h denote a seller’s update of Fh upon observing a
sale. Similarly, for some buyer history h, let Fa,h and Fd,h denote an accepting and
a declining buyer’s update of Fh upon observing a sale, respectively. Moreover, let
Fno,h denote a buyer or seller’s update of Fh upon observing no sale at a time at
which N3 would have permitted a trade. The calculation of the posteriors involves
5Mathematically, probability φω is identical to an allocation according to a queue as motivated
in the introduction. Since the queue is unobserved and redrawn uniformly at random after each
sale, the probability that exactly j buyers are in front in the queue is given by 1/n = (n− 1)!/n!
for all integer j ∈ [0, n− 1]. The probability φω is thus a finite geometric series weighted by 1/n,
leading to an equivalent formulation of (4.16),
φω =
1
n
n−1∑
j=0
Fh(xt)
j =
1− Fh(xt)n
n (1− Fh(xt)) .
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F (v)
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vxt
Fh(xt)
≤ ε
Figure 4.1: An illustration of a prior Fh and two different updates:
Fs,h(dashed) following a sale, Fno,h (dash-dotted) following no sale. Moving
xt to the right decreases ε and makes the posteriors approach the prior.
a straightforward application of Bayes’ Rule that is explained in greater detail in
Appendix VII.B, where the posteriors are formally sated in Corollary 4.20.
Lemma 4.8. The following first-order stochastic dominance results hold for any
equilibrium in the buyers’ game
Fno,h(v) > Fd,h(v) > Fa,h(v) > Fh(v),
for all v, x : Fh(v) ∈ (0, 1), Fv(x) ∈ (0, 1). For v, x : Fh(v), Fh(x) ∈ {0, 1}, all four
distributions are equal.
Proof. See Appendix VII.B.
When a sale occurred, sellers and buyers update their priors differently because
a buyer has one piece of information more compared to the seller, i.e., he knows
his own decision. To grasp the intuition, suppose there are three buyers and a
sale occurs. A seller conducts the following thought experiment: The valuation
of a remaining buyer can only be below the cutoff, if at least one of the other
two buyers accepted the price, i.e., has a value above the cutoff. Otherwise, all
buyers would have rejected the price and no sale would have occurred. Similarly,
the valuation of a remaining buyer can only be above the cutoff, if at least one
other buyer accepted the trade (has a valuation above the cutof)f, and one of the
two was selected for trade. In comparison, one of the two remaining buyers, i,
updates his prior about the valuation of the other buyer i′ in a similar manner,
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but with the additional knowledge of his own decision. Whenever buyer i delayed
purchase, he updates his prior like a seller, but he considers only (n − 2) instead
of (n − 1) other buyers, as i himself declined. However, if a sale occurred and
buyer i had accepted the price, type vi′ can only be above the cutoff, if the third
buyer accepted the price as well and was selected for purchase. Put differently, if
i accepted and was not selected for trade, it is more likely that i′ accepted as well,
reducing the probability that i is selected. Therefore an accepting buyer i who
was not selected attaches a higher weight to i′ having a value above the cutoff.
It is straightforward to show that any (buyer or seller) prior first-order stochasti-
cally dominates any (buyer or seller) posterior following any event for any cutoff
valuation strictly within the support. If xt is either the lower or the upper bound of
the support, posterior and prior coincide, because either all buyers take the price
or a sale happens with probability zero. Following the notion of the queue elabo-
rated on in the introduction, the distribution of valuations of the buyer remaining
in the market is the same as before, because either all buyers reject the price or
the first buyer in the queue takes the price with probability one and the remaining
buyers had no chance to buy. Nice cutoff paths give rise to this equivalence. For
price paths that are not nice, the analysis leaves the realm of common priors. The
individual posteriors give rise to individual cutoff valuations x. However, for ε-nice
cutoff sequences, the posteriors are consistent in the sense of Definition 4.1.
Definition 4.9. A cutoff sequence is ε-nice over history h if, along history h, at
each point in time trade occurs with probability less than ε, i.e., for any truncation
ht of h
Fht(xt)) ≥ 1− ε. (4.18)
A cutoff sequence is nice when ε = 0.
I later provide conditions such that nice sequences arise on equilibrium path. It
turns out that the price path in any strongly symmetric equilibrium produces a
nice cutoff sequence. When the prices imply cutoffs within the support of the
updated priors, only continuous price paths with discontinuous jumps upwards
after each sale are consistent with nice cutoff sequences. The price jump has to be
high enough such that a sale occurs with probability zero. Obviously, continuous
price paths can only exist in continuous time, i.e., with strategy profiles ζ ∈ S∗.
Nice cutoff sequences are analytically convenient: Because at each time a sale
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occurs with probability zero, all buyers’ and sellers’ posteriors are identical re-
gardless of the outcome, and the each buyer’s strategy is characterized by the
same time-specific cutoff type xt. Therefore the insights from Lemma 4.5 carry
over to histories that only feature sales within nice cutoff sequences. In particular,
any player’s posterior is equal to the prior of the previous instant.
For inertia strategies, I capture the notion that prior and posterior are “roughly
the same” when the cutoff sequence is ε-nice with the following definition and the
corresponding lemma.
Lemma 4.10. If the cutoff sequence is ε-nice over history h, then for all trun-
cations ht of h, the prior Fht is ε-consistent with posteriors Fs,ht, Fa,ht and Fd,ht
following a sale at h, and ε̂-consistent with posterior Fno,ht following no sale at the
same history for some ε̂ ≥ ε.
Proof. See Appendix VII.B.
Sloppily speaking, Lemma 4.10 says that, if the cutoff sequence is ε-nice, players
only make a bounded mistake when they always update their prior as if no sale
occurred or don’t update at all, and this mistake vanishes as ε→ 0. This approach
does not (ε-)solve all problems because even if all buyers had the same updated
prior, there still might be multiple cutoff values xt that solve the corresponding
equation.
In a strongly symmetric equilibrium, given any history h, the prices pt and pt+ to-
gether with the continuation payoffs W determine critical types xt in the equation
(4.10) = (4.11) evaluated at valuation xt.
Solving for a sequence (xt) corresponding to buyers’ inerita strategies, ζI ∈ SI ,
involves a higher-order difference equation with boundary conditions that the first
cutoff is equal to v (the highest valuation, as players have not yet learned anything)
and the last cutoff is equal to the final minimum price. If multiple sales have
occurred, the critical types of all rounds in which a sale occurred along the history
path enter the posterior and hence the difference equation is of higher order.
Like Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2011), I face the issue of multiple solutions as well.
For general distributions, such problems often feature multiple or even no solutions
at all (see, for example, Agarwal (2000)). Following your economic intuition, you
may have expected multiple solutions because buyers are strategic complements:
If a buyer believes all other buyers are more likely to buy, he has more incentive
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to buy himself. Vice versa, a buyer’s incentive to delay increases if he believes
that other buyers are more likely to delay. For this reason, it is unclear whether
a general characterization of perfect inertia -equilibria for general distributions
with  = 0 exists. Hence, Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2011) later restrict attention to
the uniformly distributed valuations for which they can show a unique equilibrium.
After elaborating on the sellers’ game, I specify the buyers’ stopping strategy, i.e.,
at which price a type-v buyer wants to purchase given a pricing strategy suggested
by the analysis of the sellers’ game.
The oligopolists’ tradeoff: selling vs. not selling
As an implication of the assumption that, after a sale, sellers can adjust their price
before buyers can buy again, sellers face a simple tradeoff. In each round, at most
one trade occurs and buyers only patronize the cheapest sellers. Therefore seller
m’s time t expected profit has a discontinuity in the price at
pm
t
= min{pm′t }m′∈M\{m},
i.e., at the minimum among the prices of m’s active competitors.
Consider some seller m playing against an inertia strategy profile ζ−m ∈ S−m. I am
looking for a strongly symmetric perfect equilibrium in which all sellers post the
same price at each round. In such an equilibrium, no seller can have a profitable
one-shot deviation pm 6= pt when price pt is set by all active competitors.
Consider some seller m with seller history h at time t. Let mh(p) be the time-(t+)
continuation of history h in which a sale with seller m occurred at at price p at t
and time (t, t+ ) was inertial. Consequently, 0h(p) is a continuation seller history
in which no sale occurred at time t.
Seller m’s expected revenue, when offering k units and setting price pm while all
other sellers set price p, at time t with seller history h can expressed piecewise as
Rmt (p
m, p, h, k) =

(4.19) if pm > p
(4.20) if pm = p
(4.21) if pm < p
,
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where each line is explained below. Let Cmt+(k
′, h′) be seller m’s continuation
payoff under her strategy when she owns k units at time t+  with history h′.
Cmt+(k
′, h′) := Rmt+(p
′, p′′, h′, k′),
where p′ is the price that strategy ζm intends for market state ωm(h′) and p′′ is
the symmetric price that consistent with ζ−m and h′.
The first line of the revenue is given by
(1− Fh(xt)nh)Em′ 6=m
[
Cmt+(k,
m′h(p))
]
+ Fh(xt)
nh · Cmt+(k, 0h(p)), (4.19)
representing the expected revenue from raising the price. Here, the cutoff type xt is
unaffected by the deviator’s price, because only the minimum price is relevant for
trade. Consequently, (1−Fh(xt)nh) is the probability that one of m’s competitors
sells a good at p. The expectation for the continuation payoff is needed, because
the identity of the selected seller is uncertain, which affects the market state. With
probability Fh(xt)
nh , no good is sold, leading to a continuation payoff of the the
corresponding history, Cmt+(k,
0h(p)).
Analogously, seller m’s profit from complying, pm = p, is given by
(1− Fh(xt)nh)
(
1
Mh
(p+ Cmt+(k − 1,mh(p)) + Mh−1Mh Em′ 6=m
[
Cmt+(k,
m′h(p))
])
+Fh(xt)
nh · Cmt+(k, 0h(p)), (4.20)
because, if a sale occurs at t, seller m gets selected with probability 1/Mh. In
that case, she gets the price and the continuation payoff of having one good fewer
following the corresponding history, mh(p). With the complementary probability,
the good is bought from another seller. Similarly, if no good is traded, the game
continues as described in the previous case (4.19).
Finally, the payoff from undercutting the competitors’ price, pm < p, is given by
(1− Fh(yt)nh)
(
pm + Cmt+(k − 1,mh(pm))
)
+ Fh(yt)
nh · Cmt+(k, 0h(pm)), (4.21)
where yt > xt is the cutoff type when p
m is the minimum price at t. It must be
larger than xt because buying at t becomes more attractive. The continuation
games differs from the two previous case as the minimum price as well. If a good
is traded, it is sold by the deviator with certainty. If no good is traded, the
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continuation game is also different because a lower price got rejected and hence
the belief about the remaining buyers’ valuation is updated more pessimistically
from the sellers’ point of view.
Verbalizing this profit function, a seller playing against strongly symmetric prices
has three choices:
1. She can raise the price, which means abstaining from selling;
2. She can match the price, which means all sellers get selected with equal
probability if a buyer accepts;
3. She can undercut the price, which means she gets selected with certainty if
a buyer accepts.
The setup of the model has two implications on the continuation payoffs: First,
because a seller exits the market when all her goods are sold, Cmt′ (0, h
′) = 0 for
all h ∈ H and t′ ∈ T . Second, if t′′ > 1, Cmt′′ (k′, h′′) = 0 for any k′ ∈ N and
any h′′ ∈ H. That is, the continuation payoff is 0 at the (in terms of inertia) last
trading opportunity.
Let m’s marginal continuation payoff be denoted by
MCPmt+(k, h, p) = Em′ 6=m
[
Cmt+(k,
m′h(p))
]
− Cmt+(k, 0h(p)). (4.22)
Lemma 4.11. In any strongly symmetric equilibrium, following any history h at
t, each seller posts a price
pt = MCP
m
t+(km(h), h, pt), (4.23)
when competing with at least one other seller.
Proof. In a strongly symmetric equilibrium, no seller has an incentive to deviate
from symmetric price pt. A seller m does not want to raise the price if
(4.19) ≤ (4.20)
⇐⇒ pt ≥MCPmt+(km(h), h, pt).
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A seller m does not want to undercut price pt with some price p
m < pt if
(4.21) ≤ (4.20).
In particular, the inequality above must hold for any arbitrarily small cut pm ≈ pt,
such that the inequality can be rewritten as
pt ≤MCPmt+(km(h), h, pt),
because for any sequence of prices (lpm)l=1,... with (
lpm)→ pt, F (lyt)→ F (xt) and
Cmt+(k,
mh(lpm))→ Cmt+(k,mh(pt)).
Combining the two conditions on pt leads to a necessary condition for strongly
symmetric equilibrium prices, (4.23).
This lemma pins down a condition for strongly symmetric equilibria, namely, that
continuation payoffs are symmetric over sellers even when goods are asymmetri-
cally distributed, i.e.,
MCPmt+(k, h, p) = MCP
m′
t+(k
′, h, p) ∀m,m′ ∈M and k, k′ ∈ N. (4.24)
In an environment with km(h) ∈ {0, 1} for all m ∈ M, the continuation payoffs
are clearly symmetric, because each seller either offers a single good or has exited
the market.
Pricing under monopoly: No commitment
Now, I delineate the pricing strategy of a monopolist who lacks the ability to
commit to future prices. In particular, I investigate in which aspects it differs
from the monopolist’s full-commitment strategy discussed in the beginning of the
analysis. The monopolist’s game is relevant for two reasons: First, it establishes
the benchmark outcome under collusion when sellers maximize joint profits and,
second, it is a continuation game of the dynamic oligopoly game. Since continua-
tion payoffs determine equilibrium prices, the expected single-unit monopoly profit
with an updated prior determines the price under duopoly when each seller offers
a single good. Finally, I solve the game backwards sale-by-sale. Importantly, the
assumption of no commitment is taken seriously here in a sense that the monopo-
list cannot (commit to) destroy any units of the good. For example, for uniformly
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distributed valuations, disposal would be profitable as the seller’s revenue is only
increasing in the amount of goods when there are at least twice as many buyers
as goods.
I say that a history h generates monopoly if and only if Mh = 1, i.e., if and only
if following history h only a single active seller remains in the market. By Lemma
4.11, the continuation payoffs pin down strongly symmetric equilibrium oligopoly
prices. Since the good is scarce, every oligopoly can at some point become a
monopoly when all but one sellers are stocked out. Under a duopoly in which
both sellers offer a single good, i.e., for some h with Mh =
∑
km(h) = 2 , the
marginal continuation payoff is a single-unit monopoly payoff. If I can determine
the expected sequentially rational single-good monopoly payoff Cmt′ (1,
m′h) for any
history m
′
h ∈ H and any t ∈ T . that generates monopoly along equilibrium
path, (4.23) pins down the duopoly price for any corresponding history h with
Mh =
∑
km(h) = 2. With this insight, I can proceed to solve the game backwards
sale-by-sale and continue in a similar fashion starting from any other expected
sequentially rational k-goods monopoly payoff Cmt′ (k,
m′h(p)) for any history m
′
h(p)
that generates monopoly.
In this analysis, the history dependence of the inertia lag turns out to be helpful.
By allowing the number of remaining pricing opportunities to approach infinity for
the remaining time as soon as the market endogenously becomes monopolistic, I
can exploit existing monopoly results. Because there is no discounting, the length
of the inertia lags is irrelevant, only the number of lags remaining before the
deadline matters. Hence, I can create a sequence of inertia strategy profiles ζ ∈ S
that converges to a continuous-time strategy profile ζ∗ ∈ S∗, and I can do this
without affecting the discrete-time grid of the oligopoly game before. That is, the
only impact of the lags getting finer for the monopoly continuation game is that
the continuation payoff converges to the continuous-time continuation payoff. This
trick allows me to incorporate the convergence results of Ho¨rner and Samuelson
(2011) seamlessly.
In contrast to the full-commitment benchmark case outlined in the beginning,
here, prices have to be sequentially rational. Intuitively, a monopolist without
the ability to commit to future prices faces a tradeoff between perfect separation
of buyer types and a positive terminal price that excludes low types. Ho¨rner and
Samuelson (2011) analyze the monopolist’s game and provide two lower bounds on
her profit: The static monopoly profit (achieved by posting some price above the
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choke price at all histories that are not terminal and posting the static monopoly
price at the final opportunity) and the profit of sequential Dutch auctions without
reserve price. In contrast to the full-commitment case, the seller cannot sustain a
positive terminal price while screening types perfectly. I am especially interested
in the latter bound.
Lemma 4.10 implies that an initially regular environment remains regular follow-
ing any update at any history over which the cutoff path is nice. Moreover, for
any initially regular environment, there is some ε̂-consistent belief update that
conserves regularity if the cutoff sequence is ε-nice. If a positive measure of types
was to accept a price at some non-terminal history h, the correctly updated CDF
corresponding to (4.33) has a kink at the cutoff type. This kink introduces a
downward jump discontinuity in the updated virtual value function and thus the
updated prior generically fails regularity - even when the initial prior was regular.
By Lemma 4.10, the updated virtual valuation at some history h that corresponds
to a nice cutoff path is identical whether a sale occurred or not. Let this updated
virtual value be
ψ˜(v, x) := v − F (x)− F (v)
f(v)
= v − 1− Fh(v)
fh(v)
, (4.25)
where x is the cutoff type at that history. Hence, if the cutoff sequence along a
monopoly generating history m
′
h is ε-nice, then the k-unit monopoly continuation
payoff is given by
Cmt+(k,
m′h) = E
[
k∑
l=1
ψ˜(Y
(n′)
l , xt)
∣∣∣∣∣Y (n′)1 < xt
]
, (4.26)
where Y
(n)
i is defined as the i-th highest order statistic of n draws from distribution
F and n′ = n− (Km − k)−
∑
m′ 6=mKm′ is the number of remaining buyers.
Unfortunately, Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2011) restrict attention to the workhorse
uniform distribution for their results on multi-unit monopoly: For sufficiently
many buyers, n > K+ 5, a replication of sequential Dutch auctions is sequentially
rational.
Lemma 4.12 (Monopoly, no commitment). If values are uniformly distributed
and n > K + 5, Condition 4.4 holds.
Proof. See Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2011).
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Figure 4.2: An exemplary price path of a four-goods monopolist who cannot
commit to future prices. Sales are denoted by the black dots. The price jumps
after each sale.
An exemplary monopoly price path is depicted in Figure 4.2. In words, for suf-
ficiently scarce goods, as soon as all competitors are sold out, the last remaining
seller replicates a series of Dutch auctions by continuously decreasing the price.
Once a sale occurs, the monopolist immediately raises the price to a choke level
and again continuously lowers the price. The price has to jump after any sale,
because buyers follow a more aggressive stopping strategy. The reason is that
buyers observe the sale and hence they are aware that the relative supply of the
scarce good has decreased. In Bulow and Klemperer (1994), sellers cannot im-
mediately raise the price, but buyers are repeatedly allowed to buy at the same
sale price. Whenever excess demand occurs, the price in their model jumps. As
a consequence either a frenzy occurs (several buyer buy at the same price) or the
price “crashes”, i.e., drops discontinuously.
The buyers’ stopping strategy
A sequence of decreasing prices corresponds to a sequence of decreasing cutoff
types, and a buyer accepts a price if and only if his valuations is above the corre-
sponding cutoff type. That is, taking a symmetric ζ ∈ S as given, a type-v buyers
accepts a price
βk(v) := min{pt : xt ≤ v} (4.27)
for the k-th good that is sold.
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When the cutoff sequence is nice, a buyer faces a strategic tradeoff exactly as in
sequential Dutch auctions with any reserve price. To compute an optimal stopping
strategy at the start of one of the sequential auctions, a buyer only needs to know
his valuation, a prior about the other buyers’ valuations and how many auctions
take place after this particular auction. Let βk be the symmetric stopping strategy
in the k-th auction, let χk be the buyer type who was awarded the good in auction
k and let r be a reserve price. If the cutoff sequence is only ε-nice, there exists
an -consistent posterior such that the strategic tradeoffs are “close” to sequential
Dutch auctions.
Claim 4.13. If cutoffs sequences are nice, the stopping strategies (βk)k≤K of all
auctions are strictly increasing and differentiable in the valuation.
This claim is a standard method in auction theory. It simplifies the analysis, and
is easy to verify ex-post. By inverting βk, buyers and sellers can infer a purchasing
buyer’s valuation χ from the trading price. By Claim 4.13, buyers buy the goods
in order of their valuations. Moreover, the updated prior at the beginning of any
k-th auction is given by F (v)/F (χk−1) and any types of earlier buyers, χs with
s < k − 1, are irrelevant for the nice belief update. Imposing a seller strategy
profile that replicates sequential Dutch auctions with reserve price r, let βk,r(v)
be the price at which a type-v buyer wants to purchase in the k-th auction. It
turns out that the type of the buyer who purchased in the previous auction cancels
out and hence the stopping strategy is also independent of the previous buyer’s
valuation, χk−1.
Lemma 4.14. Suppose K units are offered in K sequential Dutch auctions with
reserve price r. The desired purchase price of a type-v buyer in the k-th auction
is given by
βk,r(v) = E
[
βk+1,r(Y
(n−k)
1 )
∣∣∣Y (n−k)1 < v]
= E
[
max{Y (n−1)K , r}
∣∣∣Y (n−1)k < v < Y (n−1)k−1 ] . (4.28)
Now, Claim 4.13 now can be verified easily. The proof of this statement proceeds
along the lines of, e.g., Krishna (2009, Proposition 15.2). I provide some details in
Appendix VII.C. Following the lines of the proof of Lemma 4.22, also in Appendix
VII.C, with r(x) = r for all x establishes the result as well.
In a K-unit sequential Dutch auction, forward-looking buyers, in equilibrium,
arbitrage away the gains from preponing or postponing purchase. Consequently,
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sale prices are a martingale. If sale prices had, say, an upward trend, a buyer
would benefit from employing a more aggressive stopping strategy in the current
auction as the next item will be more expensive in expectation. If sale prices had
a downward trend, a buyer would want to shade his current bid more, because the
option value of the following auction is higher. On the one hand side, a buyer is
willing to pay more for the good when a sale occurred, because supply decreased.
On the other hand side, fewer buyers are active and they have a lower value
than the buyer who purchased the previous item. In equilibrium in a symmetric
independent private value environment, both effects exactly offset each other. The
martingale property in sequential auctions was derived by Milgrom and Weber
(2000). In the following subsection, I show a perhaps surprising implication of the
martingale property: Proposition 4.15.
Pricing under oligopoly yields monopoly profits
The main result below appears to be counterintuitive at first glance: Why does a
competing seller not have an incentive to undercut a monopoly price path at any
time? The underlying reason is the martingale property derived in the previous
section. Because the monopolist sells with probability one, the sellers’ expected
payoff from selling to the currently highest type is at each point in time equal
to the expected payoff from selling to the next highest type after the highest
type purchased. Under Condition, 4.4 buyers and sellers know that as soon as
all but one sellers are stocked out, the remaining single seller replicates a non-
exclusive Dutch auction. Because all players anticipate this sequentially rational
continuation play, the proposed price path offers no opportunity for intertemporal
arbitrage on the seller side as well. The following proposition establishes that,
under Condition 4.4, sellers post identical prices that decrease synchronously and
continuously and jump immediately after each sale.
Proposition 4.15. Under Condition 4.4, there exists a SSMPBE in which the
outcome of efficient sequential Dutch auctions is replicated, which is independent
of the distribution of the K goods.
Proof. I begin with the analysis on equilibrium path: Lemma 4.14 describes the
buyers’ best response given the sellers use the pricing strategy proposed. I now
show that the sellers have no incentive to deviate from replicating sequential Dutch
auctions.
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The cutoff sequence is nice over any history along equilibrium path. By Condition
4.4, the last remaining seller replicates a non-exclusive sequential Dutch auction,
r ≤ v. The reason is that, when already starting as a monopolist, doing so when
arriving at exactly the same market state is sequentially rational. Hence, the K-th
good, which is provided under monopoly by construction, is allocated according
to the proposition. Similarly, the same is true for the penultimate, the (K−1)-th,
sale. In fact, if, for any k ∈ N, the k-th good is offered by a monopolist, it is again
allocated as proposed by assumption of Condition 4.4.
Suppose the market for the (K − 1)-th good is duopolistic, each seller offers one
good. Let h be a history with Mh = 2 and km(h) = 1 for both active sellers.
By Lemma 4.11, a duopolist wants to deviate from any price that differs from
the monopoly profit she can make when her competitor sells at this price, pt =
Cmt+(1,
mh(pt)).
Let G
(n)
i (v, x) be defined as
G
(n)
i (v, x) :=
i−1∑
l=0
(
n
l
)(
F (v)
F (x)
)n−l(
1− F (v)
F (x)
)l
,
the cdf of Y
(n)
i < x, and let g
(n)
i (v, x) be the corresponding density.
Define h˜t as a continuation of h, in which the price decreased continuously and
the (K − 1)-th trade has not occurred yet, i.e., all prices have been rejected so
far. The following term is rearranged in Appendix VII.D. For any such history h˜t,
there exists a corresponding buyer type χ = xt who wants to accept price pt. The
price paid for the (K− 1)-th good by this buyer is given by (4.28) of Lemma 4.14,
pt = βK−1,v(χ) = v +
∫ χ
v
g
(n−K+1)
1 (v, χ)βK,v(v)dv
= E
[
ψ˜(Y
(n−K+1)
1 , χ)
∣∣Y (n−K+1)1 < χ] = Cmt+(1,m′h˜t), (4.29)
which is exactly the expected profit of a monopolist selling the last good when the
penultimate good got sold to type χ: The expected value of the virtual valuation
of the highest buyer type left in the market. Therefore both sellers m and m′ have
no incentive to deviate from any price βK−1,v(χ) for any χ = x(h˜) along the price
sequence for the (K − 1)-th sale, i.e., at no time after the (K − 2)-th sale.
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Next, consider the k-th sale for any k < K − 1. From Lemma 4.14,
βk,v(χk) = E
[
βk+1,v(Y
(n−k)
1 )
∣∣∣Y (n−k)1 < χk] .
Hence, a seller is indifferent between selling the k-th traded good in the market to
some type χk or trading the (k + 1)-th good in the market with the highest type
at the time, given that the k-th good was sold to type χk.
This statements also holds true when the market is asymmetric. Because of the
martingale property, the expected prices of future sales are equal. Then the sym-
metry of continuation payoffs pin down equilibrium prices at each time, that is,
for any history h and the corresponding cutoff type xt = χk. Hence,
pt = βk,v(χk) = kβk,v(χk)− (k − 1)βk,v(χk) = MCPmt+(k, ht, pt)
and the necessary condition of Lemma 4.11 holds. This condition is also sufficient,
because a deviator can at no history gain more than pt: While undercutting is
dominated by letting the competitor sell, raising the price essentially means letting
the competitor sell which yields payoff also equal to pt. Raising the price does not
even influence the market sate.
Suppose that a seller at some time t with history h sets a lower price p′ < pt
than she is supposed to set. As a consequence, the cutoff sequence off equilibrium
path is only ε-nice, where ε depends on the size of the price cut. Then, there
exists a continuum of ε-consistent beliefs approximating correct off-path beliefs
Fno,h and Fs,h that are first-order stochastically dominated by the on-path belief.
Since the correct off-path belief is first-order stochastically dominated by the on-
path belief as well, one can always find such an ε-consistent belief. Therefore
not only the price, also the off-path continuation payoff is weakly below the on-
path continuation payoff. In particular, by Lemma 4.10, the on-path belief is
ε-consistent with the correct off-path belief. With this belief, the deviation leads
to equal continuation payoffs, but is strictly non-profitable as p′ < pt.
In words, when sequential Dutch auctions are replicated, any seller has, at any
price along the continuous price path, no incentive to deviate. The reason is that,
in equilibrium, the marginal continuation payoff is at each point in time equal to
the current price as prices are a martingale. Under Condition 4.4, all goods gets
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traded with certainty, and hence the price is equal to the marignal continuation
payoff.
Proposition 4.15 only holds when the monopoly continuation game induces an
efficient allocation. From earlier analysis, it is known that a seller with price
commitment wants to exclude low buyer types, and thus Condition 4.4 fails. I
address sellers with price commitment in the following section. However, even
for the case of no price commitment, Ho¨rner and Samuelson (2011) show that
a monopolist only prefers to implement an efficient allocation when the good is
sufficiently scarce. For example, a monopolist facing a single buyer maximizes her
profit by always posting unacceptable prices up to the deadline, at which she posts
the static monopoly price. Similarly, for few buyers and few goods, the monopolist
also posts unacceptable prices until few pricing opportunities before the deadline.
IV Full price commitment
In this section, I shed light on the role of commitment to future prices. Although
the no-commitment case appears to be more suitable for applications, the full-
commitment solution is a relevant benchmark case to quantify the value of com-
mitment. In this section, I consider the same model as in the previous one, but
I relax the no-commitment restriction on the sellers’ behavior: In the beginning
of the game, each seller m commits to a price plan contingent on each possible
market state (full price commitment).
By Corollary 4.3, Condition 4.4 holds if and only if (4.9) is true. Thus, under this
condition, Proposition 4.15 continues to hold. If vf(v) < 1, the optimal allocation
excludes low buyer types and hence the good is not sold with probability one.
In a no-gap case, v = 0, a monopolist prefers to exclude low-type buyers for
any updated prior fh. Hence, if sellers’ strategies are not restricted by sequential
rationality, the remaining seller at any history that generates monopoly would not
want to sell with probability one. However, the measure of excluded types with
respect to the initial type distribution is smaller.
Suppose, all sellers replicate the monopoly price path of an optimal Dutch auc-
tion. Then, a single seller can profitably deviate by decreasing the price further
than the optimal reserve price r∗. On the one hand, the deviator gains in case
she becomes the only seller posting the minimum price because she exploits the
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revealed information that active buyers’ valuations are lower. On the other hand,
the deviator loses from the fact that buyers employ a less aggressive stopping strat-
egy as they anticipate that with some probability (in the case in which only the
deviator remains) the terminal price will be lower. For a monopolist, the loss from
the second effect exceeds the gain from the first effect. Under oligopoly, however,
the second effect is shared with all other sellers while the gains of the first effect
are solely pocketed by the deviator. In other words, the buyers shade their bid
less compared to the monopoly case because the reserve price is lower once the
deviator becomes the monopolist which occurs with a positive probability. By a
Bertrand argument, posting a positive price at the final trading possibility cannot
form an equilibrium when the market is oligopolistic at that time.
The following proposition pins down an equilibrium price path: All sellers post
identical synchronously and continuously decreasing prices that jump to the choke
price after each sale if at least two sellers are active. When only a single seller
remains active, she sells her goods by replicating sequential Dutch auctions with
an exclusive reserve price that is optimal with respect to the updated prior of the
history that generated the monopoly. By Claim 4.13, the type of the buyer who
purchased the last good traded in oligopoly is learned from the corresponding price
paid. Since the proposed price path is nice, the updated virtual valuation is given
by (4.25). Figure 4.3 shows (a) an exemplary oligopoly price path, when sellers
can commit, juxtaposed with (b) the corresponding monopoly price path.
Let ψ˜−1(0, xt) be the inverse of ψ˜ with respect to the first argument evaluated at
0 and xt.
Proposition 4.16. Suppose vf(v) < 1. When sellers can commit to a price
path contingent on market states, the price continuously decreases with upward
jumps whenever a sale occurs. For any history h that generates monopoly at time
t + , the monopolist commits to a Dutch auction with reserve price r∗(xt) =
max{ψ˜−1(0, xt), v} Prices and expected industry profits are higher under monopoly
than under oligopoly.
Proof. The reserve price r(χ) set by a monopolist who emerged endogenously at
some time t is determined by valuation χ = xt, the type of the last buyer who
purchased under oligopoly. Function r maps a buyer type x into a reserve price
such that ψ˜(r(x), x) = 0 with ψ˜ given in (4.25). From then on, the buyers’ best
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response to the monopolist’s strategy is given by Lemma 4.14 with r = r∗(χ),
βk,r∗(χ)(v).
Next consider the buyers’ best response to the sellers’ proposed pricing strategy
under oligopoly. Let βolik (v, ω) be stopping price of type v when the k-th sale
takes place under an oligopolistic market state ω, as defined in (4.3). The strategy
depends on ω because the distribution of goods determines how likely it is that
the market becomes monopolistic for the next sale(s).
The intertemporal arbitrage condition of a buyer implies that he must be indif-
ferent between getting the k-th good at some price p̂ and entering an auction for
the remaining (K − k) goods when the k-th good was sold at the same price p̂.
In particular, this is true for any sale that could potentially be the last sale under
oligopoly. In Lemma 4.22 in Appendix VII.C, I show that
βolik (v, ω) =
∑
w∈Ωω
Pr(ω′ = w)
· E
[
βolik+1(Y
(n−1)
k , w)
∣∣∣Y (n−1)k < v < Y (n−1)k−1 ] , (4.30)
where Ωω is the set of all market states that can possibly arise from ω when a
single sale occurred. Similar to the procedure before, this formulation allows me
to solve the game backwards from the K-th sale on, which by construction occurs
in a monopolistic market. For details, see Lemma 4.22 in Appendix VII.C.
I now show that the proposed seller behavior is indeed the best reply to the buyers’
strategy.
Consider the penultimate sale (K − 1) with a duopolistic market state ω =
(Fh, (1, 1)) at some history h such that the next market state after a sale is mo-
nopolistic with certainty. Suppose all players have behaved as proposed so far.
Let h˜t be some continuation of h in which all prices along the continuous price
path until time t were rejected.
The stopping strategy βoliK−1(χ, ω) (see (4.45) in Appendix VII.C) of a buyer type
χ is given by
βoliK−1(χ, ω) = v + (n−K − 1)
∫ χ
v
(
Fh(z)
Fh(χ)
)n−K
fh(z)
Fh(χ)
·
[
z −
∫ z
r(z)
(
Fh(y)
Fh(z)
)n−K
dy
]
dz.
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I can rewrite this term (see the details in Appendix VII.E) as
βoliK−1(χ, ω) =
∫ χ
r(χ)
(n−K + 1) f(y)
F (χ)
(
F (y)
F (χ)
)n−K (
y − F (χ)− F (y)
f(y)
)
dy
= E
[
max{ψ˜(Y (n−K+1)1 , χ), 0}
]
= Cmt+(1,
mh˜)
where the second line holds for exactly one function r: r∗(x) such that ψ˜(r∗(x), x) =
0, the reserve price function proposed in this statement. Each χ corresponds to a
history h˜t with xt = χ and
pt = β
oli
K−1(χ, ω) = C
m
t+(1,
mh˜)
That is, both sellers are indifferent between selling to type χ at price βoliK−1(χ, ω)
and obtaining the expected monopoly profit of the final sale when type χ purchased
the penultimate good. The equality of the price and the corresponding monopoly
continuation payoff holds at every point in time when players follow the proposed
strategy profile. The resulting price path is nice everywhere.
The off equilibrium path analysis is more involved compared to Proposition 4.15
since after deviations continuation play does not have to be sequentially rational.
Discontinuous price cuts are not profitable deviations following the same argument
as in the proof of Proposition 4.15: It strictly reduces the payoff from the current
price and it weakly decreases the continuation payoff which is maximized under
the proposed rule.
Next suppose that some seller commits to some price path other than a sequential
Dutch auction with reserve price rule r∗(x) in a monopolistic market state. Still the
same types as on equilibrium path buy at the oligopolistic market states and hence
the same monopoly posterior is induced. By definition the monopoly continuation
payoff decreases, as it is maximized under the proposed rule. The intertemporal
arbitrage condition of the buyers requires that the marginal type χ that accept
the last price posted under oligopoly is indifferent between buying at this price
and entering the monopoly continuation game. Suppose the deviating monopoly
continuation game increases the payoff of type χ in compared to the proposed
equilibrium. By incentive compatibility, it also increases the payoff of all types
larger than χ. As a consequence the stopping strategy of all types that buy in
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equilibrium becomes less aggressive such that the accepted prices are lower, making
this deviation non-profitable for the deviating seller.
Suppose the deviating monopoly continuation game decreases the utility of type
χ. The idea of this deviation is to increase the price to be gained under oligopoly
at the cost of decreasing the monopoly continuation payoff. An upper bound
of this deviation is the profit of the same deviation while also decreasing the
oligopoly price slightly faster than the other sellers. That way it is guaranteed
that the deviator sells all her goods under oligopoly without reaching the monopoly
continuation game which yields less payoff than the equilibrium payoff. However,
in this case the continuation game after the deviator is sold out is exactly the same
as in equilibrium. Hence, the bidding strategies are the same and the deviator does
not gain from this deviation.
The proposed monopoly continuation play is the only strategy that ensures that
the buyers’ and the sellers’ intertemporal arbitrage conditions hold simultaneously.
That is, only when sellers, who endogenously become monopolists, commit to
conducting sequential Dutch auctions with the given reserve price function, the
sellers’ marginal continuation payoffs have the martingale property as well. In
comparison with the no-commitment case, buyers purchase at higher prices, but
in expectation fewer goods are sold because the prices do not decrease as much.
The opposite is true in the comparison with the full-commitment monopoly case.
Figure 4.3 illustrates the difference between monopoly and oligopoly prices with
price commitment. Although the first three units are sold to the same buyer types,
monopoly prices are higher. The reason is that an ab-initio K-unit monopolist
commits to a higher terminal price than an endogenously emerging monopolist.
The latter’s reserve price is ex-ante unknown, but lower than the ab-initio monop-
olist’s reserve price with probability one.
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Figure 4.3: Comparison of monopoly and oligopoly (each seller one good)
prices. Price paths under full commitment with K = 4 goods and n = 10
buyers with uniformly distributed values. The black dots indicate the sales to
types 0.8, 0.75, 0.6(, 0.4 - not served with M = 1).
V Discussion
In this model, the strategic interaction between forward-looking buyers and sellers
without price commitment in continuous time suggests that it is irrelevant for prof-
its and buyer surplus how goods are distributed among sellers, because monopolis-
tic market power can be sustained anyway. Proposition 4.15 is a counterintuitive
result because economists instinctively promote competition in standard settings
(without innovation, synergies, natural monopoly cost structures etc). From any
real world angle, it appears to be a questionable policy advice to ignore market
conditions in the industries mentioned in the introduction. To provide a better un-
derstanding of Proposition 4.15, I suggest some modifications which may overturn
the result.
I interpret Proposition 4.15 as a benchmark result that sheds light on which char-
acteristics of an industry are important when, e.g., evaluating the welfare effect
of a merger. In Section IV, I analyzed the role of commitment to future prices in
destroying the irrelevance result. In the following, I investigate the role of other
important aspects and connect my results to the literature on sequential auctions.
In standard oligopoly models, sellers’ incentives to undercut prices provide benefits
to consumers. In the equilibrium of Proposition 4.15, these incentives are not
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present because of the simultaneous intertemporal arbitrage conditions of buyers
and sellers which result in martingale prices. Since the benchmark result is driven
by the martingale property of equilibrium prices, it opens the door for research
investigating a similar setting in which prices do not follow a martingale.
Interdependent values: The martingale property of prices in sequential auctions
in was derived by Milgrom and Weber (2000, written in 1982). In addition, they
show that prices tend to drift upward in a model with interdependent values with
affiliated signals. For example, a reasonable application of my model with affiliated
signals are fashion fads: There is a sales season and the previously produced goods
are only fashionable for a given time after which the market dries up. Because
the sale price of items bought earlier reveals information about the value of the
good to other buyers, remaining buyers are willing to pay higher prices for the next
items. Then, however, a seller prefers to trade later rather than earlier. Extending
my model in this extension would be interesting.
Risk: Empirically, prices in real world sequential auctions appear to show a down-
ward trend, a stylized fact known as the “declining price anomaly”. This term
was popularized by Ashenfelter (1989) who notes such a trend in prices of se-
quential art and wine auctions. Since then many empirical papers ( e.g. Van den
Berg, Van Ours, and Pradhan (2001)) reported declining prices and many theoret-
ical papers provided possible explanations for the finding. A natural explanation
for declining prices is risk aversion. McAfee (1993) can explain the discrepancy
between theory and empirics with nondecreasing absolute risk aversion which ap-
pears to be unconventional. More recently, Hu and Zou (2015) set up a model with
”background risk”, i.e., bidders participate in auctions not only to seek profits, but
also to avoid losses. Bidders exhibit non-quasilinear utilities and the risk exposure
is type dependent. In such a setting, they show that a pure strategy equilibrium in
sequential first- or second price auctions exists when marginal utilities of income
are log-supermodular in payment and type. Equilibria feature a declining price
path when bidders are risk-averse and an increasing price path when bidders are
risk-loving. Buyers’ background risk can easily be incorporated into my model
and the implications of background risk in a setting with competition on the seller
side remain to be investigated.
Unobserved inventory: I assume that buyers are always aware of how many
goods are left to allocate. Internet platforms often reveal the inventory (e.g. num-
ber of seats, rooms or tickets left), but in many settings, especially in bigger
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markets, this assumption might be implausible. Because airlines sometimes re-
serve seats for special passengers, the number of remaining seats observed online
is only an informative proxy for real inventory. In Jeitschko (1999) prices in se-
quential auctions can decline because the number of units is unknown. Due to the
uncertainty whether a next auction takes place, the option value of participating
in the next auction declines which drives up the price in the current auction. Sim-
ilarly, an increasing expected price path can be found when information arrives
that fewer units than anticipated will be sold.
Arriving buyers: Another intriguing extension would be to allow additional
buyer entry over time. A dynamic buyer population could be incorporated into
my setting by dividing the continuous time interval into several continuous time
intervals which start with the arrival of additional buyers. This extension is par-
ticularly interesting in the context of airline tickets as, say, business travelers find
out about their need to travel much later than leisure travelers. The vast majority
of theory papers predict falling prices as the deadline approaches, contradicting
the date (see McAfee and Te Velde (2006) for stylized facts about pricing in the
airline industry). Board and Skrzypacz (2015) consider such a model with a single
seller. Remarkably, they show that the optimal allocation in the continuous-time
limit of their setting can be implemented with an optimal path of posted prices.
However, this result heavily hinges on their assumption of discounting. For sev-
eral applications, discounting is of second order importance. To illustrate, a hotel
room is consumed and paid at the day of arrival and hence the time of purchase is
only indirectly relevant through the price and the probability that there still is a
hotel room available. This indirect form of discounting is endogenously part of my
model and an explicit discount factor may only reflect a reduced form approach
to model an urge to buy early. Without a discount factor, their monopolist would
simply wait until the deadline when all buyers have arrived and conduct an opti-
mal auction following Myerson (1981). This strategy is clearly not an equilibrium
if additional sellers were present. Competition gives rise to an interesting dynamic
of preponing sales to attract already present high-value buyers versus postponing
sales to include buyers entering in the future.
Heterogeneous goods: Although many typical applications, such as low-cost
bus and plane travel or small-sized rental cars, do not display significant brand or
product differentiation, my assumption of homogeneous goods limits the scope for
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reasonable applications. Here, I want to stress that good homogeneity is not driv-
ing the results qualitatively per se. Suppose there is a quality difference between
two goods offered by two different sellers. For example, two flights with the same
destination departing on the same day, one leaving at 4 am and the other at 11
am. If the quality difference is modeled as a shift of the distribution, qualitatively
the analysis remains the same. That is, if for any buyer whose willingness to pay
for the good of seller A amounts to v, then this seller values the good of seller
B v + ∆. Because the quality difference is assessed unanimously, incentives are
not distorted and prices continuously decrease at the same speed, but at different
levels.
As discussed in the introduction, strategic buyers are prevalent in many markets.
However, the purchase of some goods is rather the result of impulsive decision
making instead of fully strategic considerations. The proofs of Propositions 4.15
and 4.16 hinge on the buyers’ objective to optimally time their purchase. Strate-
gic buyer arbitrage away any expected intertemporal price differences. When, in
contrast, buyers are fully myopic, i.e., when they have a discount factor of zero,
they buy as soon the price is below their valuation, xt = pt for any history ht.
Myopic buyers: I consider the extreme case of fully-forward-looking buyers.
For a better understanding of this assumption, it is helpful to study the opposite
extreme assumption, fully myopic buyers as in Lazear (1986). Assume the envi-
ronment of Section II, but suppose buyers have a discount factor of zero. As a
result, a K-good monopolist maximizes profit by continuously decreasing prices
to make a profit of
E
[
K∑
k=1
Y
(n)
k
]
and all buyers obtain zero utility. Clearly, prices are decreasing over time.
Under oligopoly, a competitor has incentive to undercut prices to attract the
highest-type buyer. Consequently, a positive measure of buyer types accepts the
first price and, hence, the price path is not nice in equilibrium under oligopoly.
Because Lemma 4.11 continues to hold and all goods are sold in equilibrium,
oligopoly prices are a martingale. To illustrate, consider two sellers, each offering
one good. The first price is equal to the continuation payoff of not selling and
becoming a monopolist, which is equal to the expectation of the highest order
statistic of (n− 1) draws from the updated prior. If no sale occurs, the same pro-
cedure is repeated with an updated prior. Prices jump discontinuously in duopoly
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and when a sale occurs, the remaining seller continuously decreases prices. The
expected revenue of the monopolist is equal to the expected price which is equal
to the duopoly price. For asymmetrically distributed capacities the martingale
property of sale prices is lost.
VI Conclusion
In this paper, I contribute to filling a gap in the RM literature by analyzing
oligopolistic competition. Virtually none of the industries characterized by RM
business conditions is monopolistic and hence this paper adds to a better un-
derstanding of real world RM industries. Surprisingly, my setting features equal
allocations, prices, joint industry profits and buyer payoffs under monopoly and
oligopoly if under monopoly, an efficient allocation arises with probability one.
With uniformly distributed values, the latter is true when sellers are unable to
commit to future prices and goods are sufficiently scarce. With commitment, it
holds when sellers value the good sufficiently less than the lowest buyer type. This
result is driven by the forward-looking buyers and the scarcity of the good, because
the buyers’ intertemporal optimization entails martingale equilibrium prices and
hence, in equilibrium, sellers have no incentive to deviate from the monopoly price
path. If, however, a single seller optimally want to commit to excluding low buyer
types from trade, competition on the seller side leads to lower prices accompanied
by higher consumer surplus and lower industry profits.
The main result of this paper is puzzling: Why do price paths observed in re-
ality differ when the competition is introduced? In the previous section, I offer
modifications of the model that produce the more intuitive result that competi-
tion on the seller side benefits the consumers and harms the sellers. Nevertheless,
this model is a relevant benchmark that contributes to a better understanding of
oligopolistic RM markets. It highlights the role of commitment and the role of
forward-looking buyers. Moreover, I derive sharp predictions about the behavior
of prices and thereby open the door for intriguing empirical research. For example,
the observation that competition beats down prices in the airline industry suggests
that buyers are myopic instead of forward-looking. In combination with a more
elaborate form of the proposed modifications of the model, it could be interesting
to see how myopic they are.
Competeing for Strategic Buyers. 104
VII Appendix
VII.A Defining the Continuous-Time Game
This section establishes that the continuous-time game I set up is well-defined.
I expand the approach of Bergin and MacLeod (1993) for complete-information
repeated games to imperfect-information stochastic games. The following proofs
mimic the corresponding ones in their paper.
Let BT and BA be the Borel sets of T and A = ×ι∈IAι, respectively. Let µι be a
metric on Aι and µ =
∑
µι be a metric on A. Let
Dι(oι, o˜ι, T
′) =
∫
T ′
µι(oι(t), o˜ι(t))dt ∀oi, o˜i ∈ Oi
be a metric on outcome paths relative to time interval T ′. Let D(o, o˜, T ′) :=∑
ιDι(oι, o˜ι, T
′) for all o, o˜ ∈ O be a metric on O relative to T ′ ∈ BT . Let BO be
the Borel σ-algebra determined by D. This metric on outcome paths is explicitly
used to generate the appropriate metric ρ on the space of inertia strategies. With
respect to ρ, the completion S∗ of the space of inertia strategies is then taken.
Let player ι’s strategy given by the mapping
ζι : O × T → Aι
where ζι(o, t) is the action chosen by player ι at time t, given outcome o, while ζι(o)
represents ζι(o, ·) ∈ Oi. Note that the private information Bergin and MacLeod
(1993) use this formulation because then the domain of a strategy conveniently is
time invariant.
Let me, for now, ignore the restriction that strategies have to be sequentially
rational, are only set contingent on a market state and a strategy of a player
cannot depend on the private information of another player. The requirement
that a player’s strategy at time t can only depend on the past is reflected by A2
below. First of all, ζι has to satisfy the following conditions:
A1. ζι is a BO ×BT measurable function on O × T .
A2. For all t ∈ T , and o, o′ ∈ O such that D(o, o′, [0, t)) = 0, ζι(o, t) = ζι(o′, t).
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These conditions are necessary, but not sufficient for well-defined strategies. See
Bergin and MacLeod (1993). I also need the following condition:
Definition 4.17. A strategy ζι satisfies inertia if given t ∈ T , and o ∈ O, there
exists an  > 0 and aι ∈ Aι such that
Dι(ζι(o
′), aι, [t, t+ )) = 0,
for every o′ ∈ O, such that D(o, o′, [0, t)) = 0.
In other words, at every point in time, a strategy has to be constant for a small
period of time. Denote by Si the set of strategies satisfying A1, A2 and inertia. The
next lemma shows that any |I|-tuple of functions ζ = (ζi1 , . . . , ζin , ζm1 , . . . , ζmM ,
ζN1, ζN2, ζN3) ∈ S = ×ιSι determines a unique outcome on every continuation
game.
Lemma 4.18. Let ζ ∈ S, then for every o ∈ O, and t ∈ T , there exists a unique
outcome o˜ ∈ O such that D(o, o˜, [0, t)) = 0, and D(ζ(o˜), o˜, [t, 1]) = 0.
Proof. See Bergin and MacLeod (1993) Theorem 1, different notation: o = h,
ζ = x.
Given (o, t) ∈ O × T , and ζ ∈ S, let σ(ζ, o, t) be the outcome that is identical to
o on [0, t) and is determined by ζ on [t, 1]. Now, define a metric on Sι,
ρι(ζι, ζ
′
ι) = sup{D(σ((ζι, ζ−ι), o, t)), σ((ζ ′ι, ζ−ι), h, t)
∣∣
(o, t) ∈ O × T, ζ−ι ∈ S−ι} ∀ζι, ζ ′ι ∈ Sι. (4.31)
I take the completion with respect to this metric ρ to guarantee a well-defined
outcome. This metric considers two strategies to be equal if they give the same
outcome starting at an arbitrary history and time, when played against the same
strategies of other players. Extend this metric to ρ(ζ, ζ ′) =
∑
ι ρι(ζ, ζ
′), for all
ζ, ζ ′ ∈ S. Let S∗ι be the completion relative to ρι, and let S∗ = ×ιS∗ι : Two
Cauchy sequences (xl)l=1,... and (yl)l=1,... in S converge to the same strategy vector
ζ ∈ S∗ if and only if ρ(xl, yl) → 0. Extend the metric to ρ∗ on S∗ by letting
ρ∗(x, y) = lim ρ(xl, yl) for x, y ∈ S∗ and (xl)→ x and (yl)→ y.
The next result establishes that every strategy in S∗ is identified with a unique
outcome o∗ ∈ O.
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Lemma 4.19. For every ζ ∈ S∗, and every (o, t) ∈ O × T , there exists a unique
o∗ ∈ H, such that σ((ζl), o, t) → o∗ for any Cauchy sequence (ζl)l=1,... in S con-
verging to ζ ∈ S∗.
Proof. See Bergin and MacLeod (1993) Theorem 2, different notation: o = h,
ζ = x.
The limit is taken only within the strategy space and the outcome function is not
changed. We have constructed a game such that for any ζ ∈ S∗, a well-defined
payoff of outcome σ(ζ, o, t) for any (o, t) ∈ O × T exists.
VII.B The Posterior
Corollary 4.20. Suppose history h of time t features no sale so far. Following a
sale or no sale, sellers update their prior according to Bayes’ Rule as follows:
fno,h(v) =
fh(v)
Fh(x)
and (4.32)
fs,h(v) =

fh(v)(1−σω)
(1−Fh(x)n)n−1n
if v < x
fh(v)(1−φω)
(1−Fh(x)n)n−1n
if v ≥ x
for any m ∈M, (4.33)
where x is given by (4.15), σω is given by (4.17) and φω is given by (4.16).
Similarly, buyers update their prior after a sale as follows:
fd,h(v) =

fh(v)(1−σ′ω)
(1−Fh(x)n−1)n−2n−1
if v < x
fh(v)(1−φ′ω)
(1−Fh(x)n−1)n−2n−1
if v ≥ x
for any m ∈M, (4.34)
fa,h(v) =

fh(v)(1−φ′t)
(1−φω)n−2n−1
if v < x
fhi (v)(1−φ′′ω)
(1−φω)n−2n−1
if v ≥ x
for any m ∈M, (4.35)
with σ′ω = Fh(x)
n−2 and φ′ω =
1−Fh(x)n−1
(n−1)(1−Fh(x)) and φ
′′
ω =
2(n−1−nF (x)+F (x)n)
(n−1)n(1−Fh(x))2
Let h′ be a continuation of history h with one additional trading opportunity
Bayes’ Rule states
fh(vi|h′) = fh(v)Pr(h
′|h, vi)
Pr(h′|h) .
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The posterior when no sale occurred is straightforward to derive. Suppose a sale
occurred. Let a seller consider buyer 1 wlog.
If v1 < xt, a sale to some buyer i 6= i1 could only occur when at least one of the
other (n− 1) buyers has a value greater than xt. Hence,
Pr(h′|v1, h) = 1− Fh(xt)(n−1).
If v1 ≥ xt, buyer 1 only remains in the market following a sale when 1 was not
selected to trade. There must have been another buyer type larger than the cutoff
and this buyer was selected instead. Otherwise, buyer 1 would have bought the
good and would have exited the market. Hence, Pr(h′|h, vi) = 1− φω.
The denominator is the probability that a good gets traded, but not with buyer i:
∫ xt
0
f(v)(1− F (xt)n−1)dv +
∫ 1
xt
f(v)
1−
φ︷ ︸︸ ︷
1− F (xt)n
(1− F (xt))n
 dv.
Next, suppose a sale occurred following a buyer history h, and wlog consider buyer
2 forming a posterior about buyer 1. Suppose 2 declined purchase. As 2 declined
himself, 1 only could have declined as well (v1 < xt) if one of the other (n − 2)
buyers accepted the price. Similarly for valuations v1 ≥ x, buyer 2 updates his
belief exactly as a seller, but considers only (n− 2) other buyers.
Now, suppose 2 accepted the price. In case 1 declined (v1 < x), it must have been
that some buyer other than 2 was selected for purchase. If 1 tried to purchase
(v1 ≥ x) as well, it must have been that one buyer other than 1 or 2 was selected,
1−
n−2∑
j=0
(
n− 2
j
)
2
j + 2
F (xt)
n−2−j(1− F (xt))j = 1− φ′′.
The following lemma holds for all symmetric equilibria, even when no cutoff strate-
gies are played:
Lemma 4.8. The following first-order stochastic dominance results hold for any
equilibrium in the buyers’ game
Fno,h(v) > Fd,h(v) > Fa,h(v) > Fh(v),
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for all v, x : Fh(v) ∈ (0, 1), Fv(x) ∈ (0, 1). For v, x : Fh(v), Fh(x) ∈ {0, 1}, all four
distributions are equal.
Proof. For ease of exposition, I suppress the subscripts. I proof this inequality for
symmetric cutoff strategies, so that the posteriors look like the ones in Corollary
4.20. In any equilibrium not in cutoff strategies, it must be that higher types are
more likely to accept a price. Otherwise, the equilibrium candidate would violate
the principle of incentive compatibility. The following extends to mixed strategies
that are weakly increasing in the type.
The last inequality is obviously true. I start with the first in inequality. It holds
for v < x if and only if
1 · F (v)
F (x)
>
(1− σ′)F (v)
(1− σ′)F (x) + (1− F (x))(1− φ′) ,
which is obviously true. For v > x, Fno,h(v) = 1 such that the inequality holds,
too.
The second inequality holds for v < x if and only if
(1− σ′)F (v)
(1− σ′)F (x) + (1− F (x))(1− φ′) >
(1− φ′)F (v)
(1− φ′)F (x) + (1− F (x))(1− φ′′)
1− σ′
1− φ′ >
1− σ′
1− φ′ ·
F (x) + (1− F (x))1−φ′
1−σ′
F (x) + (1− F (x))1−φ′′
1−φ′
which holds when the second term on the RHS is ≤ 1. Hence, it is to show that
(1− φ′)2 < (1− φ′′)(1− σ′) (4.36)(
n−2∑
j=1
aj
)(
n−2∑
k=1
ak
)
<
(
n−2∑
j=1
bj
)(
n−2∑
k=1
ck
)
with
2ajak = 2
(
j
j + 1
)(
k
k + 1
)(
n− 2
j
)(
n− 2
k
)
F (x)2(n−1)−j−k(1− F (x))j+k <
bjck + bkcj =
(
j
j + 2
+
k
k + 2
)(
n− 2
j
)(
n− 2
k
)
F (x)2(n−1)−j−k(1− F (x))j+k
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for all j 6= k ∈ (1, . . . , n− 2) and
ajak =
(
j
j + 1
)2(
n− 2
j
)2
F (x)2(n−1)−2j(1− F (x))2j <
bjck =
(
j
j + 2
)(
n− 2
j
)2
F (x)2(n−1)−2j(1− F (x))2j
for all j = k ∈ (1, . . . , n− 2).
The second inequality holds for v ≥ x if and only if
(1− σ′)F (x) + (F (v)− F (x))(1− φ′)
(1− σ′)F (x) + (1− F (x))(1− φ′) >
(1− φ′)F (x) + (F (v)− F (x))(1− φ′′)
(1− φ′)F (x) + (1− F (x))(1− φ′′)
(1− σ′)
(1− φ′) ·
F (x) + (F (v)− F (x)) (1−φ′)
(1−σ′)
(1−σ′)
(1−φ′)F (x) + (1− F (x))
>
(1− φ′)
(1− φ′′) ·
F (x) + (F (v)− F (x)) (1−φ′′)
(1−φ′)
(1−φ′)
(1−φ′′)F (x) + (1− F (x))
which is true because of (4.36).
Corollary 4.21.
W ′+(vi, h, p, 0) ≥ W ′+(vi, h, p, 1) for a.e. vi ∈ [v, v]
We have shown that a declining buyer is more optimistic about getting a good
than an accepting buyer the Lemma 4.8 .
Lemma 4.10. If the cutoff sequence is ε-nice over history h, then for all trun-
cations ht of h, the prior Fht is ε-consistent with posteriors Fs,ht, Fa,ht and Fd,ht
following a sale at h, and ε̂-consistent with posterior Fno,ht following no sale at the
same history for some ε̂ ≥ ε.
Proof. Since the (buyer or seller) posterior after sale is first-order stochastically
dominated by the prior, and it first-order stochastically dominates the posterior
following no sale, for all G ∈ {Fs,ht , Fa,ht , Fd,ht},
Fht(v)
Fht(xt)
≥ G(v) ≥ Fht(v) (4.37)
1 ≥ Fht (v)
G(v)
≥ Fht(xt) ≥ 1− ε, (4.38)
which shows the first statement.
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From inequality (4.37), it also follows that any such G is ε-consistent with
Fht
Fht (xt)
,
1 ≥ G(v)
Fht (v)/Fht (xt)
≥ Fht(xt) ≥ 1− ε
As a consequence Fht is ε̂-consistent with
Fht
Fht (xt)
, because
Fht(v)
Fht(xt)
≥ G(v) ≥ (1− ε) Fh(v)
Fh(x(h))
together with (4.38) implies
1 ≥ Fht(v)
G(v)
≥ Fht(v)
Fht(v)/Fht(xt)
and
1− ε ≤ Fht(v)
G(v)
≤ Fht(v)
(1− ε)Fht(v)/Fht(xt)
.
Hence,
(1− ε̂) = (1− ε)2 ≤ Fht(v)
Fht(v)/Fht(xt)
≤ 1.
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VII.C Stopping Strategies β
Proof of Lemma 4.14
Proof. Suppose that Claim 4.13 is true. Then buyers purchase in order of their
values and players can infer the valuation of a buyer from the price he paid. Let h
be a history in which the penultimate good got sold to type χ. Then, the (unique,
see, e.g., Maskin and Riley (2000)) equilibrium stopping strategy in the final Dutch
auction with nh buyers and reserve price r ≥ v is given by
βK,r(v) = r
G
(nh−1)
1 (r)
G
(nh−1)
1 (v, χ)
+
1
G
(nh−1)
1 (v, χ)
∫ v
r
yg
(nh−1)
1 (y, χ)dy (4.39)
= E
[
max{r, Y (n−K)1 }
∣∣∣Y (n−K)1 < v]
= E
[
max{r, Y (n−1)K }
∣∣∣Y (n−1)K < v < Y (n−1)K−1 ] ∀v ∈ [r, χ]. (4.40)
Types v < r abstain from buying and types above v > χ purchase at β1(χ) which
only happens off path. The strategy βK,r is independent of χ.
The iterative arguments behind Krishna (2009, Proposition 15.2) or Lemma 4.22
(see the proof below) straightforwardly extend to a non-zero and fixed reserve
price,
βk,r(v) = E
[
βk+1,r(Y
(n−k)
1 )
∣∣∣Y (n−k)1 < v] (4.41)
= E
[
βk+1,r(Y
(n−1)
k )
∣∣∣Y (n−1)k < v < Y (n−1)k−1 ]
= E
[
E
[
max{r, Y (n−1)K }
∣∣∣Yk < Yk−1]∣∣∣Y (n−1)k < v < Y (n−1)k−1 ]
= E
[
max{r, Y (n−1)K }
∣∣∣Y (n−1)k < v < Y (n−1)k−1 ] ∀v ∈ [r, χ], (4.42)
which is (4.28).
Lemma 4.22. Suppose K units are offered and prices behave as suggested in
Proposition 4.16. When the market has an oligopolisitc market state ω at history
h, the desired purchase price of a type-v buyer when the k-th good is offered is
given by
βolik (v, ω) =
∑
w∈Ωω
Pr(ωhm = w)
· E
[
βolik+1(Y
(n−1)
k , w)
∣∣∣Y (n−1)k < v < Y (n−1)k−1 ] , (4.30)
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where Ωω is the history-dependent set of all possible market states that can follow
from ω when a single sale occurred.
Proof. Consider the sale of the K-th good. Suppose that sellers have acted ac-
cording to Proposition 4.16 so far. At history h, the market was duopolistic,
ω = (Fh, (1, 1)) and then the (K − 1)-th good was the last good traded in
oligopoly, leading to history mh˜t(p). Let the corresponding buyer type be de-
noted by χ = xt and he bought at price p = β
oli
K−1(χ, ω). Then, by the Revenue
Equivalence Theorem, a buyer’s expected utility from entering the last auction at
history mh˜(βoliK−1(χ, ω)) is given by
uK(v, r(χ),
mh˜) =

∫ v
r(χ)
G
(n−K)
1 (y, χ)dy for v ≥ r(χ)
0 for v < r(χ)
, (4.43)
with r(x) such that ψ˜(r(x), x) = 0, because G
(
1n−K) is the probability of winning
when n−K + 1 buyers are active.
Next, consider the penultimate sale at history h (with χ2 as upper bound of the
support of Fh) and suppose two sellers are active, each offers one good, ω =
(Fh, (1, 1)). The expected utility of a type-v buyer from disguising as another type
z in the penultimate auction is given by
G
(n−K+1)
1 (z, χ2)(v − βoliK−1(z, ω)) +∫ χ2
z
g
(n−K+1)
1 (x, χ2)uK(v, r(x),
mh˜(βoliK−1(x, ω)))dx (4.44)
where G
(n−K+1)
1 (z, χ2) is the probability of winning the penultimate good and
βoliK−1(z, ω) is the price to be paid when disguising as type z. Expression (4.43) is
the expected utility when a type-χ buyer snatched the penultimate good (χ > z).
Dropping some super- and subscripts for convenience, the FOC wrt z is given by
g(z)(v − β(z))− β′(z)G(z)− g(z)uK(v, r(z),mh˜(β(z))) = 0.
Imposing z = v, rearranging and then integrating yields
g(z)(z − uK(z, r(z),mh˜(β(z)))) = g(z)β(z) +G(z)β′(z)
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which can be rewritten as
βoliK−1(v, ω) = v +
1
G(v)
∫ v
v
g(z)
[
z − uK(z, r(z), h˜m(β(z)))
]
dz (4.45)
= v +
1
G(v)
∫ v
v
g(z) · βK,r(z)(z)dz
= E
[
β
K,r(Y
(n−K+1)
1 )
(Y
(n−K+1)
1 )
∣∣∣Y (n−K+1)1 < v]
= E
[
β
K,r(Y
(n−1)
K−1 )
(Y
(n−1)
K−1 )
∣∣∣Y (n−1)K−1 < v < Y (n−1)K−2 ] , (4.46)
where the second line follows from the fact that type z, as the highest type of the
support of Fmh˜(β(z)), wins the last auction with certainty and pays βK,r(z)(z).
The penultimate trade is the last trade that could possibly occur in an oligopolistic
market state. Thus, the next sale is monopolistic and χ, the type of the penul-
timate buyer, determines the reserve price of the final auction, r(χ). For earlier
sales, however, the probability mass function that assigns a probability with which
any of the following auctions is monopolistic depends on how the goods are dis-
tributed, which depends on the history.
Consider another history h′ and suppose there are three active sellers offering
the last good but two, the (K − 2)-th sale, i.e., ω′ = (Fh′ , (1, 1, 1)). Then, with
probability one, the corresponding continuation game is the duopoly analyzed
above. If type χ2 buys the (K − 2)-th good, type v either gets the (K − 1)-th
good, when all other types are lower, or he gets the K-th good when there exists
only one active type χ ≥ v and all other active types less than v, conditional on
v ≥ r(χ).
Consider another history h′′ and suppose there are two sellers offering the last good
but two, and suppose that seller 1 has one good and seller 2 has two goods. Because
I look for symmetric equilibria, it is irrelevant whether ω′′ = (Fh′′ , (1, 2)) or ω′′ =
(Fh′′ , (2, 1)). Then, the continuation game is either duopolistic or monopolistic.
Both continuation games are equally likely because both sellers sell with equal
probability,
EH [uK−1(v, rh, H)] =
1
2
umonK−1(v, r(χ2), h
mon) +
1
2
uoliK−1(v, 0, h),
where hmon generates monopoly and h generates duopoly (as analyzed above). If
type χ2 buys from seller 1, seller 2 becomes a monopolist and replicates a sequential
Dutch auction with a reserve price r(χ2). A type-v buyer gets to buy the good if
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and only if v is among the highest two valuations and v ≥ r(χ2). If type χ2 buys
from seller 2, type v gets the next good if and only if all other types are lower
or he gets to buy the last good when v has the highest valuation among the then
active buyers, conditional on v ≥ r(χ).
From (4.44), it follows that
Eh[uK−1(z, r(z),mh(β(z))] =
1
2
(z − βK−1(z, r(z))) + 1
2
(z − βoliK−1(z, ωh)),
because z is the highest type and, on equilibrium path, wins the good with cer-
tainty.
To find βoliK−2, I maximize the expected utility of a buyer of type v masking as a
type z when stopping along a price path for the (K − 2)-th good. The objective
looks just like (4.44) and the FOC corresponds to (4.45). It can be rearranged to
βoliK−2(v, ω
′′) = v +
1
G(v)
∫ v
v
g(z)
[
z − Eh[uK−1(z, r(z),mh˜(β(z)))]
]
dz(4.47)
= v +
1
G(v)
∫ v
v
g(z)
1
2
[
βK−1,r(z)(z) + βoliK−1(z, ω)
]
dz
=
1
2
E
[
β
K−1,r(Y (n−1)K−2 )
(Y
(n−1)
K−2 )
∣∣∣Y (n−1)K−2 < v < Y (n−1)K−3 ]
+
1
2
E
[
βoliK−1(Y
(n−1)
K−2 , ω)
∣∣∣Y (n−1)K−2 < v < Y (n−1)K−3 ]
=
1
2
E
[
β
K,r(Y
(n−1)
K−2 )
(Y
(n−1)
K−1 )
∣∣∣Y (n−1)K−2 < v < Y (n−1)K−3 ]
+
1
2
E
[
β
K,r(Y
(n−1)
K−1 )
(Y
(n−1)
K−1 )
∣∣∣Y (n−1)K−2 < v < Y (n−1)K−3 ] ,
where I plugged in (4.46).
Iteratively, I arrive at (4.30).
VII.D Details of Proof of Proposition 4.15
βK−1,v(χ) = v +
∫ χ
v
g
(n−K+1)
1 (v, χ)βK,v(v)dv
= v +
∫ χ
v
(n−K + 1)
(
F (v)
F (χ)
)n−K
f(v)
F (χ)
[
v −
∫ v
v
(
F (y)
F (v)
)n−K
dy
]
dv.
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Then change the order of integration in the second term and cancel F (v) once
∫ χ
0
∫ v
0
(n−K + 1)
(
F (v)
F (χ)
)n−K
f(v)
F (χ)
(
F (y)
F (v)
)n−K
dydv
=
∫ χ
0
∫ χ
y
(n−K + 1)
(
F (y)
F (χ)
)n−K
f(v)
F (χ)
dvdy
=
∫ χ
0
(n−K + 1)
(
F (y)
F (χ)
)n−K ∫ χ
y
f(v)
F (χ)
dvdy.
Then (after swapping v and y wlog) plug this term back into the original term to
yield
βK−1,v(χ) = v +
∫ χ
v
(n−K + 1)
(
F (v)
F (χ)
)n−K
f(v)
F (χ)
[
v − F (χ)− F (v)
f(v)
]
dv
= v +
∫ χ
v
(n−K + 1)
(
F (v)
F (χ)
)n−K
f(v)
F (χ)
[
v − F (χ)− F (v)
f(v)
]
dv
= E
[
ψ˜(Y
(n−K+1)
1 , χ)
∣∣∣Y (n−K+1)1 ≤ χ].
VII.E Details of Proof of Proposition 4.16
Dropping some subscripts, I can rewrite the second part of term (4.45) as
∫ χ
v
∫ z
r(z)
(n−K + 1) f(z)
F (χ)
(
F (y)
F (χ)
)(n−K)
dydz
=
∫ χ
v
∫ min{r−1(y),χ}
y
(n−K + 1) f(z)
F (χ)
(
F (y)
F (χ)
)(n−K)
dzdy
=
∫ r(χ)
v
(n−K + 1)
(
F (y)
F (χ)
)(n−K) ∫ r−1(y)
y
f(z)
F (χ)
dzdy
+
∫ χ
r(χ)
(n−K + 1))
(
F (y)
F (χ)
)(n−K) ∫ χ
y
f(z)
F (χ)
dzdy
=
∫ r(χ)
v
(n−K + 1)
(
F (y)
F (χ)
)(n−K)
F (r−1(y))− F (y)
F (χ)
dy
+
∫ χ
r(χ)
(n−K + 1)
(
F (y)
F (χ)
)(n−K)
F (χ)− F (y)
F (χ)
dy.
The integral of the first term of (4.45) can be split into
∫ r(χ)
0
... +
∫ χ
r(χ)
and the
integration variable can be renamed as y. Adding the two parts of (4.45) again
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yields
βoliK−1(χ, ωh) =
∫ χ
r(χ)
(n−K + 1) f(y)
F (χ)
(
F (y)
F (χ)
)(n−K)(
y − F (χ)− F (y)
f(y)
)
dy
+
∫ r(χ)
v
(n−K + 1)
(
F (y)
F (χ)
)(n−K)(
y
f(y)
F (χ)
− F (r
−1(y))− F (y)
F (χ)
)
dy
=
∫ χ
r(χ)
g
(n−K+1)
1 (y, χ) · ψ˜(y, χ)dy, (4.48)
because the additive term in the second line is zero as the inverse of r is given by
r−1(y) = F−1[yf(y) + F (y)]:
ψ˜(v, y) = v − F (y)− F (v)
f(v)
= 0 ⇐⇒ y = F−1[vf(v) + F (v)].
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